27th JCCT Concludes in DC: Many IPR-Related Outcomes

 

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The 27th Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade concluded in Washington, DC on Wednesday, November 23, 2016, in time for the Thanksgiving holidays in the United States.  Here is a link to the U.S. government fact sheet.  The following is my summery of IP-related issues –

Amongst the “core” IP issues the fact sheet notes that China agreed to “take further efforts to combat bad faith trademark filings.”  Regarding technology transfer, China advised that it is “actively conducting research on the Technology Import and Export Administration Regulations (2002) (TIER) to address U.S. concerns.”  Both of these statements are forward leaning although they admittedly lack specificity.  Regarding trade secrets protection, China agreed that “ in practice, trade secrets misappropriation may be committed by individuals, including employees, who may not be directly involved in the manufacture or sale of goods and services” , thus addressing the concern that the trade secret provisions of the anti-unfair competition law only address commercial undertakings (this issue was also addressed in the draft revisions of the AUCL that was released earlier this year).  China also announced that it plans to bolster other elements of its trade secrets regime, including with respect to  evidence preservation orders  and damage calculations.  Also on the technology side, China also confirmed that “the government has never asked the fund to require compulsory technology or IPR transfer as a condition for participation in [state semiconductor] Funds’ investment projects.”

Issues involving entertainment market access in China also got some attention.  Regarding music licensing, China committed to “issue a measure allowing foreign-invested enterprises to engage in online music distribution and revoking the requirement established by the Ministry of Culture’s 2009 Circular on Strengthening and Improving Online Music Content Examination.”  Regarding theatrical film distribution, which had been the subject of a settlement of a WTO case between the United States and China, China affirmed that it will “enter into consultations with the United States in calendar year 2017 in order to provide further meaningful compensation to the United States.”  Furthermore, the United States and China agreed that, as part of the calendar year 2017 consultations, they will seek to increase the number of revenue-sharing films to be imported each year and the share of gross box office receipts received by U.S. enterprises.

There are several outcomes which are cooperative in nature.  Regarding on-line IP issues, both sides committed to training of small and medium-sized enterprises as well as exploring the use of big data and other new information technologies to enhance the capability for combating infringement and counterfeiting online.  A program on copyright protection for live sports broadcasts is planned for 2017.  In addition, China committed to further study the feasibility of protecting the broadcasts of sporting events under its Copyright Law and the United States “welcomes further clarification” on this issue from the Chinese judiciary “at the earliest possible time.”    Other cooperative programs include ones on: “legal protections for product and service designs, and U.S. trade dress protections “; “criminal enforcement of trade secrets and counterfeit pharmaceuticals”; a joint conference in 2017 on criminal law, legislation and enforcement “to share experiences on recent trends in technologies, business models, and legal developments”; and a workshop on Judicial IPR Protection in China in 2017.

Often events happen on the margins on the JCCT which may not be fully reflected in JCCT outcomes.  There were two notable developments around the time of the JCCT affecting intellectual property rights.  One was the publication of the draft revisions of China’s patent examination guidelines, which address post filing data supplementation, software and business method patents.   Post-filing supplementation of data has been the subject of prior JCCT and bilateral commitments.  Another development involved de-linking of government procurement policies with indigenous innovation, which has been the subject of a recent State Council document that, according to the fact sheet, “requir[es] all local regions and all agencies to further clean up related measures involving linking the indigenous innovation policy to the provision of government procurement preferences….”

The JCCT has a long history, but has typically grown in scope and significance over the years as the US and Chinese economies have increasingly become interdependent.  This was the last JCCT of the Obama administration.  It will next be up to the Trump Administration to decide how to guide the JCCT to continue to play a useful role in bilateral trade relations.

The above are my personal, non-official observations.  All photos are by Mark A. Cohen.

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IPR Outcomes in the 26th JCCT

Here are the IP outcomes of the 26th Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, concluded early in November 2015 in Guangzhou.  The IP-related outcomes appear primarily in three different places in the JCCT outcome document, under “Competition”, “Intellectual Property Rights” and “Cooperative Dialogues and Exchanges.”

I have repeated below the outcome language in full, without the annotation that appears in the US Department of Commerce release on the subject, followed by my own “references” on the outcome to compare the text with recent developments in these areas.

The Chinese government version of the outcomes follows the US outcomes.

COMPETITION

China’s anti-monopoly enforcement agencies are to conduct enforcement according to the Anti-monopoly Law and are to be free from intervention by other agencies.

China clarifies that commercial secrets obtained in the process of Anti-monopoly Law enforcement are protected as required under the Anti-monopoly Law and shall not be disclosed to other agencies or third parties, except with a waiver of confidentiality by the submitting party or under circumstances as defined by law.

Taking into account the pro-competitive effects of intellectual property, China attaches great importance to maintaining coherence in the rules related to IPR in the context of the Anti-monopoly Law. China clarifies that any State Council Anti-monopoly Law Commission guidelines will apply to the three anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies.

The Chinese side clarifies that in the process of formulating guidance related to intellectual property rights in the context of anti-monopoly law, it will solicit comments from relevant parties, including the public, in accordance with law and policy.

References: SAIC’s IP Abuse rules, NDRC’s draft IP Abuse rules. Importantly, this outcome specifically recognizes the pro-competitive nature of promoting IP. As I said in my comments on the NDRC’s IP abuse guideline questionnaire, “Rather than seek to minimize IP rights through euphemisms such as “balance” perhaps a better approach would be how to optimize the patent system to foster long term innovation and competition and insure that the competition system supports and does not retard such development.”

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Standards and Intellectual Property

The United States and China affirm the beneficial role of standards in promoting innovation, efficiency, and public health and safety, and the need to strike an appropriate balance of interests of multiple stakeholders.

The United States and China commit that licensing commitments for patents in voluntary standards are made voluntarily and without government involvement in negotiations over such commitments, except as otherwise provided by legally binding measures.

The United States confirms that Chinese firms participate in the setting of voluntary consensus standards in the United States on a non-discriminatory basis, consistent with the rules and procedures of the relevant standards organizations. China welcomes U.S.-invested firms in China to participate in the development of national recommendatory and social organization standards in China on a non-discriminatory basis.

With a view to enhance mutual understanding and trust, the United States and China agree to hold dialogues over issues under this topic.

Here are some other blogs on this important topic.

