Category Archives: Geographical Indications

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Unpacking the Role of IP Legislation in the Trade War

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Here is my attempt to unpack recent legislation and their relevance to the on-going trade dispute.

In recent months, China has amended its Foreign Investment Law, the Technology Import/Export Regulations (“TIER”), the Anti-Unfair Competition Law regarding trade secrets, and the Trademark Law, with new provisions on bad faith filings and damages. A summary of the Trademark Law revisions provided by SIPS is found here. China also amended the Joint Venture Regulations provisions removing provisions that which limited a foreign licensor’s freedom to license technology beyond years or to restrict use of licensed technology after the 10 year period had elapsed.

With the revisions to the TIER and the JV regulations, much of the basis for the US and EU complaints against China at the WTO regarding de jure forced technology transfer may have evaporated (WTO Disputes DS542, and DS549). However, the public dockets do not indicate that the cases have been withdrawn.

China seems to have determined that it has crossed a line in how much it can accommodate US demands. Bloomberg reported on a commentary published after the imposition of escalated sanctions in the influential “China Voice” column of the People’s Daily which accused the US of fabricating forced technology transfer claims. The commentary is entitled “If you want to condemn somebody, don’t worry about the pretext”, with the sub-title, written in classical Chinese: “‘Forced Technology Transfer’ Should Stop!”. (欲加之罪，何患无辞 – “中国强制转让技术论”可以休矣). The title is a quotation from the Zuo Zhuan, a classic of Chinese history written around 400 B.C. that realistically describes the palace intrigues, military tactics, assassinations, etc. from the chaotic “Spring and Autumn” period from 771-476 B.C. The People’s Daily view is also shared by a number of scholars and observers who view the problem as exaggerated or mischaracterized (apart from the TIER and JV regulations). However, this view has been rejected by USTR Lighthizer, as was reported in a recent NPR interview (March 25, 2019):

“CHANG: Though a number of scholars believe the Trump administration is overstating how often forced technology transfers are happening.

LIGHTHIZER: Well, I guess I don’t know who those scholars are. We did an eight-month study on it, and I think it’s the very strong view of the people that we talked to that it’s a very serious problem and has been for a number of years.”

(Update of May 21, 2019: A recent EU Chamber survey in fact showed an increase in businesses reporting that FTT is a concern, from 10% two years ago to 20%.)

There have also been several IP legislative developments that may not be as directly linked to US government trade pressure. Perhaps the most important is the launch of China’s new national appellate IP Court effective January 1, 2019. The NPC has released a draft of the civil code provisions on personality rights (See this translation). Personality rights can be important tools in addressing trademark squatting, such as in the Michael Jordan case with Qiaodan. CNIPA also released Draft Provisions for Regulating Applications for Trademark Registration （关于规范商标申请注册行为的若干规定（征求意见稿） which addresses bad faith registrations. CNIPA released a draft rule for public comment on Protection of Foreign GI’s (国外地理标志产品保护办法 （修订征求意见稿）on February 28, 2019. The comments focus on generic terms and a GI expert committee for examination of foreign GI’s. Here are INTA’s comments on the trademark registration and GI proposed rules. CNIPA also proposed changes to patent examination guidelines on such issues as proof of inventive step and what constitutes “common knowledge.” Here are AIPLA’s comments from April 4, 2019.

Still pending are proposed amendments to the Drug Administration Law, with comments due by May 25, 2019. This is a second public comment draft released by the NPC. Ropes & Gray has provided a useful analysis. The proposed changes to the DAL also include increased punitive damages for counterfeit medicines, in line with increased penalties in the IP laws (Trademark, AUCL, etc.). There are also proposed changes to the patent law which was released for comment earlier this year. Of particular interest to the pharma sector in the proposed changes were provisions calling for patent term restoration. However, a hoped for inclusion of patent linkage through an “artificial infringement” provision to trigger an infringement challenge by reason of a pharmaceutical regulatory approval has not yet materialized. There were also rumors that China and USTR has scaled back regulatory data protection for biologics from the 12 years that had originally been proposed by China in 2018 to the 10 year period provided by the US Mexico Canada Free Trade Agreement.

What is the relationship between all these legislative changes and the trade war? Larry Kudlow, the Director of the National Economic Council, described the legislative snafu that caused the administration to reinstitute tariffs as follows:

“For many years, China trade, it was unfair, nonreciprocal, unbalanced, in many cases, unlawful. And so, we have to correct those and one of the sticking points right now as we would like to see these corrections in an agreement which is codified by law in China, not just the state council announcement. We need to see something much clearer. And until we do, we have to keep our tariffs on, that’s part of the enforcement process as far as we are concerned.”

