Category: TRIPS

China’s ASI Strategic Retreat and WTO Compliance

China appears to have taken a meaningful step toward complying with the WTO’s DS611 ruling by stepping back from its controversial use of anti-suit injunctions in SEP disputes, with no new ASIs reported since the decision and indications—primarily through WTO statements—that the Supreme People’s Court withdrew the policy. However, implementation remains incomplete. The underlying doctrine has not been clearly repudiated, key judicial materials remain difficult to locate, and earlier decisions continue to be inconsistently published, often in anonymized or unstable form. The WTO arbitrators’ expansive interpretation of “decisions of general application” raises additional concerns, as it extends TRIPS transparency obligations beyond formal precedent in ways that may not align with how Chinese courts actually develop policy. At the same time, the United States’ attempt to narrow transparency obligations was rightly rejected. With parallel developments in Europe and the UK, anti-suit injunctions are no longer uniquely Chinese, but part of a broader global struggle over jurisdiction in SEP disputes. China’s response reflects a cautious retreat rather than a full policy reversal, leaving important questions about transparency, judicial signaling, and future practice unresolved.

Phase 1 and CAI: A Tale of Two Agreements

CAI, RCEP and the Phase 1 Trade Agreement all responded to different economic, trade demands and political urgencies. The CAI has been understood as a sign by the Biden administration that the European Union will pursue its own trade relationship with China based on its own interests. While the IP and forced technology transfer provisions of the Phase 1 Agreement helped establish new standards in China that are applicable to all countries, the non-IP provisions of the Phase 1 Agreement were not kind to Europeans and other allies in their preferential buying requirements. The EU, however, did not significantly advance IP protections in the CAI text. The bright side of this picture is that the CAI leaves space for the United States and the European Union to further coordinate strategies on IP protection in China.

Due Process and ASI’s: Wuhan and Texas

There are now numerous IP cases where foreign judges have decided that Chinese courts failed to provide adequate notice or procedural transparency. Should concerns over a failure to comply with general notions of due process, including notice or access to counsel mandate that a court limit the impact of a foreign court’s anti-suit injunction?

The WTO IP Cases That Weren’t

Does the WTO / TRIPS Agreement still have teeth on IP? This blog explores the possible claims that could be made involving TRIPS Agreement violations and China. The more important claims are complex, data-dependent, and would require a whole of government approach by the Biden adminisitration.

RCEP And Phase 1: Strange Bedfellows in IP

RCEP and the Phase 1 Trade Agremeent are strange historical bedfellows, joined by common approaches to IP that diminish its role as a private right. The differences between the two agreements are also significant. The Phase 1 Agreement explicitly contemplated a Phase 2 Trade Agreement. It also only involved one country. RCEP intends to be comprehensive and regional, if not global. It is an alternative to the TPP. It will help China establish global IP norms.