Catching up With The Literature on Forced Tech Transfer…

FTT
(from the OECD report, discussed below)

While President Trump has extended the truce on the trade war, academic and business debate around the nature of “forced technology transfer” (FTT) practices in China and appropriate business and legal strategies continues.

A  study last year by Dan Prud’homme and his team, discussed earlier in this blog, was one important empirical effort looking at the nature and consequences of FTT.  Their FTT Strategy & Risk Forecasting Matrix was intended to guide foreign firms to anticipate risks associated with FTT policies and serve as a starting point for understanding how to further quantify or mitigate these risks.  In January 2019, the OECD also released a study on International Technology Transfer policies which cites to the Prud’homme study and further describes FTT, as well as the various international agreements and practices that may constrain it.  Consistent with the approaches of the US and EU in the currently pending WTO case, the study highlights the importance of joint ventures for transfer of technology in China (para. 90), pointing to equity restrictions as one reason for such licensing arrangements.   Because of the high volume of multinational and governments in tech transfer, the OECD reports also underscores the importance of transparency in the tech transfer process to “distinguish[] voluntary  technology transfer from its more constraining variants.” [para. 92].  Predictably, the report also cites to the same provisions cited by the United States and Europe in the pending WTO case against China regarding its FTT polices [para 65].

A timely and business-oriented to FTT was presented by the IP consulting firm Rouse in a highly useful webinar of February 27, 2019, available here.  The speakers, Tim Smith and Chris Bailey, noted that due to the current trade dispute with the US, Chinese prospective JV and business partners are currently “falling over themselves” not to require tech transfer as a condition to a deal.   The speakers also noted that there had been a resurgence of joint ventures in tech-driven deals with China.  In addition, smaller companies have found that it has become more expensive to develop market share in China making a JV more attractive.  Even if a JV is not mandatory, the access to local capital and expertise can be a rationale for forming a JV.  The additional capital may also lead to higher valuations if an IPO exit is contemplated for the joint enterprise.

The speakers noted that Chinese companies are also increasingly more concerned about less traditional factors of a tech transfer such as whether they can scale up quickly using the technology, how they will handle IP infringements in China, and whether the technology can offer an immediate competitive advantage.

Amongst the newly emerging business structures, the speakers also noted that there have also been  an increasing number of offshore joint ventures formed outside of China that then reinvest China.  The Chinese party may also try to take a stake in a foreign party, and then license the technology into China. The Chinese party thereby may become a financial or strategic investor in the foreign partner.  Contrary to the common understanding, the Rouse speakers also underscored that state-owned enterprises are not as “untouchable” in IP or licensing disputes with foreign partners as private companies.  In some cases they may be better targets for litigation, as they may be more concerned about reputational risks from IP law suits than privately-owned companies.

The presenters also noted that there are deals where China is licensing out have become more common, particularly in new technologies such as AI, VR/AR, electric vehicles and battery technologies.  Western businesses are increasingly looking to Chinese businesses for these innovations.

As is evident from the above, the presenters’ viewed the current WTO dispute around the TIER and other concerns over FTT to be “yesterday’s issue” for practitioners and business people.  They also point to the data from recent surveys showing that a minority of US and European Companies have been asked to transfer technologies by their business partners, often as a condition of obtaining market access. However, they also note that companies have long utilized work arounds to the TIER, which has been on the books since 2002.

The Rouse webinar is particularly instructive in documenting the sophistication of Chinese licensees and future licensors.  Of course, the subsistence of a discriminatory provision as “yesterday’s issue” is also not justification for its continued existence.  If anything, it underscores how much of an unncessary, if not counterproductive,  impediment China’s Administration of Technology Import/Export Regulations (TIER) has become.  From a WTO perspective, even if the TIER is often irrelevant to current transactions, the key issue  in WTO jurisprudence is likely to be whether “expectations of the competitive relationship” offer less favorable treatment to a foreign licensor than a domestic Chinese licensor.   Further, the presence of “additional regulatory hurdles”, such as the necessity of using a domestic subsidiary or an offshore joint venture to sub-license a technology due to discriminatory provisions that exist for a foreign licensor,  does not afford a useful justification for a discriminatory provision.  Indeed such additional regulatory hurdles may constitute de jure discriminatory treatment, as was documented in the case the United States brought against the EU regarding its regime for Geographical Indications (See Para. 7.314, WTO Panel Report)  Due to the increasingly sophisticated experience of Chinese companies, including their willingness to contribute capital or participate in complex multinational licensing structures, the webinar ultimately proved to me that the TIER itself has also largely outlived its usefulness in protecting “vulnerable” Chinese licensees.