So what are the unenacted “laws” and what is the State Council “announcement” that Mr. Kudlow is referring to and which in his view launched this new trade war escalation? I doubt that Mr. Kudlow has read China’s Law on Legislation and understands the difference between a Law passed by the NPC and a State Council Regulation, particularly as US and European practice in recent months appears to be oblivious of legislative nomenclature and its role in determining what constitutes a legally binding document.

Perhaps Mr. Kudlow is talking about the NDRC 38 agency MOU published in late 2018 regarding punishments for serious patent infringement, including use of social credit system. The NDRC document is clearly inferior to a Law or State Council Regulation, but it was a directly promulgated document of a State Council agency. As the patent law amendments have not been enacted yet, he may be referring to this delay in enactment and the failure to increase damages for infringement as has been provided by other statutes. In my own view, the focus on punitive or even statutory damages is misguided as is increased administrative enforcement, as the primary reason that damages are low is the failure of most Chinese courts to impose fully compensatory damages and abide by priorities in law for establishing damages. But I hope to have more on that in another blog…

One thing is certain: China has been timing legislative developments with trade diplomacy. This may lead one to believe that China’s approach to the new laws was purely transactional, and/or there were other laws that the US was also expecting but that China has since declined to deliver. The previously mentioned NDRC 38 Agency MOU was enacted before the G-20 meeting but made publicly available shortly thereafter. The “Working Measures [sic] for Outbound Transfer of Intellectual Property Rights (For Trial Implementation), (State Council, Guo Ban Fa [2018] No. 19)” (知识产权对外转让有关工作办法（试行）) which was previously discussed here, appear to have been timed with the 301 announcement in March 2018. In addition, the revocation of TIER provisions, JV implementing regulations, and amendments to the Trademark Law and AUCL revisions all were enacted with incredible efficiency, often denying any opportunity for meaningful public comment in violation of prior procedural practices. A reasonable guess may be that there were some additional laws or regulations that the US was expecting but that China had determined it could not deliver, or deliver in the time frame provided. Nonetheless, the legislative track record thus far is quite impressive.

China’s improved environment for technology transfer and technology collaboration is coming at a time when the United States has tightened up its controls with China. The most notable legislation in this area is the John S. McCain Defense Authorization Act for 2018 (the “Act”), including the enactment of the Foreign Investment Risk Reduction Modernization Act and the Export Controls Act of 2018. These laws extended export control and foreign investment control authorities to foundational and emerging technologies, as well as to non-passive, non-controlling investments. Much of the technologies of concern overlap with Made in China 2025 and other Chinese industrial policy documents. Although the Act did not specifically create “black” and “white” countries as subjects of controls, the Congressional history did point to special concerns about China:

“Congress declares that long-term strategic competition with China is a principal priority for the United States that requires the integration of multiple elements of national power, including diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and military elements, to protect and strengthen national [t]security, [including] … the use of economic tools, including market access and investment to gain access to sensitive United States industries.”

The most recent report which analyzes the impact of US and Chinese regulations on Chinese investment in the United States by Rhodium Group is found here (May 8, 2019). The report notes an “over 80% decline in Chinese FDI in the US to just $5 billion from $29 billion in 2017 and $46 billion in 2016. Accounting for asset divestitures, net 2018 Chinese FDI in the US was -$8 billion. Meanwhile, American FDI in China dropped only slightly to $13 billion in 2018 from $14 billion in 2017.” The Rhodium report also notes that “the chilling impact of politics on US FDI in China was mostly visible in the ICT space where new investment declined significantly last year.” Other countries have also been enacting similar restrictions on FDI in sensitive areas, as pointed out in a recent article by my Berkeley colleague Vinod K. Aggarawal. Note: I will be speaking at a forthcoming AIPLA webinar on export controls and IP strategies on May 23, 2019 as well as at forthcoming events in China (to be announced).

In addition to these legislative efforts, the US has undertaken steps to restrict H1B visas for talented scientists and engineers and the FBI has created a new working group to address economic espionage from China. The Committee of 100 released an important paper in 2017 showing that Asian Americans were more likely to be prosecuted for economic espionage than any other ethnic group, are also subject to higher sentences and were twice as likely as other groups to have cases against them dismissed. Some observers fear that overly broad regulation and enforcement by the United States may now be encouraging exactly what China has sought to do for decades: repatriate to China the vast talent pool of Chinese scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs to contribute to the technological development of the motherland.

Although there have been few legislative efforts directed to making US science and technology more competitive in response to these perceived threats from China, there have been several general reports and proposals. The National Institute of Science and Technology recently released a green paper, “Return on Investment Initiative for Unleashing American Innovation” (April 2019) to improve federal technology transfer and entrepreneurship. There are increasing calls for Congress to fund the long defunct Office of Technology Assessment, which once played an active role in analyzing US-China technology trade.

