Qualcomm’s Litigation Strategies and Recent IP Developments in China

反者道之動。弱者道之用。 (, Chap. 40) (Return is the movement of the Dao. Yielding is the way of the Dao.  Daodejing, Chap. 40.)

To the uninitiated, Qualcomm’s licensing practices in China must appear confusing.  Since paying a fine of 975 million USD to NDRC – about 50,000 times average patent damages according to the CIELA database for its Standards Essential Patent licensing practices, Qualcomm has entered into approximately 100  licensing settlements with Chinese companies.  How can the weak become so successful, so soon?

According to press accounts, Qualcomm has settled with the major cell phone manufacturers in China,  most recently with Chinese cell phone companies Vivo and Oppo.  Both deals came after Qualcomm decided to bring law suits against cell phone manufacturer Meizu in the Beijing and Shanghai intellectual property courts for damages that reportedly total about 520 million RMB.  The first law suit was filed by Qualcomm around June 23 at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court.   The complaint essentially sought to enforce an NDRC rectification plan imposed on Qualcomm against other infringers/potential licensees.  The original complaint, according to Qualcomm’s press release “requests rulings that the terms of a patent license offered by Qualcomm to Meizu comply with China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, and Qualcomm’s fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing obligations.  The complaint also seeks a ruling that the offered patent license terms should form the basis for a patent license with Meizu for Qualcomm’s fundamental technologies patented in China for use in mobile devices, including those relating to 3G (WCDMA and CDMA2000) and 4G (LTE) wireless communications standards.”  Since that filing, Qualcomm filed 17 new complaints were filed in Beijing and Shanghai.

Given the risks to Qualcomm posed by seeking injunctive relief for standards essential patents, Qualcomm appears to have initially launched its litigation campaign against Meizu by enforcing the NDRC approved licensing terms against one hold out company who might thereafter be left with an unfair competitive advantage.   Qualcomm appears to be reducing its antitrust risks by first getting “immunized” by NDRC, and then enforcing the terms of the NDRC “rectification plan” and couching its patent infringement litigation in terms of promoting fair competition.  This in effect has turned the tables on recalcitrant licensees who have previously relied on Qualcomm’s FRAND commitments to reduce the risk of being sued by Qualcomm by threatening an antitrust counterclaim.  What remains to be seen, however, is the legal status the court affords the rectification plan given the often unclear relationships between judicial and administrative decision making.

Qualcomm’s GC, Don Rosenberg said Qualcomm is taking legal action out of a sense of fairness to other companies that are paying what they owe.  In addition, the case represents a vote of confidence by Qualcomm in the court system.  As Don Rosenberg noted “”We’re putting our faith in the court system there and we wouldn’t do that if we didn’t think we were in capable hands.”  Qualcomm may no doubt have been inspired by the success of its licensing program as well as the perfect or near perfect win rate in the sixty five infringement cases filed by foreigners in 2015 in the Beijing IP court.  As I have noted repeatedly on this blog, foreigners do win IP cases in China.

In China’s current legal environment,  where licensing is burdened by seemingly contradictory norms – e.g., where the Chinese government sets prices for license transactions in antitrust cases, restricts the freedom to negotiate of foreigners, provides tax incentives for licensing in to China for high tech enterprises, sets national goals for licensing transactions, and where the courts seem to have difficulty imposing damages based on actual or implied royalties, Qualcomm appears to be turning the 975 million dollars of “lemons” of the  NDRC fine, into a vat of lemonade.

Qualcomm’s vote of confidence in the courts in a high stakes case may also help set an important model for other foreign and Chinese rightsholders, potentially by highlighting such important issues as: Yes, foreigners win cases in China, the importance of actual or explicit license agreements for determining damages (already being tried in some jurisdictions, see: 江苏固丰管桩集团有限公司 vs 宿迁华顺建筑预制构件有限公司 (Jiangsu, 2015), and the respective roles of patent law,  antitrust law, the courts and administrative agencies, in obtaining SEP licenses in China.

Qualcomm and China both have a lot at stake in the handling of SEP issues.   A recent report by Thomson Reuters (The Evolving Landscape of Standard Essential Patents: Keeping What is Essential, Sawant and Oak), showed that Qualcomm owns 17% of the patent declarations before the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, followed by Nokia, Huawei, and InterDigital.   Decisions in Europe such as Huawei vs. ZTE may also have underscored the importance of looking at whether a putative licensee/infringer is in fact negotiating in good faith with a FRAND encumbered licensor.

