Patent Litigation, Local Protectionism and Empiricism: Data Sources and Data Critiques

Professors Brian Love, Christine Helmers and Markus Eberhardt have recently co-authored an article Patent Litigation in China: Protecting Rights or the Local Economy?.  The article has been excerpted in the IAM,  discussed on Prof. Don Clarke’s Chinalaw listserve and is also set to be published in 18 Vanderbilt J. Ent. & Tech. L. (2016).  It has created a bit of a stir.

The authors seek to counter certain generalizations regarding the nature of China’s IP (utility patent) enforcement environment.   They bring to an English language reader many useful observations regarding the patents that are being litigated, favored locations for litigations of different technologies, and that local protectionism is not apparent in the litigated cases that were studied.  What has most attracted attention, however, is something that really should not have:  foreigners win cases.  This is not new news and probably oversimplifies what the data suggests.  The conclusion itself reflects mostly on the lack of knowledge of the West on China’s IP system.  Indeed, I personally believe that a review of all available data would likely lead to a different conclusion on how foreigners win cases and the nature of Chinese “local protectionism.” Unfortunately, by relying primarily on English language secondary sources, an incomplete database and data that is over five years old, the article doesn’t address why foreigners bring so few cases when they are winning and what are the factors that contribute to success or failure.

I have divided my observations on this article into three parts: (a) why foreigners winning cases is “old news”; (b) what litigant behavior and the databases likely say about “win” rates; and (c) manifestations and data on local protectionism.

  1. Win Rates as Old News

The authors suggest that they are the “first large-scale empirical study of patent litigation in China” and that “empirical study of Chinese patent enforcement is virtually non-existent.”

In fact, there are a wealth of surveys on foreign “win rates”胜诉率 in the Chinese IP courts, most of which draw upon a larger sample than the 471 patents cases used by the authors, which included only 49 cases with foreign plaintiffs and 29 cases as defendants — a rather small sample.

Here’s a random survey of prior studies on foreign win rates that I found in preparing this review of the article.

 

1.According to a press report of a Shanghai news conference, the success rate for foreigners in first instance IP trials was 84.6% for the 447 cases filed in Shanghai from 2009-2013.

2. Of the 2,691 cases adjudicated in the Beijing Number 1  Intermediate court for the period 2006-2010, foreigners had a full or partial win rate of 55.2%.

3.A newspaper report on success rates for foreigners on IP cases in Zhejiang  reported success rates of 95% for 2013 out of 85 foreign cases adjudicated that year, with rates as high as 99% in 2010.

4.  A sample of 350 foreign-related cases conducted by the Guangdong High Court in 2010 to the first half of 2013 of 1272 cases filed (not including Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau), revealed success rates of 70-80%, with relatively low settlement rates of 10-20%.  Foreign cases constituted about 2.25% of all IP cases.

5.  A study of the leading cases discussed in the gazette of the Supreme People’s Court for the 30 year period from 1985 to 2014 reported a success rate in the 33 foreign cases (out of 157 cases filed) of 73%, with foreigners playing the role of plaintiff in two-thirds of the cases.

6.  A study reported by the renowned Judge Sun Hailong in Chongqing in 2015 noted that for the period of 2003 -2007 the success rate for Chinese litigants was 5.78%.   This report also challenges the notion, that “inland provinces”, such as Sichuan, are somehow hotbeds of local protectionism, which the authors of the Love study noted has “little empirical evidence… to support or refute.”

7.  The Shanghai Number 2 Intermediate Peoples Court reported for the period 2006-2010, that the success rate for foreigners on IP cases was 86.3% of the 80 cases heard.  Foreigners were plaintiffs in 94.5% of the cases filed.

8.  In an English language September 27, 2012 letter of SIPO Commissioner Tian Lipu to USPTO Director Kappos, SIPO also points to analyses it conducted of foreign win rates, noting that in the 800 foreign cases surveyed from a number of different provinces (including inland provinces), foreign companies on average stood a better chance of winning their cases than Chinese parties, with foreigners winning all design patent cases in Guangdong.  The study notes that in Shanghai foreigners were more likely to appear as defendants and their win rate was 59% compared to 52% for domestic defendants   When foreigners acted as plaintiffs in Shanghai, their win rate in first instance cases was 77.8% versus 59.3% for domestic parties.