Trade Secrets

The United States and China are committed to providing a strong trade secrets protection regime that promotes innovation and encourages fair competition.  China clarifies it is in the process of amending the Anti-Unfair Competition Law; intends to issue model or guiding court cases; and intends to clarify rules on preliminary injunctions, evidence preservation orders and damages. The United States confirms that draft legislation proposed to establish a federal civil cause of action for trade secrets misappropriation has been introduced in relevant committees. Both sides confirm that IP-related investigations, including on trade secrets, are conducted in a prudent and cautious manner.  The United States and China agree to jointly share experiences and practices in the areas of protecting trade secrets from disclosure during investigations and in court proceedings, and identify practices that companies may undertake to protect trade secrets from misappropriation in accordance with respective laws.

References: Note that the reference in the trade secret provision to a degree mirrors that of the Competition outcome, regarding protecting confidential information in administrative proceedings. Proposed revisions to the AUCL were previously discussed here.

Geographical Indications (GIs)

The United States and China will continue our dialogue on GIs. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of the 2014 JCCT commitment on GIs and confirmed that this commitment applies to all GIs, including those protected pursuant to international agreements. China will publish in draft form for public comment, and expects to do so by the end of 2016, procedures that provide the opportunity for a third party to cancel already-granted GIs.

Reference: This commitment builds on the 2014 GI commitment in the JCCT. An important case involving enforcement of a trademark based GI for scotch whisky is discussed here.

Sports Broadcasts

The United States and China agree to protect original recordings of the images, or sound and images, of live events, including sports broadcasts, against acts of unauthorized exploitation, including the unauthorized retransmission of such broadcasts over computer networks, in accordance with their respective laws and regulations.  The United States and China agree to discuss copyright protection for sports broadcasts and further cooperate on this issue in the JCCT IPR Working Group and other appropriate bilateral fora.

References: Copyright protection for sports broadcasting has been discussed elsewhere in this blog, and is of increasing important to China as it prepares to host the Winter Olympics and wants to develop its sports leagues. In addition US courts have granted copyright protection to Chinese sports broadcasts in a recent case. Tencent has also signed an important licensing deal with the NBA to make content available online.

Enhanced Enforcement Against Media Boxes and Unauthorized Content Providers

Noting the challenges posed by new technologies to the protection of copyright, China and the United States will continue discussions and share respective experiences and practices on combating the unauthorized online distribution of audiovisual content made possible by media boxes.  China clarifies it is to enhance enforcement against such media boxes and the providers of unauthorized content in accordance with its laws and regulations.

Reference: A recent US media box case involving Chinese content is discussed here.

Online Enforcement

In order to address the civil, administrative and criminal enforcement challenges caused by the rapid development of e-commerce, as part of the JCCT IPR Working Group, China and the United States will enhance engagement and exchanges between U.S. and Chinese government IPR policy and enforcement officials, IP right holders, business representatives and online sales-platform operators, among other relevant stakeholders.  This engagement will cover current and anticipated challenges in protecting and enforcing IPR online by sharing respective practices, discussing possible improvements in each country’s systems, facilitating information exchange and training between our two countries, and increasing cooperation on cross-border enforcement.  The goal of this effort is to enhance existing legal and cooperative regimes among businesses, rights holders and governments in civil, administrative and criminal online IPR enforcement.  Appropriate criminal matters will be referred, if necessary, to law enforcement agencies through the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) IP Criminal Enforcement Working Group or domestic law enforcement officials.

References: there have been numerous Chinese domestic efforts to deal with on-line infringement, including copyright-related campaigns, and an important role for Chinese Customs.

COOPERATIVE DIALOGUES AND EXCHANGES

Searchable Database for Intellectual Property (IP) Cases

The United States welcomes that the Supreme People’s Court has established a database for searching intellectual property-related court decisions.  In order to increase the understanding of each other’s legal systems, the United States and China agree to dialogue and to share experiences on their respective databases containing IP cases.

References: Whether or not China is developing “case law with Chinese characteristics,” understanding how Chinese courts handle cases can help guide sound business decisions.

Bad Faith Trademark Filings

Given the importance of addressing bad faith trademark filings, both sides agree to continue to prioritize the issue of bad faith trademark filings, and to strengthen communication and exchange on this issue through existing channels.

References: This is a continuation of earlier efforts.

Copyright Legislation

The United States and China are to continue exchanges on the development of their respective copyright laws.  China clarifies that its Copyright Law is in the process of amendment and useful principles and interpretative guidance from the Supreme People Court’s 2012 Judicial Interpretation on Internet Intermediary Liability will be considered in the law, if appropriate and feasible.

The final judicial interpretation is available here. Here is a blog on the 2014 State Council draft of the Copyright Law revision, and a blog on a 2012 NCA draft.

Exchange on Intellectual Property Rights Legislation

Recognizing the success and experience of recent exchanges on IP legislation through the JCCT IPR Working Group, programs under the Cooperation Framework Agreement and other fora, as well as the desire of the United States and China to further understand recent developments in this area, the United States and China agree to exchange views on their legislative developments in IP and innovation including on pending reforms in copyright law, patent law, trade secret law (anti-unfair competition law), science and technology achievement law, etc., with relevant legislative bodies.

References: This is a broad commitment, with much legislative activity planned in China in areas such as trade secrets, copyright, patents and related regulations.

Protection of New Plant Varieties

The United States and China agree to hold exchanges on the protection of new plant varieties through bilateral meetings and other means to be determined.

References: China and Switzerland agreed to extend plant variety protections in the Swiss-China FTA.

Here are the outcomes involving IP from the MofCOM website.  Source:

http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/l/201512/20151201200026.shtm

“特别301”报告 SPECIAL 301 REPORT

美方重申其承诺,将在“特别301报告”中客观、公正、善意地评价包括中国在内的外国政府,在知识产权保护和执法方面付出的努力。美方欢迎旨在加强中国知识产权保护的改革和行动,并承诺在2016年“特别301报告”中将强调中国政府在知识产权保护和执法方面采取的积极行动。

 恶名市场 NOTORIOUS MARKETS

美方重申其承诺,如果适当,将在“恶名市场”名单中客观、公正、善意地评估和认可外国实体,包括中国实体,在知识产权保护和执法方面付出的努力和取得的成绩。美方计划在2016年通过将利益相关方的异议期延长一倍,继续增加程序的透明度。美方将继续与中方就此事项进行讨论。

 

知识产权有效和平衡保护 EFFECTIVE AND BALANCED IP PROTECTION

考虑到《与贸易有关的知识产权协定》的原则和目标,美方和中方将继续就诸如有助于保护创新者免于恶意诉讼的相关政策进行交流和沟通,为创新行为提供积极环境。

 

知识产权合作 IP COOPERATION

中美双方确认知识产权保护在中美双边经贸关系中的关键作用。双方承认合作的益处,并认可合作构成了双方知识产权交流的基础,承诺进一步加强重要领域的深入合作,包括:

进一步加强中美商贸联委会知识产权工作组作为牵头协调知识产权问题双边论坛的作用。

继续高度重视中美知识产权合作框架协议的工作,包括2016年司法交流和将在中国举办的一项培训项目;在完成并对现有承诺项目进行审查后,在预算允许的前提下,考虑在框架协议下增加其他项目。

支持中国商务部在2016年第一季度举办的技术许可联合研讨会。

其他项目将根据个案原则进行组织。双方认识到中美双方,特别是美方,与一系列从事知识产权培训和技术交流的机构和私人组织合作,实施了广泛的项目策划工作。

 

加强在打击网络盗版方面的合作  STRENGTHENED COOPERATION IN DEALING WITH ONLINE PIRACY

为应对在美国涉嫌网络盗版刑事侵权案件影响中国权利人的情况,中美执法联合联络小组下设的知识产权刑事执法合作工作组在美国驻华使馆的联系人将负责接收中方行政部门转交的此类信息。

 

通过中美双边合作加强知识产权在企业中的利用和保护 USING BILATERAL COOPERATION TO STRENGTHEN IP UTILIZATION AND PROTECTION IN ENTERPRISES

认识到双边贸易与投资持续增长的情况,中美双方同意加强合作与交流,就各自国家知识产权保护和利用有关的经验数据进行研究,并在此领域采取具体行动或举办项目,以协助中美关于鼓励创新的决策,并帮助中美创新者、创造者和企业家更好地理解如何在各自国家创造、保护和利用知识产权。

 

深化和加强中美知识产权刑事执法合作 DEEPENING CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION IN IP

在中美执法联合联络小组下设的知识产权刑事执法合作工作组机制项下,中美将继续就跨国知识产权调查开展合作。双方将确定共同合作的重点案件,就此类案件保持定期沟通和信息分享,并探索在共同感兴趣的领域开展技术交流的机会。

 …

中美共同打击网络销售假药 JOINT SINO-US COMBATTING OF ONLINE COUNTERFEIT MEDICINE SALES

中美两国政府都非常重视打击网络销售假药以保障公共的用药安全和健康。两国食品药品监管机构之间已就打击网络销售假药开展合作,并承诺未来继续开展合作。这种合作包括分享信息、分享提高公众对网络销售药品认知的最佳实践以及加强在现有国际组织活动中的沟通与协调。

Updated: December 2 and 3,  2015, December 26, 2018.

JCCT 2014 Winds Up – Joint Fact Sheets Now Released

JCCT2014

The 2014 JCCT was hosted by the US government in Chicago, Illinois this year. Here is a link to the updated English  fact sheet (released Dec. 29) (Chinese:第25届中美商贸联委会联合成果清单)  that is now a joint fact sheet.    Here is a summary of the IP accomplishments of this year’s JCCT according to the joint fact sheet:

One significant outcome involved “technology localization” which is the practice whereby China grants tax preferences based on where IP is owned or R&D is undertaken.  Here is what the fact sheet says about the outcome in this area:

The United States and China commit to ensure that both countries treat intellectual property rights owned or developed in other countries the same as domestically owned or developed intellectual property rights.  ..Both China and the United States confirm that the government is entitled to take measures to encourage enterprises to engage in research and development and the creation and protection of intellectual property rights. 

In my personal estimation, the significance of this outcome is that China committed to not discriminating in awarding tax preferences based on where IP is owned.  To a degree this reflects footnote 3 of the TRIPS Agreement, which prohibits discrimination in “protection” of IP, which includes “matters affecting the use of intellectual property.”

Regarding service invention compensation, which has been important to readers of this blog, the JCCT commitment reflected the accomplishments of the 2014 Innovation Dialogue regarding freedom of contract:

The United States and China commit to protect the legal rights of inventors in respect of their inventions and creations, in accordance with their respective domestic laws and regulations, and in line with their domestic laws, commit to respect the legitimate rules and regulations developed by employers and legitimate contracts between employers and inventors concerning inventor remuneration and awards.

Another JCCT outcome involved protection of trade secrets in government regulatory proceedings:

The United States and China confirm that trade secrets submitted to the government in administrative or regulatory proceedings are to be protected from improper disclosure to the public and only disclosed to government officials in connection with their official duties in accordance with law…

The rather “hot” issue of geographical indications was also the subject of an “outcome” involving not extending GI’s to generic terms and establishing procedures to object to and cancel the registration of the GI.

There were also a number of cooperative commitments which will likely be a focus of various bilateral discussions and programs, including on technology licensing, bad faith trademark registrations, judicial best practices, data supplementation for pharmaceutical patents, IP in standards setting, sale of IP-intensive goods and services, and addressing on-line infringement.

The revised joint fact sheet also includes a joint commitment on abusive litigation:

Patent Protection and Bad Faith Litigations

  • The U.S. and China remain committed to promoting a robust intellectual property system that will incentivize future innovation and economic growth in both countries. Both parties are to strengthen cooperation to protect innovators from bad faith litigations, including to hold a joint seminar on IP licensing, so as to create positive conditions for innovation.

 

 

There were also outcomes that weren’t focused on IP but have significant IP implications.  One involved medical device and pharmaceutical market access, where China committed to accelerate approval procedures, which has long been hampered by inadequate resources at China’s Food and Drug Administration.  Another involved clarifying standards for antimonopoly law enforcement, including providing for greater due process and law firm access.  Still another commitment involved collaboration on law firm market access, which certainly affects foreign IP lawyers practicing in China.

In my personal experience, this 25th JCCT might equally be labeled JCCT v. 3.0.  The JCCT has changed to accommodate the growing complexity and importance of US-China trade.  In its first version (1983 to approximately 2001), the JCCT was as often a rather sleepy technical exchange mechanism.  I remember attending an early JCCT dealing with the enforcement of arbitration awards.  Another iteration (v 2.0) was under the leadership of Vice Premier Wu Yi after China’s WTO accession.  The JCCT then became a mechanism for negotiating trade issues with the Vice Premier chairing on the Chinese side and the Secretary of Commerce and US Trade Representative as formal co-chairs, but with an important added role for the Secretary of Agriculture.  Version 3.0 includes the same leadership structure, but with more involvement by industry and the host locality through various programs and symposia, joint fact sheets, and commitments to move negotiations changes in the negotiating calendar, including “a year of continuous work to address important issues facing our two nations.”

The above are my personal, non-official observations.

Positive Developments on IP in JCCT Outcomes

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The 24th bilateral Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade concluded on December 20, 2013 at Diaoyutai State Guest House.  The US “Fact Sheet” on this year’s JCCT is attached here

The JCCT was jointly chaired by the US Department of Commerce, the US Trade Representative and the US Department of Agriculture at the ministerial (Secretary) level on the US side, and by Vice Premier Wang Yang on the Chinese side.  It is a key bilateral mechanism for raising trade-related bilateral intellectual property concerns.