Several trade organizations and think tanks have called for increased US funding in science and technology, among them is the recent report of the Task Force of American Innovation, “Second Place America – Increasing Challenges to America’s Scientific Leadership” (May 7, 2019). The R&D graph at the head of this blog showing China’s rapid growth in R&D is from that report. The report notes:

“America’s competitive edge is now at stake, as China and other countries are rapidly increasing investments in research and workforce development in order to assume positions of global leadership. Our nation risks falling perilously behind in the basic scientific research that drives innovation, as our global competitors increase support for cutting-edge research and push to the forefront in fields such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, aerospace, advanced manufacturing, and the next generation of telecommunications networks.”

To round out this summary of legislative developments, there have been developments at the USPTO that impact US relations with China on IP. The USPTO published a proposed regulation which will regulate legal services for the rapidly increasing number of Chinese pro se trademark filers in the US (2/15/2019). This proposed regulation would require these applications to use a US licensed attorney. The purported purpose of this change in current practice is “instill greater confidence in the public that U.S. registrations that issue to foreign applicants are not subject to invalidation for reasons such as improper signatures and use claims and enable the USPTO to more effectively use available mechanisms to enforce foreign applicant compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements in trademark matters.” The rule also seems generally consistent with TRIPS Art. 3, which permits WTO members to require “the appointment of an agent within the jurisdiction of a Member … to secure compliance with laws and regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of [the TRIPS] Agreement”.

Another important development involves USPTO efforts to clarify subject matter eligibility under Sec. 101 of the patent act, and functional claim limitations for computer-enabled inventions under Section 112. The United States had been weakening and destabilizing protections in these important areas affecting artificial intelligence, fintech and biotech inventions at the precise time when China had been strengthening its protections. These are important steps towards strengthening predictability in our domestic IP system, which may be further strengthened by proposed legislative changes.

Ironically, China’s improvements in its investment and tech transfer environment are coming at a time of heightened concern over a Chinese technological threat and increased US and international regulatory scrutiny. It may be difficult, therefore, to perceive any immediate positive impact from changes in China’s investment environment. Indeed, the media has recently been reporting on decisions of different companies or entrepreneurs to close down R&D operations in each other’s markets. Hopefully, both countries may ultimately create the right mix of IP enforcement and protection, regulatory controls over collaboration and industrial policy to enable bilateral scientific collaboration to once again flourish and contribute to the global economy.

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A Statistical Snapshot of IP Prosecution, Admin. Enforcement and Monetization for 2018

As reported by zhichanli, CNIPA (the new agency formed from SIPO, SAIC and AQSIQ’s – IP authorities within the State Administration for Market Regulation) held a news conference on January 10 to report on statistical developments for 2018.  Here are some of the highlights:

Explosive Patent Growth Continues: 1,542,5000 invention patent applications were received by CNIPA, an increase from 2017 when it was 1,381,594.  432,000 patents were granted.  Of these 346,000 were domestic patent applications (2017: 326,970).  This leaves 86,000 foreign applications for 2018 (2017: 93,174).  There was therefore an increase of  5.8% to 19,030 in Chinese domestic patent grants in 2018, while foreign grants appear to have dropped by 7.7% to 7,174.  Any drop in a growing economy and IP system can be indicative of a problem of some type.

In total 93.3% of the domestic invention patents were service inventions, which is one indicator of possibly increasing quality.    Huawei remained the lead domestic filer with 3,369 invention patent applications.

CNIPA had a busy year examining 808,000 invention patents, 1,874,000 utility model patents (an increase from 1,687,593), and 667,000 design patents (an increase from 420,144).  The PRB heard 38,000 cases, resolved 28,000 and invalidated 5,000 patents.

Comparative data on 2017 is drawn from this report.

Trademarks Too, on Overdrive: CNIPA received 7,337,1000 trademark applications (2017: 5,748,00) and registered 5,000,7000.  Of these, 4,797,000 were domestic applicants.  In aggregate, there were 18,049,000 trademarks registered in China (2017: 14,920,000).  The good news is that the rapid growth in TM applications is slowing.  In 2017, there had been a year-on-year increase of 55.7% in trademark applications. In 2018, the increase was “only” 31.8%.