The above data, in general, supports all of the conclusions of the authors, except for the notion that their study is path breaking.  The notion that foreigners win patent cases in China is not new news. However, I differ with the implicit conclusion that local protectionism or other challenges hardly exist…

(2) What the Databases Say About Win Rates and Empirical IP Research in China

The authors reliance on some rather old cases in the CIELA database (www.ciela.cn) actually may be said to undercut their conclusions.  CIELA catalogues approximately 30,000 IP cases for the period 2006-2014.   This is a fraction of the total cases filed during this period.    In 2014 alone, there were 133,863 IP cases accepted by the courts, of which patent cases constituted 9,648 and administrative patent cases were 539.  CIELA especially lacks in settled cases and cases litigated after 2011 (article, fn. 23).  Indeed, the small sample of invention patent cases selected by the authors in a multiple year period was about 1/20 of the numbers of patent cases in 2014 alone

Because China’s IP policies change quickly compared to the United States, recent samples can be very important.  In using data prior to 2012, the authors chose to ignore many recent developments, which could have affected their conclusions  These include the expiration of the National IP Strategy and a new plan for 2014-2020, a lack of data on the IP Courts, and the lack of reference to administrative patent litigation.   The growth of administrative patent enforcement litigation may be the most disruptive of this study as SIPO, heard 35,884 patent administrative enforcement cases in 2015, up 46.4% from 2014, of which 14,202 were patent infringement cases, and 21,237 were patent passing off cases.   The Love study sample pales in comparison to these numbers. Unfortunately, we know very little about the disposition of these cases.  Moreover enhancing administrative patent enforcement appears to be a current priority of SIPO, including in proposed amendments to the patent law.

The authors’ data however might also be compared with other, more recent and comprehensive sources.  A competing commercial database, Darts IP, offers considerably more cases, especially recent cases. Here is what I understand that Darts collects on Chinese civil patent litigation compared to CIELA:

Ciela Total Civil Patent cases Darts IP Total Civil Patent Cases
2007 699
2008 531
2009 566
2010 631 1516
2011 852 1719
2012 736 2067
2013 271 1755
2014 0 2490
2010-2014 Total 2490 9547

 

The DARTS IP decisions also include data on provisional relief and settlements, as indicated above, which CIELA does not as fully report.

Nonetheless, I believe the honor of the largest judicial database likely belongs to the courts themselves.   Chinese judicial databases have become increasingly more comprehensive.  As Susan Finder has noted on her Supreme Peoples Court Monitor Blog, the SPC has recently upgraded its case database, to include over 14,000,000 separate documents and has become a “a rich source of understanding how the Chinese court system is operating, through (for example) a focused search of a  specific type of case…”.  Chinese judges have told me that the largest collection of cases involving patent infringement at this time likely belongs to another judicial database, the IPR court decision database.  Whatever their respective holdings, I believe that judicially-maintained databases will be increasingly useful in undertaking the kinds of empirical analyses that are needed, including analyses of the fairness and independence of the Chinese judiciary.  One early effort in using these databases was Xin He and Su Yang’s important article on the handling of civil law suits in Shanghai.   “Do the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead in Shanghai Courts?, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 10, Issue 1, pp. 120-145, 2013 ), which analyzed 2,724 adjudication decisions in Shanghai to reach their conclusions that “stronger parties not only win more often, but also do so by a large margin.” This article did not focus on “local protectionism”, but its conclusions suggest that bias persists in less visible forms than simple discrimination against outsiders.  I do not believe that IP is an exception to other forms of civil litigation in terms of political pressure.

Finally, there is the problem of database selectivity, which was also discussed on Don Clarke’s list serve, and is acknowledged by the authors.  The reasons for the high win rates are likely to be buried in other data, including the very low percentage of cases in China that are foreign related, which has resulted in a high degree of self-selecting of cases that foreigners bring.  Moreover, many important cases in China have simply not been published, among them the landmark first instance case of Chint v. Schneider, which resulted in the largest patent damages (for a utility model) in China’s history, and the important first instance antitrust case of Huawei vs. Interdigital, both of which involved foreigners who lost.  Finally, the CIELA database has its own weaknesses in terms of focusing on China’s key courts.  For example, CIELA records only two patent infringement law suits from the Supreme People’s Court (with a 50% “win” rate), which is hardly the situation for China’s most important court.