Judges such as  Zhu Li of the SPC have noted some of these changes publicly.  As Zhu Li said in a recent blog:

…标准必要专利权作出FRAND承诺即自愿放弃了在任何情况下寻求禁令救济的选择,更不意味着其寻求禁令救济一定产生反竞争的效果。因此,作出FRAND承诺的标准必要专利权利人寻求禁令救济的反竞争效果仍然需要具体分析判断。

[T]he owner of standard essential patent FRAND commitment that is made voluntarily does not give up under all circumstances the choice of seeking injunctive relief.  Furthermore, it does not mean seeking injunctive relief must produce anti-competitive effects. Therefore, when a holder of a FRAND encumbered SEP seeks injunctive relief, the anti-competitive effects still need specific analysis and judgment。

The evolving practice appears to be that the evidentiary burden to demonstrate that the infringers have refused to pay a license fee is on the licensor and, as Zhu Li noted,  a monopoly is not necessarily constituted when an injunction is requested by SEP owners.

The State Council’s recent opinion on how China should become a “strong” IP country, also highlighted how China needs to draft rules on standard essential patents that are based on FRAND licensing and “stopping infringement” (Art. 38) (with the involvement of AQSIQ, SIPO, MIIT, and the Supreme People’s Court) and that encouraging standardization of Chinese patents also remains a priority (Arts. 61, 71).

As I indicated elsewhere, a key question for China is “What circumstances exist to suggest that a prospective licensee is engaged in patent hold-out, i.e., refusing to license in good faith which might suspend the licensor’s F/RAND obligation…”  Hopefully China is beginning to ask the better questions that are suitable for its licensing environment and its efforts to become a “strong” IP economy.

What are you observing in this hot area? Please post your comments and corrections!

The preceding is the author’s personal opinion only.

lemonade

Forthcoming Loyola/USPTO Conference on Chinese Entertainment Law

Loyola University Law School of Los Angeles and the USPTO are jointly sponsoring the first US-China Entertainment Law Conference on November 2, 2016.  Registration information and other information are found here.  The program will cover (1) Year in Review: Recent Developments in the US-China Entertainment Industry; (2) Commercialization of Content; (3) IP Issues Related to the US-China Entertainment Industry; and (4) Opportunities and Legal Challenges in the US-China collaboration of Movies, TV Productions, Music and Gaming etc.

I am scheduled to speak at the conference along with other colleagues from USPTO and a number of leading entertainment lawyers, business people, academics and officials.

USPTO and Renmin University Copyright Protection Program Highlights Importance of Copyright Reform for China

revenuestreams

Last July 20, 2016,USPTO and Renimin University jointly hosted a program at Renmin University on Copyright Developments in China and the United States.  The program was covered by some of the specialty media.  Here’s a brief summary regarding some of the four key developments in China that I abstracted from the speakers at the conference:

  1. Building upon some of the path breaking work of Eric Priest and others, there appeared to be near unanimity amongst the speakers and audience of the importance of revenue diversity for China’s creative industries to thrive.  Amongst the areas highlighted, were the importance of public performance rights, of licensing for digitalization of content, of small claims procedures for copyright owners, the utility of collective management in certain contexts, and the importance of providing copyright protection for sports broadcasting (as opposed to using neighboring rights or antiunfair competition law).  The current copyright licensing environment in China uniquely supports one exclusive license, but even that revenue source is vulnerable to non-renewal if piracy erodes the value of buying legitimate content and may therefor not be sustainable in the face of “piratical” or free competition.  Musicians, as an example, are heavily dependent on public performances and secondary sources of revenue, such as DVD/CD/ streaming sales are thin.  Revenue diversity can also included non-copyright revenue streams, such as trademark rights, and perhaps merchandising rights.  Efforts have also been underway to increase pledging of copyrighted content, which can help with financing of copyrighted content.
  2. Many of the Chinese speakers spoke about increasingly creative enforcement approaches, such as the Sword Network Campaign,  enhanced administrative supervision over platforms (16 video sites/20 music sites/20 literary sites) and punitive damages.  Although they are still a minority of criminal IP cases, there is an increasing number of  criminal referrals from administrative cases (from 2005 to 2015, more than 450 cases were referred to criminal prosecution).  Article 287 of the newly amended Criminal Law, which provides for criminal liability by reason of providing computer services was noted as a potential area for expanded criminal copyright liability.
  3. Technology and globalization were making enforcement increasingly more difficult, while at the same opening up possibilities for more efficient enforcement techniques.  Audiovisual use of the internet was one of the most popular reasons in China to be online (73.2% of netizens view AV products in China). Music is a close second (72.8%), while literature was only 43.1%.     Copyright protections which did not extend to interactive (online) environments, were increasingly undercutting revenue streams.  China’s reservation under article 15(1) of the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty was noted (“(1) Performers and producers of phonograms shall enjoy the right to a single equitable remuneration for the direct or indirect use of phonograms published for commercial purposes for broadcasting or for any communication to the public.”).  The increasing complexity of the copyright environment, including the environment for licensing was highlighted as a theme in both the United States and China.   Media box piracy was identified as a problem (see 湖南快乐阳光vs 清华同方).  A case involving use of parasitic software to modify the original code was noted, under the Antiunfair competition law ( 鹏讯 [深圳] v 上海虹连网络)
  4. Regarding enforcement, the efforts of the courts to develop precedential or guiding cases to resolve complicated emerging issues was also underscored, particularly due to the extensive delays in passing copyright law reform, which has now been ongoing for several years.  There were over 70 research topics underway as part of the copyright law reform.  There needs to be increased scope of protection of copyright and improved mechanisms for enforcement.  Some of the difficulties in providing copyright protection to certain areas were traced back to the original training program in 1985 in Nanjing on copyright law, which was provided by European experts, and introduced European concepts and models, such as neighboring rights.    Changes in substantive law and judicial practice, such as providing for treble damages,  sampling of allegedly infringing content, establishing a requisite standard for “originality” vs a non-original product (see 北京乐东 vs 北京昆仑 concerning copyright in entertainment software characters) idea vs. expression in variety shows (See Beijing High Court’s: 关于审理涉及综艺节目著作权纠纷案件若干问题的解答), harmonization with other laws (such as the Antiunfair Compeittion Law),  how much copying constituted infringement, discovery of source code to verify infringement of software products, and specialized IP courts/three-in-one (administrative/civil/criminal) tribunals were all noted.  In addition, an expanded scope for audiovisual works, or lowering of the creativity required for cinematographic works were noted as possible approaches to providing protection for sports broadcasts.   Rights holders were also selecting overseas venues for litigation where rights were sometimes better protected.

In general, the speakers agreed that China needs copyright reform for its own needs, and that this reform was not due to outside pressure. In addition, there are increasing opportunities for collaboration between the United States and China on the creation and distribution of copyrighted content, which appear to be mirroring increased collaboration in science and technology.  Ultimately, China needs improved copyright protection and enforcement in light of its own desires to increase its soft power, and support its creative industries.

US & China Conclude High Level Exchange on Judicial Reform and Commercial Rule of Law

WP_20160802_005 (1)(photo by Mark Cohen)

Last week, top U.S. and Chinese judges and legal experts came together to implement the agreement between Presidents Obama and Xi to hold a high level exchange on judicial reform and commercial rule of law, which stated:

China and the United States commit to conduct high-level and expert discussions commencing in early 2016 to provide a forum to support and exchange views on judicial reform and identify and evaluate the challenges and strategies in implementing the rule of law. U.S. participants are to include leading members of the U.S. judiciary, U.S. government legal policy experts, and officials from the Departments of Commerce and Justice and the Office of the United States Trade Representative. Chinese participants are to include officials from the Central Leading Group on Judicial Reform, leading members of the Chinese judiciary, and Chinese government legal policy experts. This dialogue is to result in an improvement in the transparency and predictability of the business environment. This dialogue does not replace, duplicate or weaken existing regular bilateral legal and human rights dialogues between China and the United States.

According to Amb. Baucus’ view of the dialogue: “companies – American and Chinese – need predictability.  An independent judiciary that can resolve civil and administrative disputes fairly, transparently, and according to the law, is critical.  If we can deepen cooperation between the United States and China on judicial matters, it will help improve the investment climate, to the benefit of companies and workers in both of our countries.”