This year there were several outcomes that were IP-related.  These outcomes included: a commitment by China to include trade secrets protection as a priority item in the interagency IPR leading group for 2014, as well as a commitment to work on trade secret legislative reform matters in China.  A prior commitment by China to insure that patent applicants in pharmaceutical patents can supplement their data was expanded to specify that this commitment applied to examination, re-examination and SIPO’s representation before the courts, as well as to work together to resolve specific cases. 

China also committed to work with the US on civil IPR enforcement matters, to continue to work on trademark squatting issues, cooperate on enforcement efforts to realize increases in sales of legitimate, non-infringing goods and services, and to undertake enforcement efforts involving substandard and infringing semiconductors.  

There was a also a recognition of SIPO’s efforts to date to provide design patent protection for graphical user interfaces, and a signing ceremony for a bilateral MOU with the U.S. Trade And Development Agency to provide IPR-related technical assistance with MofCOM as a coordinating agency (that is the picture above).  The various signings are attached here.   A Chinese summary of the outcomes from the concluding ceremony also includes improved bilateral criminal justice enforcement cooperation on IP matters.

The JCCT is sometimes used to break new ground (such as on trade secrets, or SIPO’s representations before the courts on pharma patents).  It is also used to reinforce existing commitments (such as on GUI’s and sales of legitimate goods), and to expand areas of technical assistance and cooperation (such as in civil enforcement of IP and the signing of the TDA MOU).

I personally believe the outcome statement shows a good balance among the role of administrative enforcement agencies, resolution of technical IP issues, and the importance that the civil and criminal systems should play in the development of a mature IP system.

 

Photographs above and below by Mark Cohen.

Diaoyutai scenery

Diaoyutai Scenery 

The Phase 1 IP Agreement: Its Fans and Discontents

How much will the IP Sections of the Phase 1 Agreement (the “Agreement”) with China change  IP strategies in China?   For the most part, the Agreement adds much less than its appearance might suggest.  Many of the important changes that the Agreement memorializes have recently been codified into law or set into motion for forthcoming codification.  There are some important prospective changes in the text, particularly regarding pharmaceutical patent protections and in civil and criminal enforcement.  If these changes are well-implemented, that could augur significant changes in the future.  Nonetheless, a cautious approach should be taken to these changes as well, as many of them have a long history of disappointing US rightsholders.  An additional problem with the Agreement is its reliance on administrative mechanisms that have a track record of not providing sustained protection for IP rights.

The IP-related sections are found in Chapter 1 of the Agreement (“Intellectual Property”) and Chapter 2 (“Technology Transfer”).  Chapter 1 is divided into the following sections: General Obligations, Trade Secrets and Confidential Information, Pharmaceutical-Related Intellectual Property, Patents, Piracy and Counterfeiting on E-Commerce Platforms, Geographical Indications, Manufacture and Export of Pirated and Counterfeit Goods, Bad-Faith Trademarks, Judicial Enforcement and Procedure in Intellectual Property Cases, and Bilateral Cooperation on Intellectual Property Protection. Chapter 2 concerns Technology Transfer and is not divided into separate sections.

There are many concerning textual aspects of the Agreement.  For example, it is unclear why “Technology Transfer” was not considered an IP issue in the Agreement.  Additional ambiguities are supplied by inconsistent use of legal language as well as differences in the English and Chinese texts, both of which are understood to be equally valid (Art. 8.6).  A careful reading shows that in many cases the Agreement does not afford any new progress on particular issues, but merely serves as a placeholder on issues that have long been under active discussion (e.g., on post-filing supplementation of pharmaceutical data in patent applications).  There are also several provisions that appear to break new ground, such as in consularization of court documents by foreigners and enforcement of civil judgments.

Reactions from the dozens of people I spoke with about the Agreement in the US and China have been mixed.   One prominent Chinese attorney thought that Chinese IP enforcement officials were now much more likely to be responsive to US requests in forthcoming enforcement proceedings.  Several individuals thought that the Agreement would be a great stimulus to IP agencies and the courts in their enforcement efforts as well as in drafting new laws, regulations and judicial interpretations.  Many academics were perplexed by the unclear language in the Agreement.  Some experts shared my view that the Agreement places an undue emphasis on the wrong issues, such as punitive damages, administrative campaigns, and criminal punishment at the expense of compensatory civil compensation.  Due to the numerous errors and inconsistencies in the Agreement, many people speculated that the negotiators on the US side and/or the Chinese side may not have been adequately consulting with experts, bringing to mind the Chinese expression of “building a chariot while the door is closed (without consulting others)” (闭门造车).  The administrative and Customs enforcement provisions were dismissed by many as out of date or just for show.  On the other hand, it did appear that the Chinese negotiators did rely upon their interagency experts.  Susan Finder, the author of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) Monitor, told me that the SPC (and likely the Supreme People’s Procuratorate [SPP]) provided input to the Chinese negotiating team.

Review of the Individual Sections and Articles

The trade secret provisions generally memorialize amendments already made to China’s Anti-Unfair Competition Law, including an expanded scope of definition of “operator” (Art. 1.3), acts that constitute trade secret infringement (Art. 1.4), as well as a shifting of burden of proof in civil proceedings where there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a trade secret infringement has occurred (Art. 1.5).  Interestingly, the United States asserts in this section that it provides treatment equivalent to such shifting of a burden of proof.  I am unaware of any nationwide burden-shifting in US civil trade secret proceedings, except – as a stretch – insofar as US discovery proceedings provide an opportunity to compel production of evidence from an adverse party.  This view was also shared by others I had spoken to.

The trade secret provisions also require China to provide for preliminary injunctions in trade secret cases where there is an “urgent situation”.   The use of preliminary injunctions to address early-stage trade secret theft has long been under discussion between the US and China.  This is an awkward hybrid of Chinese and English legal standards.   Generally the test in Chinese law for “action preservation”  as in US law for “preliminary injunctions” is whether there is irreparable injury arising from such urgent situation which necessitates provisional relief (See Sec. 101 of Civil Procedure Law)  An “urgent” situation which is not likely to cause irreparable injury does not require granting of a preliminary injunction.   China’s judicial practice currently permits the use of preliminary injunctions where there is a risk of disclosure of confidential information (关于审查知识产权纠纷行为保全案件适用法律若干问题的规定, Art. 6.1).  It appears likely that the current test for preliminary injunctions are unaffected by this provision, and the provision just memorializes current Chinese law –  notwithstanding that is unclear about the standards and scope of action preservation procedures in China

The Agreement also uses inconsistent nomenclature to describe preliminary injunctions.  As noted, the Chinese text does not refer to preliminary injunctions but refers to an overlapping concept of “action preservation.” Other provisions of the English language text of the Agreement discuss “preliminary injunctions or equivalent effective provisional measures” (Art. 1-11).