Patent Administrative Enforcement Continues to Be the Focus:  CNIPA reported 77,000 administrative patent cases, with an increase of 15.9% over the previous year.  35,000 cases involved patents disputes, of which 34,000 involved infringement (an increase of 22.8%).  43,000 cases involved counterfeit patents, with an increase of 10.9%.  There were also 31,000 cases involving illegal trademark activities.  This was an increase from approximately 30,000 the year before, which was itself a decrease of 5.1% from the prior year.  The apparent administrative enforcement realignment to patents thus continues, despite recent moves to improve the civil patent system, including the establishment of a specialized IP court at the SPC level, and the relatively high historic utilization of the administrative trademark system by foreigners.

Another odd development: 2018 marked the launch of the first administrative case involving infringement of a registered semiconductor layout design.

TM’s Remain Number 1 in Geographical Indications: There were 67 sui generis GI registrations approved, presumably under the former AQSIQ system, and 961 GI trademarks registered.   The trademark-based GI system thus appears to be occupying a dominant role.

Cross-border Trade In IP – is it Growing:  CNIPA also reported that “usage fees” for IP rights in cross border trade increased to 35 billion USD.  Comparative data to prior years and breakout data with individual countries would be especially useful, in order to do year-on-year comparisons and to also compare with US data on licensing revenue.  As reported in an earlier blog, according to official Chinese statistics for 2013, technology import contracts into China were reported at 41 billion dollars, with patent licensing contracts constituting 15.4% of that total.  I don’t have comprehensive data to make even preliminary comparisons at this time – and such data would be highly useful.

Summary: Altogether, the report shows a rapidly growing huge IP system, with active government involvement, encouragement and planning.  The report also suggests that there may be a diminishing foreign role, relative and/or absolute, in certain areas.  Finally, this report is the first hint of how the combined CNIPA may report on its joint activities in patents, trademarks, semiconductor layout designs, GI’s and administrative enforcement.  Additional data is usually released around IP Week of each year (April 26).

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New State Council Decision on Intellectual Property Strategy For China as a Strong IP Country

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On July 18, 2016, the State Council issued a new policy document,国务院关于新形势下加快知识产权强国建设的 若干意见-重点任务分工方案  — the “Opinion of the State Council on Accelerating the Construction of Intellectual Property Powers for China as an Intellectual Property Strong Country under the New Situation –Division of Tasks.”  Here’s a link to this action plan (docketed as State Council  Working Office No. 66)  , and a link to the machine translation, from which the world cloud above is drawn.   The action plan itself is drawn from a State Council document issued in 2015 on accelerating the establishment of a strong IP country in the context of a new situation.  This 2015 document identified such problems as China being a big country for IP, but not a strong country, protection was not adequately strict, infringement was easy and pervasive, and that these factors were affecting industry’s efforts to innovate.

As I discussed previously, the idea of China needing to become a strong IP country appears in the 2014-2020, National IPR Strategy Action Plan, which has the goal of “Striving to Build A Strong IPR Country”  (努力建设知识产权强国). While China indeed has become “big” on most scales: invention patent filings, trademark, utility models and design patents, intellectual property litigation, criminal IP litigation and administrative litigation, to name a few, “strong” suggests quality, which is much harder to judge.

Here are a few specific observations about this action plan:

  1. Much of the action plan repeats existing efforts, through the MofCOM IPR Leading Group and SIPO’s National IP Strategy Office, and their current efforts at analyzing and coordinating IP effort, as well as cooperative activities (Arts. 1, 3, 13, 15, 18, 21, 22, 25, 30, 44, 88, etc.).
  2. There are greater efforts to incorporate IP into macroeconomic strategies, such as in calculations regarding the national economy and national social welfare (Art. 9), as well as credit reporting (Art. 23).
  3. Increasing compensatory  and punitive damages are a focus (Arts. 14), which have also been an effort of China’s IP courts.  This is one of the key civil-law reform proposals in this plan.   There continues to be an undue emphasis on speed, which I assume is focused on patent administrative enforcement as a more rapid remedy (Art. 16).  China is already a fast moving IP environment.
  4. International cooperation in criminal enforcement is underscored (Arts. 19, 21, 22).
  5. Regarding trade secret protection, the focus is on revising trade secret laws, and protecting IP when employees change jobs (Art. 24).  Changes to China’s discovery regime and other appropriate measures which would greatly assist trade secret claimants, are not discussed.
  6. Geographical indications are a focus, including drafting a stand-alone GI law at “the appropriate time” (Art. 32), increasing the role of trademarks in promoting farmer prosperity (Art. 58), and promoting GI products (Art. 90).
  7. Regarding the long-delayed IP Abuse Guidelines, NDRC, MofCOM, SAIC and the State Council Legislative Affairs Office are all listed as being responsible for drafting “according to their responsibilities” (Art. 36).  Rules on standard essential patents that are based on FRAND licensing and “stopping infringement” are also noted (Art. 38), with the involvement of AQSIQ, SIPO, MIIT, and the Supreme People’s Court).  Encouraging standardization of Chinese patents also remains a priority (Arts. 61, 71).
  8. Service Invention Regulations, an area of some controversy are not specifically noted as a priority.  Encouragement is to be given to enterprises to set up appropriate invention recognition and reward programs in accordance with law (Art. 45), and research is to be undertaken in giving compensation for new scientific achievements (Art. 46).  The language may suggest that more flexibility will be given contractual arrangements and the market, as was agreed to bilaterally between China and the United States.   Relevant agencies involved in these efforts include SIPO, MoST, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, SASAC, Chinese Academy of Sciences, MIIT, Ministry of Defense, etc.
  9. Chinese universities are also encouraged to become more actively engaged in commercialization of technology, through establishment of technology transfer offices (Art. 53) and other efforts.
  10. The impact of US efforts to study IP-intensive industries in the US economy is also apparent in this plan in terms of the government’s efforts to investigate promoting IP intensive industries in the Chinese economy, government procurement of products from IP intensive industries, and developing model districts for IP intensive industries (Arts. 55-56).  Interestingly, there is no specific reference to engaging economists on any of these efforts, despite the role of foreign economists in similar efforts, some of who have also directly engaged China on how to determine IP-intensity in an economy.
  11. There is discussion of using tax and financial policies to promote IP creation in China (Arts. 98, 99).  There is no explicit discussion of harmonization with OECD guidelines regarding patent boxes and other forms of international tax avoidance.
  12. The report discusses a number of strategies and plans to reduce overseas IP risks facing Chinese companies, including assisting Chinese companies in strategic planning, patenting and licensing (Arts. 72-76), developing information resources on risks and cases (Arts. 78-79), and – rather ominously – developing policies for countering large intellectual property cases overseas (with the support of MofCOM, Customs, SAIC, AQSIQ, NCA, and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade – “CCPIT”).   There is no discussion on any changes to current technology import regulations which impose onerous indemnity and non-grant back requirements on foreign licensors.
  13. The report directs research to be conducted of placing IP officials overseas in important countries, region and IP organizations.  Although China’s current IP attaché in the United States is a MofCOM employee, the responsible agencies for this effort include SIPO, NCA, SAIC, and CCPIT (Art. 85).  The first Chinese IP attaché was dispatched to the United States pursuant to a bilateral commitment of the  2005 Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade.
  14. The report notes that China will become more involved in promoting a more “fair and reasonable” international IP regime, through support of the Doha amendments to the TRIPS Agreement, the Convention on Biodiversity and various IP conventions.  The Hague Convention on Industrial Designs is noted, but not UPOV 1991.  Promotion of intangible heritage and folklore are also noted (Arts. 59. 87).
  15. IP talent creation and training are also key elements of the plan (103-105).

 

Often in looking at plans like these, it is also equally important to ask what is not being covered.   The plan does not focus enough on a China where there is greater scientific collaboration with foreign scientists and engineers, which are also result in an increasingly large number of co-invented patents.  Similarly, increasing Chinese investment in IP-intensive industries in the United States means that many Chinese companies will own substantial IP interests and may be less inclined to view IP issues as “us” vs “them.”  The relative under-emphasis on civil remedies for IP issues in this plan is also troubling, as the availability of adequate civil remedies is what drives IP commercialization.

The report also does not suggest increasing the role of economists in IP and antitrust agencies, despite a clear focus on increasing the IP-intensity of the Chinese economy. Gaps in Chinese law, such as denial of copyright protection for sports broadcasting, weak protection for trade dress, and “circular” litigation between the patent and trademark offices and the courts which may delay final adjudication on matters, controlling trademark squatting and subsidies for unexamined patents are not discussed.

Although there are many positive aspects of this plan, I believe that focusing on issues like compulsory licensing, the Doha Declaration and folklore, or what appears to be political solutions to overseas infringement may also not deliver as much value to the Chinese economy and China’s scientists, engineers, artists and entrepreneurs, as returning to core IP concepts which let the market govern IP creation and enforcement through such measures as improving the scope of rights that are protected under Chinese law, limiting government intervention, increasing the role of the civil judicial system, and promoting increased collaboration.

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IPR Outcomes in the 26th JCCT

Here are the IP outcomes of the 26th Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, concluded early in November 2015 in Guangzhou.  The IP-related outcomes appear primarily in three different places in the JCCT outcome document, under “Competition”, “Intellectual Property Rights” and “Cooperative Dialogues and Exchanges.”

I have repeated below the outcome language in full, without the annotation that appears in the US Department of Commerce release on the subject, followed by my own “references” on the outcome to compare the text with recent developments in these areas.