(C) Local Protectionism

Local protectionism, as the authors point out, has long been a concern to foreign rights holders in China.  However, what constitutes local protectionism, other than a fear of the foreign and unknown, has rarely been defined.  The authors define local protectionism in value-terms, such as “bias”, “corruption” and “lack of impartiality” especially in China’s inland provinces.   It is equally clear that local protectionism is not merely a foreign concern.  Chinese officials have also repeatedly complained about local protectionist barriers of various kinds, including in IP enforcement.

I do not believe that local protectionism is only question of where a party is located, but rather, consistent with Xin He and Su Yang’s view, the political power and influence that a local company may have on the local judiciary or other enforcement officials.  Local protection also is not necessarily an issue of whether one is forced to litigate in a remote inland province, as the authors suggest, and which the articles I cite at the beginning of this review (which include data from inland provinces) refute.  At its base local protectionism derives its influence from a locally employed and appointed judiciary.  In fact, a well-connected foreign company which has many employees may have significant local influence in a given Chinese locality, which is also dependent on the employment and taxes provided by that foreign entity.   Thus, foreign companies may also benefit from local protectionism – or at least to a degree.

I believe that most foreign rights holders, facing the uncertainties of a legal culture that bears the opprobrium of being “local protectionist” would actually file their cases in jurisdictions where they are likely to benefit from the most local protectionism possible.  The article appears to corroborate this when it notes, that “foreign entities appear in the data more often as patentees than accused infringers.”  However, further studies would be useful to corroborate linkages between industrial interests, R&D, and patent litigation in China.

Local protectionism may be influenced by local interests.  However, as the authors note, IP litigation in China tends to be clustered.  However, such clustering can be a double-edged sword.  Local judges who are more familiar with a particular technology or industry, may also be more sympathetic and knowledgeable about a given technology, as much as they may be inclined to favor a domestic litigant.

One place the authors might have looked at to validate if local protectionism is the basis for plaintiff’s filing of cases would be to compare cases involving the same parties or same set of facts.  For example, one might look at appellate reversal rates of judgments rendered in favor of foreigners.    Earlier (unpublished)  studies I conducted on the CIELA data shows a dramatic shift away from foreigners’ favor when they appeal their favorable first instance decisions, with about a 30% foreign win overturn rate on appeal, compared to 17% for domestic plaintiffs.  The data below needs to be updated but nonetheless gives a sense of general trends.

The data might be compared with data on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  For example,  Janicke and Ren found no statistically significant evidence of bias against foreign parties in Fed Circuit, in which 26 percent involved foreign defendants accused of patent infringement. See: See Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases? 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 9 (2006).  Other cases of this nature include: Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497,1499 (2003); Trimble, Foreigners in U.S. Patent Litigation: An Empirical Study of Patent Cases Filed in Nine U.S. Federal District Courts in 2004, 2009, and 2012 (17 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech L . ).  Still another fruitful area of comparison is in reviewing decisions by different courts on counterpart foreign patents, or on technology that is the subject of trade secret litigations in different jurisdictions, to determine if there is a bias towards one country or another.

Another way of approaching local protectionism is to be less empirical and instead look at national policies and anecdotes that suggest there may be unchecked bias.  For example, the appointment of judges by local people’s congresses for a term could suggest local favoritism. Recent national judicial policies which favor courts “vigorously” asserting jurisdiction in international matters, and “restricting foreign parties to litigation from leaving China” can create significant risks for foreign litigants.  Many academics and officials have expressed growing concerns over due process rights for foreigners in Chinese IP litigation.  In addition, there have been several high profile cases in the United States which have which have suggested that the Chinese government may be actively intervening in cases.  In at least one case (Huawei vs Interdigital) a Chinese judge has urged Chinese companies to aggressively use Chinese  antitrust law to address “technology roadblocks in China and overseas” (华为公司善于运用反垄断法律武器进行反制,值得其他中国企业学习。…国内企业,在突破技术壁垒为自己赢得发展空间上,要大胆运用反垄断诉讼的手段. ). There are also telling cases such as the matter of Hu Zhicheng, an engineer, who was involved in a patent dispute with his former business partner turned competitor.   Investigators allegedly tried to force him to sign rights to his US patents to the former business partner, and subsequently jailed him for 17 months for alleged commercial theft.  Prosecutors later withdrew the commercial theft case.  He was not released until June 2013.

