Economics and IP Position At AIT/Taiwan

The American Institute in Taiwan has posted a position for an economic specialist in Taipei.  This is a local-hire position (for those ordinarily resident in Taiwan, and others). In addition to knowledge of Chinese and English, the position requires a Master’s degree in business, engineering, economics or law or related field .  The position entails, among other things,  “researching and drafting cables and other reports on policy, legal, and business developments in the high-tech, digital economy, cybersecurity, intellectual property rights (IPR), and labor sectors.”   The application deadline is February 12, 2017.

2017 Opens with More Positive Trademark Developments

The SAIC has announced that it has  amended its TM review and examination standards (“Trademark Review and Examination Standards”).  The revised standards, with a date of December 2016, are available here. The revisions incorporate revisions to Articles 19, 50, 15.2, 1and 10 of the Trademark Law.

In addition, the Supreme People’s Court published a judicial interpretation on Certain Issues Related to Trials of Administrative Cases Involving the Grant and Confirmation of Trademark Rights 最高人民法院关于审理商标授权确权行政案件若干问题的规定.  A public comment draft of the JI was circulated as early as 2014; the final version was released at a press conference on January 11, 2017.   The JI clarifies the application of “adverse influence” in Article 10(1)8 and “other improper means” in Article 44(1) of trademark law and provides details on prior rights of Article 32  including copyright, naming right, trade name,  amongst other provisions.   The Financial Times has suggested that the JI is linked to the Qiaodan case , although as the Chinese media as noted, Qiaodan may also be seen as one of a series of cases providing more expansive relief against abusive registrations and recognizing more extensive related rights, such as naming rights and even merchandising rights.  In an unrelated development, the SPC on January 7, 2017 listed the Qiaodan case  as one of the top 10 civil and administrative cases for 2016.

 The 2016 JCCT obligated China to “take further efforts to address bad faith trademark filings”, according to the recently released Joint Fact Sheet. The amended examination guidleines, JI, and related case developments, including the development of case law in IP,  should help implement this commitment. 

Chinese IP: the Graduating Class of Officials

 

There have been several Chinese officials with authority over IP over the past few years who have been  promoted.  In December, the Ministry of Commerce recently reported that DG Li Chengang was promoted to Assistant Minister in December 2016, with authority over law and treaties (which includes trade-related IP).  His predecessor, Assistant Minister Tong Dao-chi, was also promoted and now serves as Vice Governor of Hubei as of  December 2016.   Across the straits, in July 2016, Madame Wang Mei-hua, who was formerly in charge of TIPO was promoted to Vice Minister of Economic Affairs.  

The most prominent of the Chinese officials with deep IP experience who saw their career advance due to IP involvement in recent years is Madame Tao Kaiyuan the former DG in charge of Guangdong’s IP Department, who has served as one of the justices on China’s Supreme People’s Court since 2013, and has been a key advocate for judicial reforms and promoting rule of law.  Several other Chinese IP judges have also seen promotions in the recent years (Madame Tao and several current and former IP judges are pictured below).  Another official with deep IP experience,  Chen Fuli of MofCOM also was promoted from his former position as IP Attaché in Washington, DC and Director at MofCOM, where he oversaw IP engagement with the United States to his current position of Deputy Director General.

Also of note,  former Chief Judge Randall Rader is reported to be under consideration to become the next Director of the USPTO under the incoming Trump Administration.  Rader has noted that “Yes, several senators have sent my name to the Trump team for the position of director of the USPTO,” and that “The best way to protect U.S. jobs is to protect worldwide the IP that creates and guarantees those jobs.”  China has also been quick to recognize Judge Rader’s accomplishments.  In December 2016, he was awarded an Honorary Professorship by the President of Tsinghua University.  

