A forthcoming lecture by Mark Cohen on Weaponization of Intellectual Property Against China at UCSD.
Even during a time of trade conflict, there was considerable litigation and patent licensing activity with China, including a pronounced role in global markets for Chinese companies and in China for US companies. Patent disputes and licensing involved a diverse group of technologies. Chinese companies have become more active in SEP litigation overseas. The United States is an important venue for litigating overseas patent disputes with Chinese entities. Both the patent licensing and pharma data show the importance of tracking market value and trends to determine the real-world impact of IP-related policies.
About a dozen years ago while reviewing SIPO monthly statistics, I noticed that the percentage of foreign applications for invention patents for the prior year had shrunk to the point where they […]
On January 27, 2021, the CNIPA issued the “国家知识产权局关于进一步严格规范专利申请行为的通知” (Notice on Further Strictly Regulating Patent Application Behavior)”. Although the Notice, on first glance, is reacting to the USPTO Report and is transformative in nature, it in fact builds upon prior efforts of CNIPA and other agencies, it does not completely address issues involving market externalities, such as subsidies, in patent filings.
Four upcoming speaking events on China IP in February 2021.
I will be talking February 22, 2021 at 7 PM at a virtual Duke University webinar on “China’s Emerging Intellectual Property Edge: Challenges and Opportunities.” The program is sponsored by Duke’s Asia/Pacific […]
What is the future of US – China dialogues on IP? Perhaps the future is better in IP than in other areas, regardless of the fate of the Phase 1 Agreement – at least those were lessons that could be drawn from the recent Berkeley-Tsinghua program on transnational IP litigation.
CAI, RCEP and the Phase 1 Trade Agreement all responded to different economic, trade demands and political urgencies. The CAI has been understood as a sign by the Biden administration that the European Union will pursue its own trade relationship with China based on its own interests. While the IP and forced technology transfer provisions of the Phase 1 Agreement helped establish new standards in China that are applicable to all countries, the non-IP provisions of the Phase 1 Agreement were not kind to Europeans and other allies in their preferential buying requirements. The EU, however, did not significantly advance IP protections in the CAI text. The bright side of this picture is that the CAI leaves space for the United States and the European Union to further coordinate strategies on IP protection in China.
Several press outlets are running articles about how the Biden team’s trade posture will “involve a laser focus on what improves wages and creates high-paying jobs in the United States, rather than making […]
I previously blogged about several China-oriented proposals released after the November elections here. Three additional proposals have recently been released that involve how the USG engages China on IP and innovation issues. 1.The […]