One of the oddities of practicing Chinese IP in Washington, DC is that it exists at the intersection of both IP law and Chinese legal studies.  Both of these areas have benefitted enormously from empirical research to support sounds academic analysis, business strategies and government policies.  China’s legacy of state planning has also made much of the debate in China about IP policies highly data-oriented.  However, much of the discussion in the West on Chinese IP has been less empirically-dependent.  This study of Profs. Love et al, is one important step in deepening domestic awareness of how many of our assumptions need empirical support and further research.  The need for such empirical research was one of the reasons that the USPTO set up a China Resource Center, which is an important part of USPTO’s international plans.   I believe we have just started on a long journey of accessing and analyzing the increasingly rich area of empirical analysis of China’s IP environment.

Please send any corrections or edits to this blog to me at chinaipr@yahoo.com.

Update (July 12, 2016):  Jacob Schindler at IAM reported on July 4, 2016 that, according to a Chinese judge, foreign litigants in the Beijing IP Court had a 100% win rate in civil IP cases in 2015.  The win rate for all plaintiffs was 72.3%.

Of course, the issue remains: if the win rate is so high, why is the percentage of foreign related cases so low? As pointed out in this blog, one reason may be that foreigners self-select cases which they believe they have a very high chance of success.

IPR Outcomes in the 26th JCCT

Here are the IP outcomes of the 26th Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, concluded early in November 2015 in Guangzhou.  The IP-related outcomes appear primarily in three different places in the JCCT outcome document, under “Competition”, “Intellectual Property Rights” and “Cooperative Dialogues and Exchanges.”

I have repeated below the outcome language in full, without the annotation that appears in the US Department of Commerce release on the subject, followed by my own “references” on the outcome to compare the text with recent developments in these areas.

The Chinese government version of the outcomes follows the US outcomes.

COMPETITION

China’s anti-monopoly enforcement agencies are to conduct enforcement according to the Anti-monopoly Law and are to be free from intervention by other agencies.

China clarifies that commercial secrets obtained in the process of Anti-monopoly Law enforcement are protected as required under the Anti-monopoly Law and shall not be disclosed to other agencies or third parties, except with a waiver of confidentiality by the submitting party or under circumstances as defined by law.

Taking into account the pro-competitive effects of intellectual property, China attaches great importance to maintaining coherence in the rules related to IPR in the context of the Anti-monopoly Law. China clarifies that any State Council Anti-monopoly Law Commission guidelines will apply to the three anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies.

The Chinese side clarifies that in the process of formulating guidance related to intellectual property rights in the context of anti-monopoly law, it will solicit comments from relevant parties, including the public, in accordance with law and policy.

References: SAIC’s IP Abuse rules, NDRC’s draft IP Abuse rules. Importantly, this outcome specifically recognizes the pro-competitive nature of promoting IP. As I said in my comments on the NDRC’s IP abuse guideline questionnaire, “Rather than seek to minimize IP rights through euphemisms such as “balance” perhaps a better approach would be how to optimize the patent system to foster long term innovation and competition and insure that the competition system supports and does not retard such development.”

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Standards and Intellectual Property

The United States and China affirm the beneficial role of standards in promoting innovation, efficiency, and public health and safety, and the need to strike an appropriate balance of interests of multiple stakeholders.

The United States and China commit that licensing commitments for patents in voluntary standards are made voluntarily and without government involvement in negotiations over such commitments, except as otherwise provided by legally binding measures.

The United States confirms that Chinese firms participate in the setting of voluntary consensus standards in the United States on a non-discriminatory basis, consistent with the rules and procedures of the relevant standards organizations. China welcomes U.S.-invested firms in China to participate in the development of national recommendatory and social organization standards in China on a non-discriminatory basis.

With a view to enhance mutual understanding and trust, the United States and China agree to hold dialogues over issues under this topic.

Here are some other blogs on this important topic.

Trade Secrets

The United States and China are committed to providing a strong trade secrets protection regime that promotes innovation and encourages fair competition.  China clarifies it is in the process of amending the Anti-Unfair Competition Law; intends to issue model or guiding court cases; and intends to clarify rules on preliminary injunctions, evidence preservation orders and damages. The United States confirms that draft legislation proposed to establish a federal civil cause of action for trade secrets misappropriation has been introduced in relevant committees. Both sides confirm that IP-related investigations, including on trade secrets, are conducted in a prudent and cautious manner.  The United States and China agree to jointly share experiences and practices in the areas of protecting trade secrets from disclosure during investigations and in court proceedings, and identify practices that companies may undertake to protect trade secrets from misappropriation in accordance with respective laws.

References: Note that the reference in the trade secret provision to a degree mirrors that of the Competition outcome, regarding protecting confidential information in administrative proceedings. Proposed revisions to the AUCL were previously discussed here.