Chinese media reported that there were over 30 experts, officials and judges attending the program, which included several important IP judges such as SPC Justice Tao Kaiyuan,  and Deputy Chief   IP Judge Wang Chuang, as well as Beijing IP Court President Su Chi, as well as He Zhonglin, head of the SPC’s Office of International Cooperation and a former IP judge himself (see picture above).  According to the media, members of the delegation also met with Meng Jianzhu, head of the Party Political Legal Committee.

The US Department of Justice released the opening speech of Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney General, who noted that the Dialogue included many topics germane to IP such as: “How can parties obtain the evidence they need to prepare for trial?  What evidence should be admissible in court?  How do courts and parties use expert witnesses?  What can courts do to handle a large number of cases fairly, transparently, and efficiently, when resources are finite?  What sort of personnel do we need to implement the rule of law, and how do we ensure that they are properly trained and feel they are part of a justice-focused mission? Finally, what is the role of precedents in providing guidance to business as to what behavior violates the law?”

This is not the first such judicial exchange, nor the first exchange with a common law country.   The Federal Circuit has been engaged in two major programs on IP adjudication with the Chinese courts, including one that involved over 1200 people including 200 Chinese judges  in 2012, and a second large sale  program in Shanghai in 2015This year, the focus on the UK judicial exchanges this year is also on commercial law.  Individual US judges, such as Denny Chin and Randall Rader have also traveled to China and engaged the Chinese judiciary on IP and commercial legal matters, including by attending important programs in the United States.  In the UK, Mr Justice Birss was very supportive of these exchanges in comments he delivered at the Fordham IP Conference this year. The  SPC has reportedly established friendly relationships with judicial institutions of more than 130 countries and 20 international or regional organizations.

Chinese media noted that the next meeting of the dialogue of scheduled for Washington, DC.

 

 

Upcoming Fordham Program on Asian Antitrust

 

antitrustprogram.jpg

Antitrust agency heads from the Federal Trade Commission, Department of Justice, Competition Markets Authority, and EU Commission will deliver keynote remarks at this 43rd annual event.  Panel discussions will address topics such as  antitrust and intellectual property in Asia,  international antitrust cooperation in today’s multicultural environment, and antitrust enforcement in China. The conference concludes with an in-house counsel roundtable, “The China Challenge.”  The program will be held September 22 – 23 at Fordham University.

I will be on a panel on September 22 from 11:20 a.m.–12:35 p.m. speaking in my academic capacity on “Antitrust and Intellectual Property in Asia: Convergence? ” with H. Stephen Harris Jr., Partner, Winston & Strawn  moderating.  Other panelists include  Dina Kallay, Director, Intellectual Property and Competition, Ericsson, Inc.; and Joshua Wright, Senior Of Counsel, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati.

Additional information can be found at: http://www.fordham.edu/info/20689/competition_law_institute

Comments on Draft Guidelines on Disgorgement and Fines in AML Matters

Attached are comments of the ABA Sections of Antitrust and International Law  (ABA) and the George Mason University Global Antitrust Institute (GAI) on the draft guidelines of the National Development and Reform Commission on Disgorgement and Fines in Antimonopoly Law matters. The ABA comments are bilingual and have the complete text of the draft guidelines included in the package that is being made available here.  The guidelines were published for public consultation on June 17, 2016.

The two sets of comments offer two slightly nuanced approaches in their understanding of the final drafting responsibilities for these guidelines.  The ABA comments are nominally  directed to the Antimonopoly Commission of the State Council, while the GAI’s Comments are more directed to the National Development and Reform Commission which released this draft for eventual adoption by the Antimonopoly Commission.  The relationship between these drafts and an official adoption by the AMC is not clear to me, as the NDRC announcement of the draft states that the drafting of the guidelines are in the work plan of the Antimonopoly Commission, and that NDRC undertook the research and drafting (根据国务院反垄断委员会的工作计划,我们研究起草了《关于认定经营者垄断行为违法所得和确定罚款的指南》(征求意见稿),现面向社会公开征求意见.). It does not explicitly say that this research and  drafting was undertaken on behalf of the AMC.  Moreover, comments are to be delivered to the Pricing Bureau of NDRC, not the NDRC itself, which may suggest that this is indeed a research project (发送到国家发展改革委(价监局).  It is my view that considering the continuing battle of drafting responsibility by Antimonopoly enforcement agencies + SIPO,  in the IP Abuse guidelines, which the State Council has recently said is the responsibility of these four agencies and the State Council Legislative Affairs Office, final drafting  responsibility for an interagency antimonopoly law guideline may not be easily assumed at this time.  If others in the antitrust community have more specific information, I welcome them posting it here.