An important legislative development that also deals with FTT is China’s revised Foreign Investment Law.  The European Union Chamber of Commerce has released its comments on the draft law here. The comments were due February 24, 2019.  This draft law addresses some foreign concerns about FTT involving foreign investments in China.  The EU’s comments on the FTT provision are as follows:

“Article 22 explicitly prohibits administrative organs and their staff from using administrative means to force the transfer of technology, which echoes the language used in other high-profile policies that have been released in recent years, most notably State Council Document No. 19 (2018). However, this leaves open the possibility for any non-administrative body to use any other means to compel technology transfers. Instead, the Foreign Investment Law should simply prohibit forced technology transfer by any means.”

I personally believe that the language of the draft law, by itself, is insufficient. Other observers, such as Rouse in its webinar, have noted that other incentives to FTT remain, including restrictions arising from national security, foreign investment restrictions, Made in China 2025 incentives, data localization requirements, etc.  Moreover, the draft law does not present a clear pathway to present legal challenges to local authorities, and to minimize any possible retribution when a foreign company complains about extortionary practice.  Prior history shows that foreigners are also highly reluctant to bring law suits against the same local governments that may be involved in regulating their investments. One partial solution is for China’s new national appellate IP court to consider taking jurisdiction over these FTT disputes. The Chinese government might also consider other measures such as creating an ombudsman for foreign investors, fast track administrative reconsideration of investment reviews, improvements to trade secret protection and employee mobility rules, and other measures that constrain the ability of local governments or individuals to directly or indirectly encourage a foreign investor to relinquish its technology, whether through legal or illegal means.  As another example, if the Chinese government seriously wants to address the problem of FTT, the theft of trade secrets that is undertaken in “support” of national or local government technology policies might be subject to enhanced penalties.  Moreover, such cases should be adjudicated by courts other than ones located in the jurisdiction where the misappropriation occurred.

Update from February 28, 2019: A second draft of the Foreign Investment Law has been released and made available in English by the NPC observer.  It is available here.

 

 

 

 

 

 

How to Measure the Steps to a Binding Truce…

“The real question is so we do a memorandum of understanding, …. How long will that take to put into a final binding contract” (President Trump)

“From now on … we are going to use the term ‘trade agreement’” (Amb. Robert Lighthizer)

 

This week President Trump and Amb. Lighthizer debated whether the administration will be concluding an “Memorandum of Understanding” or a “Trade Agreement” with China to resolve the current trade dispute, as detailed in Bloomberg.   However, both countries cannot enter into treaties or agreements ratified by their legislatures in the short time available to them.  The more meaningful question is not whether an “agreement” is binding, but whether the underlying commitments require actions that are binding.

US-China trade agreements have often had the staying power of the dew on a summer’s rose.  One reason was that the underlying commitments did not require clear, binding legal action.  A good example of such a non-binding commitment was the 2010 JCCT agreement on government procurement of indigenously innovated products:

China and the United States will not adopt or maintain measures that make the location of the development or ownership of intellectual property a direct or indirect condition for eligibility for government procurement preferences for products and services. China and the United States will continue to discuss whether this principle applies to other government measures.

What was the “measure” that China was not supposed to adopt or maintain?  To someone unaware of its background,  it appears that the United States had a similar problem as China.  Furthermore, a US reader may think that we asked China to enact a “law” to address discriminatory government procurement.   Oxford defines “measure” as a “legislative bill.”  By contrast, Chinese legal scholars know the term “measure” as vague and not binding.  As an example: the word “measure” appears 32 times in China’s accession documents to the WTO in a descending hierarchical order as “law regulations and/or [other] measures. ” As an ambiguous term, it could mean either a  type of law or regulation (both of which or binding) or a non-binding administrative rule.

The 2010 commitment predictably  led to problems in implementation by localities who did not believe they were bound by this negative commitment.  As my colleague Stanley Lubman noted in a Wall Street Journal blog in July 2011:

[W]hile government policy on procurement has receded from the original position and “indigenous innovation” has been “delinked” from government procurement requirements, implementation of this shift is problematic because acceptance and commitment by sub-central (provincial and municipal) governments are needed to make it meaningful.

The 2016 JCCT Commitment on innovation of indigenous innovated products attempted to clean up the vague language from the 2010 JCCT by acknowledging issuance of a State Council document was required:

The General Affairs Office of the State Council issued a document recently, requiring all local regions and all agencies to further clean up related measures involving linking the indigenous innovation policy to the provision of government procurement preferences, so as to practically implement the commitment made by the Chinese side.  The U.S. side welcomes this development.