The Chinese government version of the outcomes follows the US outcomes.

COMPETITION

China’s anti-monopoly enforcement agencies are to conduct enforcement according to the Anti-monopoly Law and are to be free from intervention by other agencies.

China clarifies that commercial secrets obtained in the process of Anti-monopoly Law enforcement are protected as required under the Anti-monopoly Law and shall not be disclosed to other agencies or third parties, except with a waiver of confidentiality by the submitting party or under circumstances as defined by law.

Taking into account the pro-competitive effects of intellectual property, China attaches great importance to maintaining coherence in the rules related to IPR in the context of the Anti-monopoly Law. China clarifies that any State Council Anti-monopoly Law Commission guidelines will apply to the three anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies.

The Chinese side clarifies that in the process of formulating guidance related to intellectual property rights in the context of anti-monopoly law, it will solicit comments from relevant parties, including the public, in accordance with law and policy.

References: SAIC’s IP Abuse rules, NDRC’s draft IP Abuse rules. Importantly, this outcome specifically recognizes the pro-competitive nature of promoting IP. As I said in my comments on the NDRC’s IP abuse guideline questionnaire, “Rather than seek to minimize IP rights through euphemisms such as “balance” perhaps a better approach would be how to optimize the patent system to foster long term innovation and competition and insure that the competition system supports and does not retard such development.”

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Standards and Intellectual Property

The United States and China affirm the beneficial role of standards in promoting innovation, efficiency, and public health and safety, and the need to strike an appropriate balance of interests of multiple stakeholders.

The United States and China commit that licensing commitments for patents in voluntary standards are made voluntarily and without government involvement in negotiations over such commitments, except as otherwise provided by legally binding measures.

The United States confirms that Chinese firms participate in the setting of voluntary consensus standards in the United States on a non-discriminatory basis, consistent with the rules and procedures of the relevant standards organizations. China welcomes U.S.-invested firms in China to participate in the development of national recommendatory and social organization standards in China on a non-discriminatory basis.

With a view to enhance mutual understanding and trust, the United States and China agree to hold dialogues over issues under this topic.

Here are some other blogs on this important topic.

Trade Secrets

The United States and China are committed to providing a strong trade secrets protection regime that promotes innovation and encourages fair competition.  China clarifies it is in the process of amending the Anti-Unfair Competition Law; intends to issue model or guiding court cases; and intends to clarify rules on preliminary injunctions, evidence preservation orders and damages. The United States confirms that draft legislation proposed to establish a federal civil cause of action for trade secrets misappropriation has been introduced in relevant committees. Both sides confirm that IP-related investigations, including on trade secrets, are conducted in a prudent and cautious manner.  The United States and China agree to jointly share experiences and practices in the areas of protecting trade secrets from disclosure during investigations and in court proceedings, and identify practices that companies may undertake to protect trade secrets from misappropriation in accordance with respective laws.

References: Note that the reference in the trade secret provision to a degree mirrors that of the Competition outcome, regarding protecting confidential information in administrative proceedings. Proposed revisions to the AUCL were previously discussed here.

Geographical Indications (GIs)

The United States and China will continue our dialogue on GIs. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of the 2014 JCCT commitment on GIs and confirmed that this commitment applies to all GIs, including those protected pursuant to international agreements. China will publish in draft form for public comment, and expects to do so by the end of 2016, procedures that provide the opportunity for a third party to cancel already-granted GIs.

Reference: This commitment builds on the 2014 GI commitment in the JCCT. An important case involving enforcement of a trademark based GI for scotch whisky is discussed here.

Sports Broadcasts

The United States and China agree to protect original recordings of the images, or sound and images, of live events, including sports broadcasts, against acts of unauthorized exploitation, including the unauthorized retransmission of such broadcasts over computer networks, in accordance with their respective laws and regulations.  The United States and China agree to discuss copyright protection for sports broadcasts and further cooperate on this issue in the JCCT IPR Working Group and other appropriate bilateral fora.

References: Copyright protection for sports broadcasting has been discussed elsewhere in this blog, and is of increasing important to China as it prepares to host the Winter Olympics and wants to develop its sports leagues. In addition US courts have granted copyright protection to Chinese sports broadcasts in a recent case. Tencent has also signed an important licensing deal with the NBA to make content available online.

Enhanced Enforcement Against Media Boxes and Unauthorized Content Providers

Noting the challenges posed by new technologies to the protection of copyright, China and the United States will continue discussions and share respective experiences and practices on combating the unauthorized online distribution of audiovisual content made possible by media boxes.  China clarifies it is to enhance enforcement against such media boxes and the providers of unauthorized content in accordance with its laws and regulations.