Geographical Indications (GIs)

The United States and China will continue our dialogue on GIs. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of the 2014 JCCT commitment on GIs and confirmed that this commitment applies to all GIs, including those protected pursuant to international agreements. China will publish in draft form for public comment, and expects to do so by the end of 2016, procedures that provide the opportunity for a third party to cancel already-granted GIs.

Reference: This commitment builds on the 2014 GI commitment in the JCCT. An important case involving enforcement of a trademark based GI for scotch whisky is discussed here.

Sports Broadcasts

The United States and China agree to protect original recordings of the images, or sound and images, of live events, including sports broadcasts, against acts of unauthorized exploitation, including the unauthorized retransmission of such broadcasts over computer networks, in accordance with their respective laws and regulations.  The United States and China agree to discuss copyright protection for sports broadcasts and further cooperate on this issue in the JCCT IPR Working Group and other appropriate bilateral fora.

References: Copyright protection for sports broadcasting has been discussed elsewhere in this blog, and is of increasing important to China as it prepares to host the Winter Olympics and wants to develop its sports leagues. In addition US courts have granted copyright protection to Chinese sports broadcasts in a recent case. Tencent has also signed an important licensing deal with the NBA to make content available online.

Enhanced Enforcement Against Media Boxes and Unauthorized Content Providers

Noting the challenges posed by new technologies to the protection of copyright, China and the United States will continue discussions and share respective experiences and practices on combating the unauthorized online distribution of audiovisual content made possible by media boxes.  China clarifies it is to enhance enforcement against such media boxes and the providers of unauthorized content in accordance with its laws and regulations.

Reference: A recent US media box case involving Chinese content is discussed here.

Online Enforcement

In order to address the civil, administrative and criminal enforcement challenges caused by the rapid development of e-commerce, as part of the JCCT IPR Working Group, China and the United States will enhance engagement and exchanges between U.S. and Chinese government IPR policy and enforcement officials, IP right holders, business representatives and online sales-platform operators, among other relevant stakeholders.  This engagement will cover current and anticipated challenges in protecting and enforcing IPR online by sharing respective practices, discussing possible improvements in each country’s systems, facilitating information exchange and training between our two countries, and increasing cooperation on cross-border enforcement.  The goal of this effort is to enhance existing legal and cooperative regimes among businesses, rights holders and governments in civil, administrative and criminal online IPR enforcement.  Appropriate criminal matters will be referred, if necessary, to law enforcement agencies through the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) IP Criminal Enforcement Working Group or domestic law enforcement officials.

References: there have been numerous Chinese domestic efforts to deal with on-line infringement, including copyright-related campaigns, and an important role for Chinese Customs.

COOPERATIVE DIALOGUES AND EXCHANGES

Searchable Database for Intellectual Property (IP) Cases

The United States welcomes that the Supreme People’s Court has established a database for searching intellectual property-related court decisions.  In order to increase the understanding of each other’s legal systems, the United States and China agree to dialogue and to share experiences on their respective databases containing IP cases.

References: Whether or not China is developing “case law with Chinese characteristics,” understanding how Chinese courts handle cases can help guide sound business decisions.

Bad Faith Trademark Filings

Given the importance of addressing bad faith trademark filings, both sides agree to continue to prioritize the issue of bad faith trademark filings, and to strengthen communication and exchange on this issue through existing channels.

References: This is a continuation of earlier efforts.

Copyright Legislation

The United States and China are to continue exchanges on the development of their respective copyright laws.  China clarifies that its Copyright Law is in the process of amendment and useful principles and interpretative guidance from the Supreme People Court’s 2012 Judicial Interpretation on Internet Intermediary Liability will be considered in the law, if appropriate and feasible.

The final judicial interpretation is available here. Here is a blog on the 2014 State Council draft of the Copyright Law revision, and a blog on a 2012 NCA draft.

Exchange on Intellectual Property Rights Legislation

Recognizing the success and experience of recent exchanges on IP legislation through the JCCT IPR Working Group, programs under the Cooperation Framework Agreement and other fora, as well as the desire of the United States and China to further understand recent developments in this area, the United States and China agree to exchange views on their legislative developments in IP and innovation including on pending reforms in copyright law, patent law, trade secret law (anti-unfair competition law), science and technology achievement law, etc., with relevant legislative bodies.

References: This is a broad commitment, with much legislative activity planned in China in areas such as trade secrets, copyright, patents and related regulations.