This commitment, in its legal terms, is a vast improvement over the 2010 JCCT commitment. It clarified that the obligation was not a bilateral one.  It also required the State Council, an authoritative agency with the power to bind inferior agencies, to issue a “document” (presumably a regulation in the heirarchy noted above).  Finally, it required local governments to “clean up” conflicting “measures” with an identified offending policy.  Using a high level document to address inferior legislative acts also made the commitment more easily verifiable.

This problem of binding commitments and conflicts with local policy is nearly identical to current issues of “forced technology transfer” where local governments may sense that there is currently no national law that doesn’t prohibit them from demanding that foreign technology owners relinquish their rights.  China’s proposed adoption of a Foreign Investment Law that prohibits forced technology transfer would be one positive step in the direction of addressing that issue.  However that law and its enforcers should specifically address contrary policies and incentives that exist throughout the country.  To further ensure enforcement, at a minimum the new national appellate IP court should have original jurisdiction over challenges brought by foreign businesses against these local practices.   The court could provide  transparent, verifiable, professional and fast resolution by accountable authorities independent of direct local influence.

A 2016 GAO report on clean energy cooperation with China provides another example of a meaningless trade commitment.  That reported stated:

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has identified a potential discrepancy between Chinese law and the bilateral U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement upon which the IP Annex to the CERC [Clean Energy Research Center] Protocol is based, according to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office officials. These officials stated that the potential discrepancy is related to ownership of any improvements made to IP licensed between U.S. and Chinese entities.

This language underscores the problem that a bilateral MOU or “agreement” may have no legal significance when there is a contrary State Council regulation, namely China’s Administration of Technology Import-Export Regulations (TIER).  The TIER mandates that the Chinese side own any improvements to technology licensed in bilateral science cooperation projects, and is therefore at odds with the inferior negotiated agreement.  This text leaves the dispute open to future diplomacy, which is not a realistic approach for private business disputes.

There are numerous other examples of poor drafting or drafting of IPR commitments that at best would accomplish only short term goals.  USG and Chinese negotiators in their haste to resolve a difficult set of issues should not lose sight that the underlying commitments of any agreement that meaningfully address US concerns must be phrased in terms of legally binding actions.  These legally binding actions must also be durable, and should not be be countermanded by local measures. They should also be easily susceptible to USG verification.

On Avoiding “Rounding Up the Usual Suspects” In the Patent Law Amendments …

 

Although many of the proposed changes in China’s patent law amendments are welcome, the draft amendments also present a difficult  choice in two key areas: (a) patent administrative enforcement and (b) punitive civil damages.

(A)The draft, if enacted, would enhance patent administrative enforcement through national coordination of large cases (Art. 70), expanding authority of administrative enforcement for infringement (Art. 69), and enhanced fines of five times illegal earnings or up to 250,000 RMB (Art. 68).  These efforts should be seen against the background of a huge ramp up in administrative enforcement in patents,  that has now eclipsed administrative enforcement of trademarks (77,000 to 31,000 cases).    Moreover, there appears to be a continuing interest of the Chinese government in special campaigns to deal with patent infringement, such as in a recently announced MOU with NDRC, and in a proposed campaign to deal with infringement issues faced by foreigners at the beginning of the current 301 investigation.

How much will these efforts help foriegn business people? The record on special campaigns is that most improvements are short-lived and perhaps focus too much on “rounding up the usual suspects” by local enforcement agencies (Casablanca).  Enhancements in administrative patent enforcement are also an about-face from the prior dominant role that trademarks played in administrative IP enforcement and the relatively minor role that patent administrative enforcement traditionally played in China.  Also of concern is that administrative trademark enforcement had uniquely been frequently utilized by foreign entities as complainants/victims.  For example, there were 17,022 administrative trademark enforcement actions taken by SAIC on behalf of foreigners in 2011.  This was nearly 14 times the number of all foreign-related civil litigation involving all types of IP rights that were disposed of by the China courts in that year (1,321).    In addition, as the Apple design patent case demonstrated in Beijing, foreigners may easily end up on the defensive side in these administrative patent cases that are typically brought by local government officials.    It is therefore uncertain how much, if at all, enhanced administrative patent enforcement will benefit foreigners.