Historically, Chinese judges have been highly reluctant to issue preliminary injunctions.  As Susan Finder has noted in an email to me, the language in the Agreement also does not address the underlying structural problem that judges may be reluctant to give injunctions because they are concerned they will be found to have incorrectly issued them, and hence held accountable under the judicial responsibility system.  The Agreement also does not account for the fact that provisional measures serve a different function in the Chinese system compared to the United States.  China concludes its court cases far more quickly than the United States, thereby providing more immediate relief, often without needing recourse to provisional measures if there is not an urgent need.

The Agreement also requires China to change its trade secret thresholds for “initiating criminal enforcement.” (Art. 1.7).   The Agreement does not specify what measures are to be reformed, such as the Criminal Law or Judicial Interpretations,  or standards for initiating criminal investigations by public security organs and/or the procuracy and State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) administrative enforcement agencies (See, e.g., 关于公安机关管辖的刑事案件立案追诉标准的规定(二)).  The issue of what constitutes “great loss” for calculating criminal thresholds has itself been the subject of discussion and changing standards over the years.

As mentioned in Susan Finder’s November 26, 2019, blogpost, a judicial interpretation on trade secrets is on the SPC’s judicial interpretation agenda for 2020, scheduled for issuance in the first half of the year.  Additional guidance may be expected from the procuratorate, SAMR, and Ministry of Public Security to address criminal enforcement issues.

Consistent with the Foreign Investment Law, the Agreement also prohibits government authorities from disclosing confidential business information (Art. 1.9).

The Pharmaceutical-Related Intellectual Property section of the Agreement requires China to adopt a patent linkage system, much as was originally contemplated in the CFDA Bulletin 55, but subsequently did not appear in the proposed patent law revisions of late 2018. Linkage will be granted to an innovator on the basis that a  (a) company has a confidential regulatory data package on file with China’s regulatory authorities,  and (b) where a third party, such as a generic pharmaceutical company, seeks to rely upon safety and efficacy information of the innovator.  The drafters seem to be describing a situation similar to an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) in the United States under the US Hatch-Waxman regime.  According to US procedures, a generic company needs to demonstrate, inter alia, bioequivalent safety and efficacy to an innovator’s pharmaceutical product in order to obtain regulatory approval.  Notice is thereafter provided to the patent holder or its licensee of the application for regulatory approval to address the possibility that the generic company may be infringing the innovator’s patent(s).

This linkage regime, if properly implemented, with be an important step for Chian’s struggling innovative pharmaceutical sector.  China’s proposed linkage regime also extends to biologics (Art 1.11).  Taiwan has also recently introduced a linkage regime.

In order to implement the linkage regime, the Agreement requires an administrative or judicial process for an innovator to challenge a generic company’s market entry based on the generic company’s infringement of a patent held by the innovator  As drafted, the Agreement omits a requirement to amend China’s patent law or civil procedure law to permit a court to act when there is an “artificial infringement” by reason of approval of an infringing product for regulatory approval, notwithstanding the lack of any infringing manufacturing, use or sale of the product prior to its introduction into commerce in China. The lack of a concept of “artificial infringement” could make it especially difficult to implement a civil linkage regime in China.  The US Chamber of Commerce and the Beijing Intellectual Property Institute (BIPI) had previously recommended revising Article 11 of China’s patent law to address this issue.  BIPI had noted in its report that “Lacking of artificial infringement provisions results in lacking [sic] of legal grounds for the brand drug company to safeguard their legal rights.” This provision likely reflects continuing turf battles between the courts and China’s administrative IP agencies in enforcing IP rights.  Implementation of a linkage regime by China’s National Medical Products Administration (NMPA) may be possible in the alternative, as a matter of its regulation of pharmaceutical products, however, there may be concerns that NMPA lacks the necessary expertise and independence to properly adjudicate pharmaceutical patent disputes.

The Agreement also does not reference regulatory data protection, which was one of China’s WTO obligations, nor does it reference China’s efforts to adopt an ‘orange book’ similar to the US FDA’s to govern patent disclosures and regulatory data protection as recommended by CFDA Bulletin 55.  This section also reiterates in general terms a commitment by China to provide for post-filing supplementation of data in pharmaceutical patent matters, which has been a long-standing request of the US reflected in several JCCT commitments.  Permitting post-filing supplementation is necessary to support a linkage regime.  In the absence of any meaningful patent grants, China’s patent linkage commitments would be a hollow outcome.

The  Patent section continues the focus on pharmaceutical IP by providing for patent term extension due to regulatory delays for pharmaceutical patents, including patented methods of making and using pharmaceutical products (Art. 1.12).  The draft patent law already provides for patent term extension.  The additional encouragement is welcome.

There are no provisions in this Agreement addressing non-pharmaceutical patent concerns.   Companies that may have concerns about such issues as:  standards-essential patent prosecution or litigation, low-quality patents, patent trolls, procedures involving civil or administrative litigation involving patents or Customs enforcement of patents, China’s increasing interest in litigating global patent disputes for standards-essential patents, the relationship between industrial policy and patent grants, expanding the scope of design patent protection, China’s amending its plant variety protection regime and acceding to the most recent treaty obligations, etc.,  will find that their issues are not addressed.

Section E on “Piracy and Counterfeiting on E-Commerce Platforms” addresses “enforcement against e-commerce platforms”.  By its terms, it does not specifically discuss e-tailers, online service providers or other third parties.

The text (Art. 1.13) seeks to clarify and update the E-Commerce Law by “eliminat[ing] liability for erroneous takedown notices submitted [presumably by rightsholders] in good faith,”  extending mandating a time period of 20 days for rightsholders to file an administrative or judicial response to a counter-notification, and penalizing counter-notifications taken in bad faith.  Joe Simone (SIPS) has told me this Article’s 20 day period may require an amendment to the E-Commerce law, which currently requires a 10 day period.