The current situation for Chinese IP officials contrasts with the experience of only a few years ago when it appeared that many Chinese IP agencies and officials were riding China’s new Antimonopoly Law, and not IP, to advance their agencies or careers.  Officials such as DG Shang Ming moved from law and treaties in MofCOM to antitrust.  At that time, China’s IP courts also picked up civil antitrust jurisdiction and the unfair competition bureau of SAIC also picked up antitrust authority.  During those years, several officials also privately complained to me that their career advancement had been stymied by focusing too much on IP issues or engagement with foreigners.   Some may also have seen former Vice Premier Wu Yi’s retirement in 2008 as tied to the filing of a WTO on IPR against China, which she appeared to take as a personal loss and that he had promised to fight vigorously against

As far as I know, the most dramatic and unusual employment engagement of an IP-knowledgeable official was made by another ardent IP supporter, Abraham Lincoln, when he appointed Edwin Stanton as Secretary of War due, in part,  to his experience of working with him on a patent litigation when Lincoln was a private lawyer. 

When officials who believe in IP are promoted to positions of higher authority it is a good sign of political support for protecting IP.  This is true of both the United States and China. WP_20160802_005 (1)

 

 

 

Identical vs. Similar Trademarks in Criminal and Civil Adjudication

Both Judge Bao WenkJiong 包文炯 in Zhichanli, and James Luo on his blog, have recently  published  summaries of a 2014 case in Wuxi (无锡滨湖法院(2014)锡滨知刑初字第0002号刑事判决书) involving the definition an “identical” mark under China’s criminal trademark law.

This case raises the important question of the differing roles and standards for civil and criminal prosecution of trademark infringement – an issue that is especially important in light of the many different manners of enforcing IP in China, which also includes an extensive administrative punishment system.

Judge Bao noted that the court held that attention should be paid to avoiding excessive application of the “trademark similarity” standard of civil trademark cases to criminal cases.  More specifically, the case held that a counterfeit “identical trademark” in the criminal law means one that is identical with the registered trademark or not visually different from the registered trademark and therefor is enough to mislead the public.   Where, however, there is a slight difference between the accused counterfeit trademark and the registered trademark, the close similarity is sufficient to cause the relevant public to be confused and it should also be regarded as an “identical trademark.”

The requirement of an “identical trademark” derives from Article 213 of China’s Criminal Code, which provides:

“Whoever, without permission from the owner of a registered trademark, uses a trademark which is identical with the registered trademark on the same kind of commodities shall, if the circumstances are serious, be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also, or shall only, be fined; if the circumstances are especially serious, the offender shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years and shall also be fined.”

A 2004 judicial interpretation on criminal IP matters (关于办理侵犯知识产权刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释 (2004)) further clarified what constituted an “identical trademark” for purposes of China’s criminal IP laws:

“Article 8: An ‘identical trademark’ as provided for in Article 213 of the Criminal Law refers to the same trademark as the counterfeited registered trademark, or one that is substantially visually indistinguishable from the counterfeited registered trademark, and is sufficient to mislead the public.”

“第八条 刑法第二百一十三条规定的“相同的商标”,是指与被假冒的注册商标完全相同,或者与被假冒的注册商标在视觉上基本无差别、足以对公众产生误导的商标.”

Why should a higher degree of similarity of trademarks be required in criminal trademark cases but not for civil cases?    The critical test, to my mind, should be whether the infringement is willful, and not whether a cunning counterfeiter designed a mark that is insufficiently identical but nonetheless potentially confusing to a segment of the consuming population.  From a policy perspective, public criminal enforcement of the trademark laws can and should protect public interests greater than the legitimate trademark itself, including such interests as purchases by innocent consumers, protecting investment in brand creation and deterring brand dilution, and addressing the confusion of third parties who may be harmed by using these products.  These policies suggest that more liberal construction of what constitutes an “identical” trademark could be useful.   Indeed some courts in the United States have used civil standards to determine when a trademark is counterfeit (United States v. Petrosian , 126 F.3d 1232, 1234 (9th Cir. 1997).  Nonethelesss, even if prosecutors declined to prosecute an “identical” trademark case, the rights owner may still be free to bring a civil case under the “similar trademark” civil standard.

