Category: AML

SAMR’s “Choreography” of  SEP AML Rulemaking

How should one understand the overlapping rules enacted by SAMR on IP, SEPS and antitrust? Is a new wave of legislation under way? Is China planning on ramping up antitrust enforcement in SEPs? What do these legislative experiments portend in terms of China’s commitments to rule of law and the challenges faced by high tech companies – whether implementer or licensor in China?

Reviewing Recent Literature on the WTO and Antitrust in IP

Two books, China and the WTO: Why Multilateralism Still Matter (Mavroidis and Sapir), and Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism (Zhang) consider trade and competition law aspects of the U.S.-China trade dispute.  They discuss the treatment of state-owned enterprises under international trade and domestic competition law rules.  They also discuss IP-specific issues, particularly forced technology transfer by or for the state and the control of abusive technology licensing practices, including the licensing of standards essential patents and China’s discriminatory Administration of Technology Import/Export Regulations (“TIER”), which has since been amended.  The books and article are part of several academic and popular discourses on the disruptive and unpredictable policy agenda of the Trump administration, which also provide cautionary roadmaps for future engagement – or confrontation – with China.

Bureaucracy and Politics in Recent SAMR Legislation

There are numerous heirarchies to Chinese legislation and IP laws are certainly not an except to this. Due to the government reorganization in 2018, Chinese efforts to become an innovative economy, and external political pressure from the Trade War, there has also been extensive external political pressure on Chinese IP legislative efforts. The different approaches to legislating may indicate potential weaknesses in the laws. They may also be the outcome of internal bureaucratic struggles.

Phase 1 and CAI: A Tale of Two Agreements

CAI, RCEP and the Phase 1 Trade Agreement all responded to different economic, trade demands and political urgencies. The CAI has been understood as a sign by the Biden administration that the European Union will pursue its own trade relationship with China based on its own interests. While the IP and forced technology transfer provisions of the Phase 1 Agreement helped establish new standards in China that are applicable to all countries, the non-IP provisions of the Phase 1 Agreement were not kind to Europeans and other allies in their preferential buying requirements. The EU, however, did not significantly advance IP protections in the CAI text. The bright side of this picture is that the CAI leaves space for the United States and the European Union to further coordinate strategies on IP protection in China.