Article 1.14 specifically addresses infringement on “major” e-commerce platforms. As part of this commitment, China also agreed to revoke the operating licenses of e-commerce platforms that repeatedly fail to curb the sale of counterfeit and pirated goods.  It is unclear from this text if this provision is limited to “major” platforms as the title suggests (in both English and Chinese), or to platforms of any size as the Article itself states.  In addition, it is unclear what kind of “operating license” is involved auch as a general business license or a license to operate an internet business.  Whatever license is involved, this remedy has theoretically been available for some time for companies that sell infringing goods.  As I recall, past efforts to use license revocations to address IP infringement had little success.  Smaller enterprises might be able to circumvent the license revocation, perhaps by transferring businesses to another platform  In the past, companies also evaded enforcement obligations by establishing a new business incorporated or operated under their name or that of a relative or friend.  This provision, similar to other IP provisions of the Agreement, rehashes earlier JCCT commitments with apparent disregard to lessons previously learned or developments in Chinese law and its economy.

Article 1.14  notes, unlike other Articles which note that the United States has equivalent procedures, tellingly states that the United States “is studying additional means to combat the sale of counterfeit or pirated goods.”  According to news reports, the USTR has threatened to place Amazon on the  list of “notorious markets.” Since the publication of the Agreement, Peter Navarro at the White House has also threatened to crack down on US platforms due to the increased pressure of the trade deal to “combat the prevalence of counterfeit or pirated goods on e-commerce platforms.”

The Geographical Indications (GI) Section (F) continues long-standing US engagement with China with respect to its GI system.   The Agreement requires that multi-component terms that contain a generic term will not be protected as a GI, consistent with prior bilateral commitments.  China will also share proposed lists of GI’s it exchanges with other trading partners with the US to help ensure that generic terms are not protected as GI’s.  The competing GI systems of the United States and China have been the subject of decades of diplomacy.  This Section arguably is intended primarily to show political support for American companies that manufacture or distribute generic food and other products that compete with GI-intensive products such as wine and cheese.  It is also likely intended to support US advocacy around these issues at the WTO, WIPO and bilaterally.

Section G requires China to act against counterfeit pharmaceuticals and related products, including active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) and bulk chemicals (Art. 1.18).  It is unclear if these APIs need to be counterfeited to be seized, or if they should be liable for seizure because they are low quality or contribute to the manufacturing of counterfeit goods.  The issue of API’s and bulk chemicals contributing to the production of counterfeit medicine has long been a discussion point between the US and China and had been the subject of JCCT outcomes.  Providing API’s to counterfeiters is already a crime and civil violation.  It can also give rise to administrative liability, although administrative agencies have often not prioritized contributory liability.  Thanks to Joe Simone again, for providing me with the benefit of his experiences in this area.

China is also required to act against “Counterfeit Goods with Health and Safety Risks” (Art. 1.19).  The text does not explicitly address unsafe products that do not bear a counterfeit trademark or the enforcement agencies that will implement this commitment.  Generally, the burden of enforcing against counterfeit products belongs to trademark enforcers, rather than enforcement officials involved in product quality or consumer protection violations.  However, the NMPA and/or the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology are specifically named as enforcement agencies in a related provision to this one (Art. 1.18).

This section also seeks to address “Manufacture and Export” of these goods, including “block[ing]” their distribution (chapeau language).  It does not elaborate on how such cross-border steps will be undertaken – such as by Customs agents, law enforcement authorities, cooperation between food and drug regulatory agencies, or through bilateral or multilateral law enforcement cooperation.

The failure to clearly designate a responsible agency in these administrative and law enforcement commitments can lead to problems with enforcing IP rights.  The academic literature, including that of Prof. Martin Dimitrov,  has suggested that when multiple agencies have unclear and overlapping IP enforcement authority, they may be more inclined to shirk responsibility.  I hope that coordination mechanisms for these and other outcomes have been well-negotiated to address this issue.

Article 1.20 addresses the destruction of counterfeit goods by Customs, in civil judicial proceedings and in criminal proceedings.  Article 1-20(1) requires Customs to not permit the exportation of counterfeit or pirated goods  Due to the growth of e-commerce and B2C exports from China via online platforms, container-sized seizures have become rarer, and the practical consequences of this provision may be limited.  Moreover, rightsholders have not often complained of Customs’ destruction procedures.  A WTO case brought by the United States involving Chinese customs destruction procedures also failed to identify losses to the United States by reason of China’s not disposing of seized goods outside of the channels of commerce consistent with its WTO obligations to seize goods on import  (DS362) (see 0% auctioned on imports, below).  At that time, when containerized shipment seizure was more common, only 3.7% of imported and exported goods were auctioned by value and 1.9% by shipments.   7.351ds362

My former colleague, Tim Trainer,  has identified what is new in the Agreement in Customs as seizures in transit.

The Article does not define what is a “counterfeit” good, or whether manufacturing a product for export may constitute an infringement of the rights of a third party that holds the right in China, which is the so-called OEM problem.  In a typical OEM scenario, the importer in a foreign country owns the relevant rights in the importing country, but not in China.

Article 1.20(2)(d) requires the courts to order that a rightsholder be compensated for injury from infringement in civil judicial procedures, presumably when goods are seized.  It is unclear to me why the Agreement does not address the critical issue of affording adequate civil damages generally, why it is limited to the Customs context, and why the Agreement does not generally address the overuse of low statutory damages in IP-related civil disputes generally.

The Agreement requires that materials and implements which are “predominantly” used in the creation of counterfeit and pirated goods shall be forfeited and destroyed.  This “predominant use” test is derived from the TRIPS agreement. It regrettably provides a basis for goods that are demonstrated to have a less than dominant use (e.g.,  49.9 percent) to avoid forfeiture and destruction.   A better test might have been to encourage China to use a “substantial use” test, or a test based simply on use in commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy.  IP owners may wish to consider using judicial asset preservation measures by the courts in order to address issues involving the seizure of goods that are also used for legitimate manufacturing purposes.

Destruction of counterfeit goods by Market Supervision Bureaus in administrative trademark enforcement proceedings is not discussed in this Agreement and has been an area of concern by rightsholders in the past.  This omission is concerning as China’s administrative enforcement of trademarks has historically been a highly active area of IP enforcement on behalf of foreign rightsholders.

Section H addresses the bad-faith registration of trademarks.  No specific action is required by China in the text.  I have previously discussed the importance of expanding concepts of “good faith” in IP protection in China with hopes that it would be addressed in resolving the trade war and had specifically noted two issues addressed in the Agreement: bad-faith registration of trademarks, and ensuring that employees were covered objects of China’s trade secret law.  Certain steps have already been undertaken by relevant agencies to address the important issue of bad faith trademark registrations, including:  supporting oppositions/invalidation against marks filed in bad faith and with no intention to use (Article 4 of the Trademark Law);  addressing the problem of trademark agencies that knowingly facilitate those bad faith trademark filings under Article 4, and imposing administrative fines against bad faith trademark applicants for a purpose other than use or judicial punishments against pirates that bring trademark infringement lawsuits against brand owners victimized by bad-faith registrations.