Regardless of which agency is the lead, the sharing of drafts with this website and others helps to increase our understanding of the overall process through sharing of different commenters’ positions, for which I am grateful.  I hope that over time Chinese agencies will also make all non-confidential comments publicly available.

GAI’s recommendations include that the Draft Guidelines be revised to limit the application of disgorgement (or the confiscating of illegal gain) and punitive fines to matters in which: (1) the antitrust violation is clear (i.e., if measured at the time the conduct is undertaken, and based on existing laws, rules, and regulations, a reasonable party should expect that the conduct at issue would likely be found to be illegal) and without any plausible efficiency justifications; (2) it is feasible to articulate and calculate the harm caused by the violation; (3) the measure of harm calculated is the basis for any fines or penalties imposed; and (4) there are no alternative remedies that would adequately deter future violations of the law.  In the alternative, and at the very least, the NDRC should expand the circumstances under which the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agencies (AMEAs) will not seek punitive sanctions such as disgorgement or fines to include two conduct categories that are widely recognized as having efficiency justifications: unilateral conduct such as refusals to deal and discriminatory dealing and vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing, tying and bundling, and resale price maintenance.

GAI also urges the NDRC to clarify how the total penalty, including disgorgement and fines, relate to the specific harm at issue and the theoretical optimal penalty.  According to GAI, economic analysis should determine the total optimal penalties, which includes any disgorgement and fines.  When fines are calculated consistent with the optimal penalty framework, disgorgement should be a component of the total fine as opposed to an additional penalty on top of an optimal fine.  If disgorgement is an additional penalty, then any fines should be reduced relative to the optimal penalty.

Finally, GAI recommends that the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agencies (AMEAs) rely on economic analysis to determine the harm caused by any violation.  When using proxies for the harm caused by the violation, such as using the illegal gains from the violations as the basis for fines or disgorgement, such calculations should be limited to those costs and revenues that are directly attributable to a clear violation.  This should be done in order to ensure that the resulting fines or disgorgement track the harms caused by the violation.  To that end, GAI recommends that the Draft Guidelines explicitly state that the AMEAs will use economic analysis to determine the but-for world, and will rely wherever possible on relevant market data.  When the calculation of illegal gain is unclear due to lack of relevant information, GAI strongly recommends that the AMEAs refrain from seeking disgorgement.

These comments are broader than IP-related antitrust.  One common theme they share with IP damage issues is the low utilization of economic calculations to determine damages, and unclear sensibility of when damages are adequate, deterrent or punitive.

The comments also do not address the relationship, if any, between low IP damages and high antitrust damages for IP abuse, except in the broadest sense that excessive damages may create over deterrence.  The Chinese government and academics are also increasingly focused on the problem of low IP damages, including possibilities of providing for punitive damages and higher compensatory damages,  the availability of discovery for damage calculations, such as in the trademark law and with experiments in increasing statutory damages or relying on alternative calculations such as actual or implied royalties such as occurred last year in Jiangsu (See 江苏固丰管桩集团有限公司诉宿迁华顺建筑预制构件有限公司侵害发明)专利权纠纷一案[(2015)苏知民终字第00038]), where an implied royalty was used for perhaps the first time in a patent case. The issue is also actively being discussed by academics. See, e.g., 刘自钦 , 著作权惩罚性赔偿制度在中国大陆的具体运用, Macau Law Review, No. 10, at p. 123 (Liu Zichen, Substantial Application of the Punitive Compensation System for Copyright in Chinese Mainland – Based on American Experience and the Chinese Reality).

