CAI, RCEP and the Phase 1 Trade Agreement all responded to different economic, trade demands and political urgencies. The CAI has been understood as a sign by the Biden administration that the European Union will pursue its own trade relationship with China based on its own interests. While the IP and forced technology transfer provisions of the Phase 1 Agreement helped establish new standards in China that are applicable to all countries, the non-IP provisions of the Phase 1 Agreement were not kind to Europeans and other allies in their preferential buying requirements. The EU, however, did not significantly advance IP protections in the CAI text. The bright side of this picture is that the CAI leaves space for the United States and the European Union to further coordinate strategies on IP protection in China.
Due Process and ASI’s: Wuhan and Texas
There are now numerous IP cases where foreign judges have decided that Chinese courts failed to provide adequate notice or procedural transparency. Should concerns over a failure to comply with general notions of due process, including notice or access to counsel mandate that a court limit the impact of a foreign court’s anti-suit injunction?
NYU Program on Due Process for Foreign Business in China
I was honored to be invited to moderate the opening session for the 21st annual Timothy A Gelatt Dialogue at NYU Law on “Due Process for Foreign Business in China?” on November 12, […]
Asking the “Better Questions”: Lessons for the AML … from a Nobel Physics Laureate
Several people have reached out to me in the past few weeks about questionnaires that have been sent out by China’s National Development and Reform Commission, which brought the Qualcomm IP abuse […]