Given the lack of identified concrete next steps in this important area, China may not be planning to do little more legislation in this area in the near future, and/or waiting to better evaluate the impact of recently implemented measures and policies, including provisions allowing fines to be imposed against trademark pirates. Joe Simone has suggested that one helpful measure to consider in the future might be for courts to award compensation for legal and investigation fees in bad faith cases, ideally by the same courts handling invalidation and opposition appeals.

Section I requires the transfer of cases from administrative authorities to “criminal authorities” when there is a “reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts” that a criminal violation has occurred.  “Criminal authorities” are not defined.  This could include the Ministry of Public Security and/or the Procuracy. The intent behind this provision is likely to ensure more deterrent penalties for IP violations and avoid the use of administrative penalties as a safe harbor to insulate against criminal enforcement.  This problem of low administrative referrals is an old and thorny one.  In bilateral discussions of the last decade, we would often inquire about the “administrative referral rate” of China, which is the percentage of administrative IP cases that were referred to criminal prosecution, which has historically been quite low. See National Trade Estimates Report (2009) at pp. 101-102.  However, if administrative agencies are required to transfer cases to the Public Security Bureau or Procuratorate, it will have little impact unless these agencies accept the case and initiate prosecutions.  A loophole in this text may be that it does not mandate that a case is accepted after it has been referred by administrative agencies, thereby risking non-action by prosecutors.  As administrative agencies have more limited investigative powers, the evidence provided by administrative authorities may also often be insufficient to initiate a criminal investigation.

Article 1.27 requires China to establish civil remedies and criminal penalties to “deter” future intellectual property theft or infringements.  These requirements are also found in the TRIPS Agreement.  The English language text of the Agreement conflates the role of civil remedies and criminal penalties and their deterrent impact.   Civil remedies should, at a minimum, deter or stop (制止,阻止) the defendant from repeating the infringing act, whereas criminal remedies might also provide broader social deterrence (威慑 as in nuclear “deterrence”, which is found in the Chinese version of the Agreement).  This paragraph and the Agreement more generally do not underscore the important role of compensatory civil damages in providing deterrence.

The Agreement also requires China to impose penalties at or near the maximum when a range of penalties is provided and to increase penalties over time.

These provisions regarding criminal enforcement generally reflect concerns articulated in the unsuccessful WTO IP case the US brought against China to lower its trademark and copyright criminal thresholds  (DS362).  However, the lost lesson from that case is that criminal thresholds are not as important as other factors in creating deterrence. Prosecutors may still decline in fact to prosecute cases, even if they are required by law to accept cases.  Law enforcement may also lack adequate resources. Judges may also have discretion in imposing sentences.  The calculation of the thresholds themselves, whether based on illegal income or harm caused, may be difficult to assess.  The civil system also needs to play a robust role in creating respect for IP.  The proof of the limited impact of lowering criminal thresholds is that criminal IP cases significantly increased in China after it lost the WTO case.  After the United States “lost” that WTO case, the number of criminal IPR cases rapidly increased to a high of approximately 13,000 in 2013.  Whether the Chinese data  of 2013 was calculated to include only IPR-specific crimes or crimes that may encompass IPR-infringing products (such as involving substandard products), this was a dramatic increase from approximately 2,684 criminal IP cases or 907 IPR infringement crimes from 2007.  The bottom line is that simply increasing criminal cases through lower thresholds may not be enough to create a healthy IP environment.

Another issue of concern is that foreigners have often been named as defendants in serious civil or criminal cases. The first significant criminal copyright case in China involved American defendants distributing counterfeit DVD’s.  More recently, patent preliminary injunction cases were granted in favor of two different Chinese entities in two cases against American defendants (Micron and Veeco). The largest patent damages case involved the first instance decision in Chint v. Schneider Electric (330 million RMB).  The NDRC investigation of Qualcomm similarly pioneered high antitrust damages in an IP licensing matter.  In many instances,  the final decisions in pioneering cases where foreigners lost were also never published.  Given this track record, we might not want to be advocating for harsher enforcement in the absence of greater commitments to due process and transparency.

The Agreement also pioneers by providing for expeditious enforcement of judgments (Article 1.28).  According to Susan Finder, the SPC already lists judgment debtors in its database.  This is a welcome area of engagement and should also be supported by continuing transparency in this area.

Over the past several years, there has been an increasing incidence of multijurisdictional IP disputes, particularly in technology sectors.  The Agreement does not address the problems arising from these cases.  It does not mention that China does not enforce US judgments, although the US has begun enforcing some Chinese money judgments, nor does it address the practice of many Chinese courts to fast track their decision making to undercut US cases.  Generally, US lawyers cannot conduct discovery in China and formal international procedures to collect evidence are slow.  Both Chinese and US courts often rarely apply foreign law, even when such law may be more appropriate to resolution of a dispute.  Based on a recent program I attended at Renmin University, it also appears likely that Chinese courts will issue their own anti-suit injunctions soon.  The Agreement also does not require anything further in terms of judicial assistance in gathering evidence.  These are areas for potential cooperation as well as confrontation.  Indeed Berkeley and Tsinghua have held a continuing series of conferences on this topic.  At the recent Renmin University conference, British, German, US and Chinese judges exchanged their views on these topics in a cordial and productive manner.  It is my hope that this topic is an area of collaboration, not confrontation.

Regarding copyright, Article 1.29 provides for a presumption of ownership in copyright cases and requires the accused infringer to demonstrate that its use of a work protected by copyright is authorized.  It would also have been helpful if the US and China had discussed the problem of title by title lawsuits in China, which has also increased costs of litigation through requiring multiple non-consolidated lawsuits for one collection of songs, photos or other works.  One Chinese academic confided in me that the current practice of requiring that each individual title be the subject of an individual lawsuit was not the original practice in China’s courts and that the old practice was more efficient for both the courts and rightsholders.

The Chinese and English texts of the Agreement also differ to the extent that the English text refers to the US system of related rights, while the Chinese next refers to the Chinese (and European system) of neighboring rights.

In terms of civil procedure, Article 1.30 permits the parties to introduce evidence through stipulation or witness testimony under penalty of perjury, as well as requiring streamlined notarization procedures for other evidence.  China’s ability to implement “penalty of perjury” submissions is limited by China generally lacking a concept of authenticating a document under penalty of perjury, which also hampers lawyer’s ability to represent clients by powers of attorney.  The implementation and impact of this provision is unclear.