The Chinese summary of the case notes that the Jiangsu IP courts, where this case was held, play a role in delineating the role of the civil and criminal IP systems, as these ourts have combined civil, criminal and administrative case adjudication in one tribunal.  I hope that these courts can play an even greater role in clarifying addressing the public policy needs behind different standards of IP protection under China’s civil, criminal and administrative enforcement regimes.

GPNE vs Apple: The Multi-Year Saga

Hawaii-based NPE, GPNE Corp.,  has  requested damages in a patent law suit related to GPRS standards of 900 million RMB in Shenzhen (about 129 million USD) against Apple as well as other related parties (Foxconn et al),  according to various news reports.  This is a significant increase over original damages request of 95 million and 1 million RMB, respectively.  The request was made in a hearing before the Shenzhen Intermediate Court in November 2016.

The case appears to have been filed as early as January 28, 2013.   Apple had reportedly previously filed three invalidations in China against the GPNE patents.  The high damages request has been noted by the media as the largest damage claim in Chinese IP history to date.  Apple had also successfully won a federal circuit appeal involving GPNE’s claims of infringement in August 2016.

The Apple/GPNE case is one of several global IP disputes, which include China as an important venue, and where damages, discovery, availability of injunctions, an increasingly hospitable Chinese legal environment to global patent litigation and likelihood of success all appear to be playing important roles.  The increase in damages may a reaction in part to Apple seeking to use evidence obtained in its successful defense against a GPNE law suit in California in the Shenzhen case.  In 2014, Apple argued that due to lack of discovery in China and differing methods of calculating damages, Apple requires discovery of GPNE’s licensing practices from the US court, pursuant to 28 USC Sec. 1782.  Apple noted in its motion that “the limited discovery sought by Apple is important to the China litigation, and will allow Apple to present the probative evidence regarding the value of GPNE’s patents and its history of granting licenses.” Apple substantiated its motion by pointing to the limitations on Chinese damage calculations and on limited discovery as supporting the relevance of its request:

GPNE also introduced evidence intended to support an “illegal gains” damages model. Under Chinese law, a claim for “illegal gains” may be chosen by the patentee if a claim for “lost profits” is difficult to determine. Although Chinese courts typically start the damages analysis with plaintiff’s chosen damages model, Chinese law allows for different damages models, and GPNE may be constrained in the damages it can seek by its licensing practices.

However, under Chinese law, there is no discovery process in civil litigation proceedings similar to that in the United States. Accordingly, GPNE may not be subject to any legal liability if it refuses to submit the relevant license agreements to the Shenzhen Court. Id. To the extent Apple intends to argue to the Shenzhen Court that GPNE’s licensing practices should inform any damages model, it will be necessary for Apple to produce GPNE’s licenses to the court. After the parties have provided the necessary evidence, Apple expects that the Shenzhen Court will weigh the evidentiary submissions and arguments and, should the court find Apple liable, may make a damages determination.

This case is also one of several IP law suits that have been filed in China against Apple over the years, including design patent, invention patent and trademark litigation, Apple has also been filing more patents in China, ranking number seven in utility model patents in 2014 amongst all foreign companies. Although an earlier report I posted on is no longer available on the SIPO website, earlier data showed that Apple had been increasing its invention patent applications in China,

GPNE’s website notes that it holds “more than 30 patents worldwide in the field of wireless and wired data communications”  and that it has entered into various forms of licensing agreements with Microsoft, Huawei, Sony and others.   The Company’s name is an abbreviation of  the four founders of the company, G – Gabriel Wong, P – Po-Sing Tsui, N – and E – Edwin Wong, but also possibly standing for “Garage Pioneer of New Electronics” as noted on its website.

The above are my personal opinions only.  Please post any factual corrections, or any differences of opinion that you may have. Please consult counsel for any legal guidance on matters discussed in this blog.

Collaboration vs Litigation in IP Licensing in China: 2016 Update

A string of articles and deals in the patent licensing sector are highlighting the increasing importance of collaborative licensing practices for foreigners to attract licensees.  Is such a collaborative approach to licensing necessary due to development, culture or other reasons?   