Reference: A recent US media box case involving Chinese content is discussed here.

Online Enforcement

In order to address the civil, administrative and criminal enforcement challenges caused by the rapid development of e-commerce, as part of the JCCT IPR Working Group, China and the United States will enhance engagement and exchanges between U.S. and Chinese government IPR policy and enforcement officials, IP right holders, business representatives and online sales-platform operators, among other relevant stakeholders.  This engagement will cover current and anticipated challenges in protecting and enforcing IPR online by sharing respective practices, discussing possible improvements in each country’s systems, facilitating information exchange and training between our two countries, and increasing cooperation on cross-border enforcement.  The goal of this effort is to enhance existing legal and cooperative regimes among businesses, rights holders and governments in civil, administrative and criminal online IPR enforcement.  Appropriate criminal matters will be referred, if necessary, to law enforcement agencies through the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) IP Criminal Enforcement Working Group or domestic law enforcement officials.

References: there have been numerous Chinese domestic efforts to deal with on-line infringement, including copyright-related campaigns, and an important role for Chinese Customs.

COOPERATIVE DIALOGUES AND EXCHANGES

Searchable Database for Intellectual Property (IP) Cases

The United States welcomes that the Supreme People’s Court has established a database for searching intellectual property-related court decisions.  In order to increase the understanding of each other’s legal systems, the United States and China agree to dialogue and to share experiences on their respective databases containing IP cases.

References: Whether or not China is developing “case law with Chinese characteristics,” understanding how Chinese courts handle cases can help guide sound business decisions.

Bad Faith Trademark Filings

Given the importance of addressing bad faith trademark filings, both sides agree to continue to prioritize the issue of bad faith trademark filings, and to strengthen communication and exchange on this issue through existing channels.

References: This is a continuation of earlier efforts.

Copyright Legislation

The United States and China are to continue exchanges on the development of their respective copyright laws.  China clarifies that its Copyright Law is in the process of amendment and useful principles and interpretative guidance from the Supreme People Court’s 2012 Judicial Interpretation on Internet Intermediary Liability will be considered in the law, if appropriate and feasible.

The final judicial interpretation is available here. Here is a blog on the 2014 State Council draft of the Copyright Law revision, and a blog on a 2012 NCA draft.

Exchange on Intellectual Property Rights Legislation

Recognizing the success and experience of recent exchanges on IP legislation through the JCCT IPR Working Group, programs under the Cooperation Framework Agreement and other fora, as well as the desire of the United States and China to further understand recent developments in this area, the United States and China agree to exchange views on their legislative developments in IP and innovation including on pending reforms in copyright law, patent law, trade secret law (anti-unfair competition law), science and technology achievement law, etc., with relevant legislative bodies.

References: This is a broad commitment, with much legislative activity planned in China in areas such as trade secrets, copyright, patents and related regulations.

Protection of New Plant Varieties

The United States and China agree to hold exchanges on the protection of new plant varieties through bilateral meetings and other means to be determined.

References: China and Switzerland agreed to extend plant variety protections in the Swiss-China FTA.

Here are the outcomes involving IP from the MofCOM website.  Source:

http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/l/201512/20151201200026.shtm

“特别301”报告 SPECIAL 301 REPORT

美方重申其承诺，将在“特别301报告”中客观、公正、善意地评价包括中国在内的外国政府，在知识产权保护和执法方面付出的努力。美方欢迎旨在加强中国知识产权保护的改革和行动，并承诺在2016年“特别301报告”中将强调中国政府在知识产权保护和执法方面采取的积极行动。

 恶名市场 NOTORIOUS MARKETS

美方重申其承诺，如果适当，将在“恶名市场”名单中客观、公正、善意地评估和认可外国实体，包括中国实体，在知识产权保护和执法方面付出的努力和取得的成绩。美方计划在2016年通过将利益相关方的异议期延长一倍，继续增加程序的透明度。美方将继续与中方就此事项进行讨论。

 

知识产权有效和平衡保护 EFFECTIVE AND BALANCED IP PROTECTION

考虑到《与贸易有关的知识产权协定》的原则和目标，美方和中方将继续就诸如有助于保护创新者免于恶意诉讼的相关政策进行交流和沟通，为创新行为提供积极环境。

 

知识产权合作 IP COOPERATION

中美双方确认知识产权保护在中美双边经贸关系中的关键作用。双方承认合作的益处，并认可合作构成了双方知识产权交流的基础，承诺进一步加强重要领域的深入合作，包括：

进一步加强中美商贸联委会知识产权工作组作为牵头协调知识产权问题双边论坛的作用。

继续高度重视中美知识产权合作框架协议的工作，包括2016年司法交流和将在中国举办的一项培训项目；在完成并对现有承诺项目进行审查后，在预算允许的前提下，考虑在框架协议下增加其他项目。