Article 1.31 permits expert witness testimony.  Expert witnesses are already permitted under existing Chinese law, although the trend appears to favor greater use of them.  Moreover, Chinese courts have been expanding the role of expert technology assessors to provide support for technologically complex cases.  Once again the implementation and impact of this provision is uncertain, although we can expect further developments from the courts in this area, particularly in anticipated guidance concerning evidence in IP cases.

Article 1.35 requires that China adopt an action plan to implement the IP chapter of the Agreement.  In an additional welcome development, the Agreement also supports reinstatement of cooperative relationships with the USPTO, the USDOJ and US Customs.

Chapter 2 addresses US allegations regarding forced technology transfer.  It prohibits China from seeking technology transfer overseas consistent with its industrial plans subject to the qualifier that such plans  “create distortion.”  Distortion is not defined.

Other provisions prohibit require technology transfer as a condition of market access, using administration or licensing requirements to compel technology transfer and maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive technical information.   These are consistent with the recently enacted Foreign Investment Law and other legislation.

The Technology Transfer provisions do not address whether the provisions that were removed from the TIER  are now governed by China’s Contract Law and proposed Civil Code provisions on technology transfer contracts.  Clarity on this important issue could help support the autonomy of parties to freely negotiate ownership of improvements and indemnities.  The Agreement also does not address the regulation of licensing agreements by antitrust authorities or under China’s contract law or proposed civil code for the “monopolization” of technology.  The Civil Code provisions are now pending before the NPC and could have appropriately been raised as “low hanging fruit” in this Agreement.  Antitrust concerns in IP had also been raised by several parties in the 301 report concerning IP concerns (at pp. 180-181).  Hopefully, these issues will be decided in the Phase 2 Agreement.

Some additional hope for IP commercialization is afforded by the commitments by China in the Agreement to increase its purchases of services by $37.9 billion from the United States during the next two years, which include purchases of IP rights as well as business travel and tourism, financial services and insurance, other services and cloud and related services.  Considering the central role played by forced technology transfer in this trade war, it was to be hoped that a specific commitment on purchases of IP rights might have been secured.

Concluding Observations

It is often difficult to discern the problems that the Agreement purports to address and/or the appropriateness of the proposed solution(s).    In some instances, it also appears that USTR dusted off old requests to address long-standing concerns that may also not have high value due to technological and economic changes.   For example, it is unclear to me if commitments in the Agreement regarding end-user piracy (Art. 1.23) by the government are as necessary today when software is often delivered as an online cloud-based service and not as a commodity.  The leading software trade association’s position in the 301 investigation did not mention end-user piracy as a top-four priority (p. 4). Moreover, China had already been conducting software audits for several years and piracy rates had been declining.  The commercial value of these commitments is also uncertain under China’s recent “3-5-2 Directive”, where the Chinese government is obligated to replaced foreign software and IT products completely with domestic products within the next three years.  The Agreement already contains commitments for China to increase its share of cloud-based services.  The issue does have a long and sad history. The U.S. Government Accountability Office had calculated 22 different commitments on software piracy in bilateral JCCT and economic dialogues between 2004 and February 2014.

Among the more anachronous provisions of the Agreement are the five separate special administrative IP campaigns that the Agreement mandates.  The general consensus from a range of disciplines and enforcement areas (e.g., IP, counterfeit tobacco products, pollution, and taxation) that campaigns result in “short term improvements, but no lasting change.”  Moreover, the focus of these campaigns, including Customs enforcement and physical markets appears outdated due to the growth of e-commerce platforms.

The situation was predictable: “late-term administrations may … be tempted to condone campaign-style IP enforcement, which can generate impressive enforcement statistics but have limited deterrence or long-term sustainability.” The Administration took this one step further, with enforcement campaign reports timed to be released during the various stages of the Presidential campaign.   Here are some of the administrative campaign reports we can expect, with some corresponding milestones in the Presidential campaign season:

March 15: China is required to publish an Action Plan to strengthen IP protection and to report on measures taken to implement the Agreement and dates that new measures will go into effect. (Art. 1.35)

May 15: China is required to substantially increase its border and physical market enforcement actions and report on activities by Customs authorities within three months (or by April 15, 2020) (Art. 1.21).

May 15: China is required to report on enforcement activities against counterfeit goods that pose health or safety risks within four months and quarterly thereafter (Art. 1.19).

June 15: China is required to report on enforcement at physical markets within four months and quarterly thereafter (Art. 1.22).  This report will coincidentally be released at the same time as the Democratic Party Convention.

August 15: China is required to report on counterfeit medicine enforcement activity in six months and annually thereafter (Art.. 1.18).  This report will coincidentally be released approximately one week before the Republican Convention.

September 15: China is required to report on third party independent audits on the use of licensed software within seven months, and annually thereafter (Art. 1.23).

Also, a quarterly report is required regarding the enforcement of IP judgments (Art. 1.28).

There is no explanation provided in the Agreement for the timing of each of these reports, their sequential staging or why the usual date for release of government IP reports (April 26) is not being used.

There are many other important IP areas not addressed in the Agreement.  The Agreement offered a missed opportunity to support judicial reform, including China’s new national appellate IP court, the new internet courts as well as local specialized IP courts at the intermediate level.  The Agreement also entails no obligations to publish more trade secret cases, to make court dockets more available to the public, and to generally improve transparency in administrative or court cases, which might have made the Agreement more self-enforcing.  Due to the relatively small number of civil and criminal trade secret cases and recent legislative reforms, the greater publication of cases would be very helpful in assessing the challenges in litigating this area and China’s compliance with the Agreement. The new appellate IP Court will be especially critical to the effective implementation of the important changes in China’s trade secret law as well as the implementation of the patent linkage regime.  The patent linkage provision also similarly neglects to describe the critical role of the courts in an effective linkage regime.  The Agreement to a certain extent memorializes the ongoing tensions between administrative and civil enforcement in China and regrettably reemphasizes the role of the administrative agencies in managing IP through campaigns and punishment.

The trade war afforded a once in a lifetime opportunity to push for market mechanisms in managing IP assets through a reduced role for administrative agencies and improved civil remedies in China’s IP enforcement regime.   A high cost was paid in tariffs to help resolve a problem that the Administration estimated, or exaggerated, to be as high as 600 billion dollars.   The reforms in the Agreement hardly total up to addressing a problem of that magnitude, and in many cases appear more focused on yesterday’s problems.  While the continued emphasis on administrative agencies and limited focus on civil remedies is disappointing, there are nonetheless many notable IP  reforms in the Agreement in addition to legislative reforms already delivered.  I hope that a Phase 2 agreement will deliver additional positive changes that also address the challenges of the future

Please send me your insights, comments, criticisms or corrections!  Happy Spring Festival!

Please send in any comments or corrections!

Revised 1/23/2020, 1/27/2020