Let’s review some of the news from 2016:  VIA licensing, a subsidiary of Dolby has reportedly signed up Lenovo . as its newest member of the pool operated by Via for Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) patents.  IAM’s Jacob Schindler, quotes Ira Blumberg, Lenovo’s vice president for intellectual property, who praises negotiators on the other side for “recognizing and flexibly addressing unique market circumstances applicable to China and other emerging markets”. Speaking with IAM, VIA president Joe Siino confirmed that his company is focusing on win-win collaboration opportunities.  Paul Lin of Xiaomi, which has a licensing agreement with Microsoft, has  observed that many Western companies make the mistake of  importing their usual licensing approach to China wholesale, and that a collaborative element needs to be introduced.  Also in 2016, former arch enemies Huawei and Interdigital entered into an  agreement,  announcing a multi-year, worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty bearing patent license agreement  to settle all proceedings.  The two companies (frenemies?)  put in place a “framework for discussions regarding joint research and development efforts”, including a “process for transfer of patents from Huawei to InterDigital”.

Yet, it was also apparent in 2016 that traditional, non-collaborative approaches, continue to have some vitality particularly where recalcitrant licensees are involved, such as the case Qualcomm brought against Meizu, a reported law suit by Dolby Labs against China’s Oppo and Vivo in India’s High Court of Delhi, or the SEP case brought by Wireless Future Technologies against Sony in Nanjing.  The high win rate for foreigners should also be acting as an additional incentive to use the Chinese litigation system, although foreigners continue to play a disproportionately small role of foreigners in IP litigation in China (about 1.3% of the docket).

There may, indeed, be greater incentives for foreign licensors to seek Chinese partners at this time.   One of these factors is of course the size of the Chinese market itself, including a greater reliance on the Chinese domestic market by potential Chinese licensees/infringers, which may provide incentives to licensors to find longer-term licensing mechanisms through close collaboration with a Chinese partner. In looking at IP-related partnerships, most Chinese companies have IP strategies that still tend to be inwardly focused, by having strong domestic portfolio supported by local subsidies, and thereby making them challenging adversaries for practicing foreign entities in domestic litigation.  At some point, these strong domestic portfolios may also encourage collaboration by a foreign company with a Chinese company as an effective way for the foreign company to boost its domestic Chinese portfolio.  Other factors include the greater intervention by the state in monetization of IP rights, which encourages development and ownership of core IP by Chinese companies, with state subsidies and banking support.  Another factor which encourages collaboration is the Technology Import/Export Regulations of China, which encourages related party licensing between the US and China to avoid mandatory indemnities and grant backs. 

There may also be disincentives for US companies from being too US-focused in conducting R&D and IP monetization at this time.  The AIA, legal uncertainties over the scope of patentable subject matter in the United States and changes in the litigation environment may also be weakening the value of patent rights and ultimately acting as a disincentive to investment in new IP-intensive enterprises.  At the same time, Chinese companies have been increasingly investing overseas, including within the United States, and have shown a willingness to bring law suits in the United States (such as Huawei’s suit against Samsung in California) and may have reciprocal needs for a US partnership, as they seek to license their rights in the United States and elsewhere.  Such a need may be at the heart of the Huawei/Interdigital deal, discussed above.

In my estimation, collaborative approaches to licensing are responses to market and legal challenges in China as well as part of China’s maturing engagement on IP issues, including its own talented labor pool and potential as an innovative economy.  Collaborative approaches to licensing are part of greater trends in collaborative IP creation with China.  In 2015, Qualcomm may have kicked off this current trend when it announced a 150 million USD investment fund in China around the same time as its settlement of its antitrust dispute with China.   In addition, we are seeing greater Chinese participation in cross border R&D.  The Global Innovation Index noted the increasing importance of such international collaboration to China last year and  that “the Chinese innovation system is now densely connected to sources of expertise everywhere.” (p. 93).  Chinese companies had “the 7th largest foreign footprint of all countries with 178 R&D centers set up or acquired outside China by year end 2015.”  USPTO data also shows greater co-inventorship in Chinese patent applications, there is also  greater Chinese participation in international standards setting, and greater Chinese co-authorship of scientific publications (now at about 15%). Hollywood is also seeing a high degree of collaboration, in the form of co-productions, investments, and other collaborative mechanisms.