­The current reality is that IP damages remain too low and non-deterrent.  To me this suggests a possible issue of disproportionality between IP protection and antitrust enforcement for IP abuse, or as I have often said one cannot have IP ‘abuse’ without having IP ‘use.’   On June 7, 2016 I had the pleasure in my official capacity of testifying before the House Judiciary Committee, where I discussed the issue of the large disparity between high antitrust damages and low patent infringement damages.   My testimony is also on the PTO website.  I recently calculated that the current ratio of average patent damages as determined on the www.ciela.cn database and the Qualcomm damage imposed by NDRC is about 50,000 to 1 (18,000 USD to 975 million USD); it is only somewhat lower if other databases are used.  As I noted in my testimony, antitrust damages and patent damages address different issues and thus may not always be directly comparable.  However, if the ratio is wildly disproportionate the ecosystem for innovation and technology transfer could erode.  Many companies already do not want to transfer technology to China, for fear that their IP will not be adequately protected.  As I have noted, the data already suggests that China is an under-licensed market.  Some companies may also now be avoiding China because damages are too low and/or antitrust risks are too high.  If antitrust damages become be too high in relationship to the actual value of a patent, incentives to disclose patentable inventions may erode – which itself may erode competition in the long run.  Moreover, China will suffer as it may not be able to obtain leading-edge technology.  I personally believe that antitrust and IP damages should not be wildly disproportionate, which should be another factor in antitrust damages, IP damages and in China’s efforts to become an IP “strong country.”

This blog remains my academic, personal and non-official observations and should not be construed as the opinion of the US government, or any former client or third party or even any academic institution with which I am affiliated.  Corrects and comments in English or Chinese are most welcome!

 

 

 

 

New State Council Decision on Intellectual Property Strategy For China as a Strong IP Country

Statecouncilwordlcoud.PNG

On July 18, 2016, the State Council issued a new policy document,国务院关于新形势下加快知识产权强国建设的 若干意见-重点任务分工方案  — the “Opinion of the State Council on Accelerating the Construction of Intellectual Property Powers for China as an Intellectual Property Strong Country under the New Situation –Division of Tasks.”  Here’s a link to this action plan (docketed as State Council  Working Office No. 66)  , and a link to the machine translation, from which the world cloud above is drawn.   The action plan itself is drawn from a State Council document issued in 2015 on accelerating the establishment of a strong IP country in the context of a new situation.  This 2015 document identified such problems as China being a big country for IP, but not a strong country, protection was not adequately strict, infringement was easy and pervasive, and that these factors were affecting industry’s efforts to innovate.

As I discussed previously, the idea of China needing to become a strong IP country appears in the 2014-2020, National IPR Strategy Action Plan, which has the goal of “Striving to Build A Strong IPR Country”  (努力建设知识产权强国). While China indeed has become “big” on most scales: invention patent filings, trademark, utility models and design patents, intellectual property litigation, criminal IP litigation and administrative litigation, to name a few, “strong” suggests quality, which is much harder to judge.

Here are a few specific observations about this action plan:

  1. Much of the action plan repeats existing efforts, through the MofCOM IPR Leading Group and SIPO’s National IP Strategy Office, and their current efforts at analyzing and coordinating IP effort, as well as cooperative activities (Arts. 1, 3, 13, 15, 18, 21, 22, 25, 30, 44, 88, etc.).
  2. There are greater efforts to incorporate IP into macroeconomic strategies, such as in calculations regarding the national economy and national social welfare (Art. 9), as well as credit reporting (Art. 23).
  3. Increasing compensatory  and punitive damages are a focus (Arts. 14), which have also been an effort of China’s IP courts.  This is one of the key civil-law reform proposals in this plan.   There continues to be an undue emphasis on speed, which I assume is focused on patent administrative enforcement as a more rapid remedy (Art. 16).  China is already a fast moving IP environment.
  4. International cooperation in criminal enforcement is underscored (Arts. 19, 21, 22).
  5. Regarding trade secret protection, the focus is on revising trade secret laws, and protecting IP when employees change jobs (Art. 24).  Changes to China’s discovery regime and other appropriate measures which would greatly assist trade secret claimants, are not discussed.
  6. Geographical indications are a focus, including drafting a stand-alone GI law at “the appropriate time” (Art. 32), increasing the role of trademarks in promoting farmer prosperity (Art. 58), and promoting GI products (Art. 90).
  7. Regarding the long-delayed IP Abuse Guidelines, NDRC, MofCOM, SAIC and the State Council Legislative Affairs Office are all listed as being responsible for drafting “according to their responsibilities” (Art. 36).  Rules on standard essential patents that are based on FRAND licensing and “stopping infringement” are also noted (Art. 38), with the involvement of AQSIQ, SIPO, MIIT, and the Supreme People’s Court).  Encouraging standardization of Chinese patents also remains a priority (Arts. 61, 71).
  8. Service Invention Regulations, an area of some controversy are not specifically noted as a priority.  Encouragement is to be given to enterprises to set up appropriate invention recognition and reward programs in accordance with law (Art. 45), and research is to be undertaken in giving compensation for new scientific achievements (Art. 46).  The language may suggest that more flexibility will be given contractual arrangements and the market, as was agreed to bilaterally between China and the United States.   Relevant agencies involved in these efforts include SIPO, MoST, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, SASAC, Chinese Academy of Sciences, MIIT, Ministry of Defense, etc.
  9. Chinese universities are also encouraged to become more actively engaged in commercialization of technology, through establishment of technology transfer offices (Art. 53) and other efforts.
  10. The impact of US efforts to study IP-intensive industries in the US economy is also apparent in this plan in terms of the government’s efforts to investigate promoting IP intensive industries in the Chinese economy, government procurement of products from IP intensive industries, and developing model districts for IP intensive industries (Arts. 55-56).  Interestingly, there is no specific reference to engaging economists on any of these efforts, despite the role of foreign economists in similar efforts, some of who have also directly engaged China on how to determine IP-intensity in an economy.
  11. There is discussion of using tax and financial policies to promote IP creation in China (Arts. 98, 99).  There is no explicit discussion of harmonization with OECD guidelines regarding patent boxes and other forms of international tax avoidance.
  12. The report discusses a number of strategies and plans to reduce overseas IP risks facing Chinese companies, including assisting Chinese companies in strategic planning, patenting and licensing (Arts. 72-76), developing information resources on risks and cases (Arts. 78-79), and – rather ominously – developing policies for countering large intellectual property cases overseas (with the support of MofCOM, Customs, SAIC, AQSIQ, NCA, and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade – “CCPIT”).   There is no discussion on any changes to current technology import regulations which impose onerous indemnity and non-grant back requirements on foreign licensors.
  13. The report directs research to be conducted of placing IP officials overseas in important countries, region and IP organizations.  Although China’s current IP attaché in the United States is a MofCOM employee, the responsible agencies for this effort include SIPO, NCA, SAIC, and CCPIT (Art. 85).  The first Chinese IP attaché was dispatched to the United States pursuant to a bilateral commitment of the  2005 Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade.
  14. The report notes that China will become more involved in promoting a more “fair and reasonable” international IP regime, through support of the Doha amendments to the TRIPS Agreement, the Convention on Biodiversity and various IP conventions.  The Hague Convention on Industrial Designs is noted, but not UPOV 1991.  Promotion of intangible heritage and folklore are also noted (Arts. 59. 87).
  15. IP talent creation and training are also key elements of the plan (103-105).

 

Often in looking at plans like these, it is also equally important to ask what is not being covered.   The plan does not focus enough on a China where there is greater scientific collaboration with foreign scientists and engineers, which are also result in an increasingly large number of co-invented patents.  Similarly, increasing Chinese investment in IP-intensive industries in the United States means that many Chinese companies will own substantial IP interests and may be less inclined to view IP issues as “us” vs “them.”  The relative under-emphasis on civil remedies for IP issues in this plan is also troubling, as the availability of adequate civil remedies is what drives IP commercialization.

The report also does not suggest increasing the role of economists in IP and antitrust agencies, despite a clear focus on increasing the IP-intensity of the Chinese economy. Gaps in Chinese law, such as denial of copyright protection for sports broadcasting, weak protection for trade dress, and “circular” litigation between the patent and trademark offices and the courts which may delay final adjudication on matters, controlling trademark squatting and subsidies for unexamined patents are not discussed.

Although there are many positive aspects of this plan, I believe that focusing on issues like compulsory licensing, the Doha Declaration and folklore, or what appears to be political solutions to overseas infringement may also not deliver as much value to the Chinese economy and China’s scientists, engineers, artists and entrepreneurs, as returning to core IP concepts which let the market govern IP creation and enforcement through such measures as improving the scope of rights that are protected under Chinese law, limiting government intervention, increasing the role of the civil judicial system, and promoting increased collaboration.