支持中国商务部在2016年第一季度举办的技术许可联合研讨会。

其他项目将根据个案原则进行组织。双方认识到中美双方，特别是美方，与一系列从事知识产权培训和技术交流的机构和私人组织合作，实施了广泛的项目策划工作。

 

加强在打击网络盗版方面的合作  STRENGTHENED COOPERATION IN DEALING WITH ONLINE PIRACY

为应对在美国涉嫌网络盗版刑事侵权案件影响中国权利人的情况，中美执法联合联络小组下设的知识产权刑事执法合作工作组在美国驻华使馆的联系人将负责接收中方行政部门转交的此类信息。

 

通过中美双边合作加强知识产权在企业中的利用和保护 USING BILATERAL COOPERATION TO STRENGTHEN IP UTILIZATION AND PROTECTION IN ENTERPRISES

认识到双边贸易与投资持续增长的情况，中美双方同意加强合作与交流，就各自国家知识产权保护和利用有关的经验数据进行研究，并在此领域采取具体行动或举办项目，以协助中美关于鼓励创新的决策，并帮助中美创新者、创造者和企业家更好地理解如何在各自国家创造、保护和利用知识产权。

 

深化和加强中美知识产权刑事执法合作 DEEPENING CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION IN IP

在中美执法联合联络小组下设的知识产权刑事执法合作工作组机制项下，中美将继续就跨国知识产权调查开展合作。双方将确定共同合作的重点案件，就此类案件保持定期沟通和信息分享，并探索在共同感兴趣的领域开展技术交流的机会。

 …

中美共同打击网络销售假药 JOINT SINO-US COMBATTING OF ONLINE COUNTERFEIT MEDICINE SALES

中美两国政府都非常重视打击网络销售假药以保障公共的用药安全和健康。两国食品药品监管机构之间已就打击网络销售假药开展合作，并承诺未来继续开展合作。这种合作包括分享信息、分享提高公众对网络销售药品认知的最佳实践以及加强在现有国际组织活动中的沟通与协调。

Updated: December 2 and 3,  2015, December 26, 2018.

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Geographical Indications: Guides and Commitments

The EU China IPR SME Help Desk recently published a Guide to Geographic Indications in China that may be useful for European companies seeking to protect geographical indications in China, and for US companies seeking to understand Europe’s approach to this issue.

This Guide notes that there are two aspects to GI protection in China:

“GIs in China can be protected as an intellectual property right (IPR) under Chinese Trade Mark Law as a collective or certificate mark which provides the same level of legal and economic protection as for any other logo, name or mark registered as a trade mark. Alternatively and in addition, the GI can be registered at the AQSIQ [Administration for Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine] which monitors and manages the quality and standard of products offered in the Chinese market. Duel [sic] registration can ensure the GI is protected both as an IPR and as a indicating a certain level of quality assurance to the public.”

This Guide notes that AQSIQ can “help” in protecting GI’s, but does not identify the same administrative mechanisms for AQSIQ to protect GI’s as exists for trademarks. In addition the Guide states that it is “only possible to litigate under the China Trademark Law” (pages 4 – 5).

The December 2014 US-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade included the following bilateral outcome which includes geographical indications and generic terms, as well as legal procedures for cancellation and recognition of a GI:

  • China and the United States …understand the following:
    • That a term, or its translation or transliteration, is not eligible for protection as a GI in its territory where the term is generic in its territory;
    • That the relationship between trademarks and GIs is to be handled in accordance with relevant articles in the TRIPS Agreement;
    • That the legal means are available for interested third parties on the above grounds to object to and to cancel any registration or recognition granted to a GI;
    • Where a component of a compound GI is generic in its territory, the GI protection is not to extend to that generic component.  In the event a relevant agency does not have a disclaimer practice, the agency may adopt such practice noting that the compound GI registered or recognized is to be protected only in compound form….

The general differences between the two system (trademark and AQSIQ) in my personal opinion, are largely attributable to the differences between a trademark system which is primarily based on private property rights and a product quality/protection system which looks more to public management.  These two systems may consequentially present different approaches towards the primacy of private enforcement and towards the role of the state. As they co-exist, they may also present challenges in coordination. Nonetheless, as the “sanctity of private property”, in the words of Dean Liu Chuntian of Renmin University, is a key principle in any intellectual property system, the trademark system more clearly reflects traditional notions of the balance between state and individual in how IP is to be created and protected, in my humble and non-official opinion.