Protection of New Plant Varieties

The United States and China agree to hold exchanges on the protection of new plant varieties through bilateral meetings and other means to be determined.

References: China and Switzerland agreed to extend plant variety protections in the Swiss-China FTA.

Here are the outcomes involving IP from the MofCOM website.  Source:

http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/l/201512/20151201200026.shtm

“特别301”报告 SPECIAL 301 REPORT

美方重申其承诺,将在“特别301报告”中客观、公正、善意地评价包括中国在内的外国政府,在知识产权保护和执法方面付出的努力。美方欢迎旨在加强中国知识产权保护的改革和行动,并承诺在2016年“特别301报告”中将强调中国政府在知识产权保护和执法方面采取的积极行动。

 恶名市场 NOTORIOUS MARKETS

美方重申其承诺,如果适当,将在“恶名市场”名单中客观、公正、善意地评估和认可外国实体,包括中国实体,在知识产权保护和执法方面付出的努力和取得的成绩。美方计划在2016年通过将利益相关方的异议期延长一倍,继续增加程序的透明度。美方将继续与中方就此事项进行讨论。

 

知识产权有效和平衡保护 EFFECTIVE AND BALANCED IP PROTECTION

考虑到《与贸易有关的知识产权协定》的原则和目标,美方和中方将继续就诸如有助于保护创新者免于恶意诉讼的相关政策进行交流和沟通,为创新行为提供积极环境。

 

知识产权合作 IP COOPERATION

中美双方确认知识产权保护在中美双边经贸关系中的关键作用。双方承认合作的益处,并认可合作构成了双方知识产权交流的基础,承诺进一步加强重要领域的深入合作,包括:

进一步加强中美商贸联委会知识产权工作组作为牵头协调知识产权问题双边论坛的作用。

继续高度重视中美知识产权合作框架协议的工作,包括2016年司法交流和将在中国举办的一项培训项目;在完成并对现有承诺项目进行审查后,在预算允许的前提下,考虑在框架协议下增加其他项目。

支持中国商务部在2016年第一季度举办的技术许可联合研讨会。

其他项目将根据个案原则进行组织。双方认识到中美双方,特别是美方,与一系列从事知识产权培训和技术交流的机构和私人组织合作,实施了广泛的项目策划工作。

 

加强在打击网络盗版方面的合作  STRENGTHENED COOPERATION IN DEALING WITH ONLINE PIRACY

为应对在美国涉嫌网络盗版刑事侵权案件影响中国权利人的情况,中美执法联合联络小组下设的知识产权刑事执法合作工作组在美国驻华使馆的联系人将负责接收中方行政部门转交的此类信息。

 

通过中美双边合作加强知识产权在企业中的利用和保护 USING BILATERAL COOPERATION TO STRENGTHEN IP UTILIZATION AND PROTECTION IN ENTERPRISES

认识到双边贸易与投资持续增长的情况,中美双方同意加强合作与交流,就各自国家知识产权保护和利用有关的经验数据进行研究,并在此领域采取具体行动或举办项目,以协助中美关于鼓励创新的决策,并帮助中美创新者、创造者和企业家更好地理解如何在各自国家创造、保护和利用知识产权。

 

深化和加强中美知识产权刑事执法合作 DEEPENING CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION IN IP

在中美执法联合联络小组下设的知识产权刑事执法合作工作组机制项下,中美将继续就跨国知识产权调查开展合作。双方将确定共同合作的重点案件,就此类案件保持定期沟通和信息分享,并探索在共同感兴趣的领域开展技术交流的机会。

 …

中美共同打击网络销售假药 JOINT SINO-US COMBATTING OF ONLINE COUNTERFEIT MEDICINE SALES

中美两国政府都非常重视打击网络销售假药以保障公共的用药安全和健康。两国食品药品监管机构之间已就打击网络销售假药开展合作,并承诺未来继续开展合作。这种合作包括分享信息、分享提高公众对网络销售药品认知的最佳实践以及加强在现有国际组织活动中的沟通与协调。

Updated: December 2 and 3,  2015, December 26, 2018.

Making the List: China Law Blogs

Carla Spina at Harvard Law School has compiled the following list of China Law Listserves, Blogs and Forums.  We are honored to be on this list, with some great company:

Chinese legal study.

See: http://guides.library.harvard.edu/content.php?pid=189933&sid=3922661.

Thanks to the Chinalaw Blog for pointing this out!