Collaboration in IP creation is occurring in response to changing market circumstances – developmental, economic, legal and perhaps cultural.  It is no surprise that it is also appearing in licensing transactions.

E-Commerce Law Up for Public Comment

The National People’s Congress announced this week that it has released a draft of the E-Commerce Law for public comment.  The public comment period began December 27, 2016 with comments due by January 26, 2016.  Although focused on the overall development and regulation of e-commerce, the draft also contains provisions regarding IP protection by platforms and their responsibilities, in order to preserve market order and fair competition 市场秩序与公平竞争.  The draft in Chinese is attached here, with relevant provisions and machine translations below.  I hope to provide more detailed comments later – I am particularly interested in how this draft relates to provisions in the tort law, IP laws and civil laws regarding online liability, as well as how enforcement authority over infringements for online operators will be amended and divided up amongst the various IP agencies if this draft is implemented into law.

Article 53 provides:

第五十三条   电子商务经营主体应当依法保护知识产权,建立知识产权保护规则。电子商务第三方平台明知平台内电子商务经营者侵犯知识产权的,应当依法采取删除、屏蔽、断开链接、终止交易和服务等必要措施。         

Article 53 The electronic commerce business principal operator shall protect intellectual property rights in accordance with the law and establish rules for the protection of intellectual property rights. If the e-commerce operator infringes the intellectual property rights within the platform, it shall take the necessary measures such as deleting, shielding, breaking the link, terminating the transaction and service according to law.

Article 54 provides:

第五十四条   电子商务第三方平台接到知识产权权利人发出的平台内经营者实施知识产权侵权行为通知的,应当及时将该通知转送平台内经营者,并依法采取必要措施。知识产权权利人因通知错误给平台内经营者造成损失的,依法承担民事责任。   

平台内经营者接到转送的通知后,向电子商务第三方平台提交声明保证不存在侵权行为的,电子商务第三方平台应当及时终止所采取的措施,将该经营者的声明转送发出通知的知识产权权利人,并告知该权利人可以向有关行政部门投诉或者向人民法院起诉。   

电子商务第三方平台应当及时公示收到的通知、声明及处理结果.

Article 54 Where a third-party platform for e-commerce receives a notice from a platform operator of intellectual property rights issued by the owner of the platform for intellectual property infringement, it shall promptly transmit the notice to the operators within the platform and take the necessary measures according to law. If the intellectual property right owner causes any loss to the operator of the platform due to the wrong notification, he shall bear civil liability according to law.
If the platform operator submits a declaration to the e-commerce third-party platform to ensure that there is no infringement, the third-party platform shall promptly terminate the measures taken and forward the statement of the operator to the notification Property rights, and inform the right person to the relevant administrative departments of complaints or to the people ‘s court.
E-commerce third-party platform shall promptly publicize the received notice, statement and processing results.

Article 88 provides:

第八十八条   电子商务第三方平台违反本法第五十三条的规定,明知平台内经营者实施侵犯知识产权行为未采取必要措施的,由各级人民政府有关部门责令限期改正;逾期不改正的,责令停业整顿,并处以三万元以上十万元以下的罚款;情节严重的,吊销营业执照,并处以十万元以上五十万元以下的罚款。         

Article 88 If a third-party platform for e-commerce violates the provisions of Article 53 of this Law and knows that the operator of the platform does not take the necessary measures for infringement of intellectual property rights, the relevant departments of the people’s governments at various levels shall order it to make corrections within a prescribed time limit; If the circumstances are serious, the business license shall be revoked and a fine of not less than 100,000 yuan but not more than 500,000 yuan shall be imposed.