CAI, RCEP and the Phase 1 Trade Agreement all responded to different economic, trade demands and political urgencies. The CAI has been understood as a sign by the Biden administration that the European Union will pursue its own trade relationship with China based on its own interests. While the IP and forced technology transfer provisions of the Phase 1 Agreement helped establish new standards in China that are applicable to all countries, the non-IP provisions of the Phase 1 Agreement were not kind to Europeans and other allies in their preferential buying requirements. The EU, however, did not significantly advance IP protections in the CAI text. The bright side of this picture is that the CAI leaves space for the United States and the European Union to further coordinate strategies on IP protection in China.
In furtherance of the August 20 Notice of the Ministry of Commerce on “Issuing the Overall Plan for Comprehensively Deepening the Innovation and Development of Service Trade” (商务部关于印发全面深化服务贸易创新发展试点总体方案的通知) (商服贸发)〔2020〕(165号), CNIPA issued two […]
RCEP and the Phase 1 Trade Agremeent are strange historical bedfellows, joined by common approaches to IP that diminish its role as a private right. The differences between the two agreements are also significant. The Phase 1 Agreement explicitly contemplated a Phase 2 Trade Agreement. It also only involved one country. RCEP intends to be comprehensive and regional, if not global. It is an alternative to the TPP. It will help China establish global IP norms.