(B)  The proposed draft would also provide for punitive damages upon a judicial finding of  willful patent infringement (Art. 72), with a maximum of 5x damages.  To many this may appear to be a welcome improvement. Punishing willful IP infringement is currently a policy that both the US and Chinese leaders share.  On the US side, the term IP “theft” appears 119 times in the Section 301 Report, while civil damages and compensation appear hardly at all.  On April 9, 2018, President Trump tweeted that he is “Defiant” and that he “Will End …Massive I.P. Theft” by China. Premier Li Keqiang apparently shares some of this enthusiasm.  He had noted in his annual report on the work of the government, that China needs to “improve IP protection, and implement a system for punitive damages against infringement “加强知识产权保护,实行侵权惩罚性赔偿制度” .

While punishment is an important tool, the more pervasive problem is that basic civil remedies are too weak.  Actual damages are in fact rarely imposed by Chinese courts and, have been the outlier.  Courts impose statutory damages in over 90% of all patent cases as well as in other IP areas.  In the Beijing IP Court median damages awarded for patent infringement in 2016 were only 112,500 RMB, or less than 20,000 USD. Rather than unduly emphasizing punishment, a better structural place to start is in improving the civil system to achieve maximum compensatory deterrence.

Intellectual property is fundamentally a private right (TRIPS Agreement, preface), and adequate civil remedies should therefore be the priority.  Using remedies that are not at the core of a healthy IP system based on private rights (administrative remedies/punitive damages)  are not a substitute for predictable, compensatory private remedies. In fact, the administrative system affords no private compensation to victims.  Punitive and administrative remedies are also often left to the discretion of the enforcement agencies, which can result in unpredictable enforcement.  In 2017 for example, despite the pressure on China to address trade secret theft, criminal cases declined by 35%.

By focusing on deterrent civil remedies that are fairly administered, the US will find common cause with many Chinese officials.  The issue was addressed  by Justice Tao Kaiyuan of the Supreme People’s Court  who similarly believes that the civil patent system is the primary enforcement mechanism for private patent rightsJustice Luo Dongchuan, who is now in charge of China’s new appellate IP circuit court, also underscored the importance of the IP courts in advancing rule of law in a visit to the US.  In an article I wrote,  with former PTO Director David Kappos and Chief Judge  Rader (ret), we also underscored that China’s administrative system is fundamentally unlike the judicial mechanisms of the USITC, and that better recourse to improved patent enforcement can be had with the courts.

Moreover, these punitive and quasi-legal remedies could easily be turned against the foreign community.  Consider, for example, that due process for foreigners has been a long-standing concern  in Chinese IP matters, well before the current concerns over retaliation over the proposed extradition of Huawei’s CFO.  Moreover, several cases have demonstrated that   foreigners are often the test cases for “improved” enforcement mechanisms in IP, such as in Chint v. Schneider (high patent damages), Iwncomm v Sony (injunctive relief in a SEP case), AMEC v Veeco (preliminary injunctions in patent infringement matters), antitrust cases involving licensing  and even the first publicized criminal copyright case, in which the principal defendants were two Americans (Guthrie and Cody).

I believe that China needs to focus its patent enforcement resources on the courts, and especially to give the new national appellate IP court a try in providing balanced and fair enforcement of IP rights, both foreign and domestic.  Both the US and China might try to focus more on much delayed and long overdue improvements in the civil system, some of whic are contemplated by the patent law amendments.  A rhetoric based too much around punishment may in the end prove to be self-defeating in the absence of necessary legal guarantees such as improvements in awarding compensatory damages, greater procedural due process, and improved transparency in the courts and administrative agencies.

shenzhenstrictlyprotectip

Bottom photo of the author in front of a Nanshan District Shenzhen IP Office sign “Create the Most Strict IP Protection Pioneering District” (Jan. 2019).  The opinions expressed in this blog are the author’s own.  Please address any corrections or improvements to: chinaipr@yahoo.com

 

 

A Federal Circuit with Chinese Characteristics? – The Launch of China’s New National Appellate IP Court 中国特色的联邦巡回上诉法院?

wangchuang

On December 27, 2018, the Supreme People’s Court released the Provisions on Certain Issues of the IP Court  (the “Provisions”), and the Standing Committee of the NPC  announced a first round name list of judges of the new IP court. These decisions follow an earlier announcement by the NPC Standing Committee  on October 26, 2018 authorizing the establishing of this new division of the SPC (officially translated as IP  Court of the Supreme Court of SPCIP, with the Chinese name 最高人民法院知识产权法庭). There were also indications that such a court was in the works that were previously reported in this blog in 2017.  The newly established IP Court is intended to function very similarly to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with a national jurisdiction over technical civil IP cases as well as appeals of patent validity decisions. Trademark validity appeals are not currently specifically enumerated as being within the court’s jurisdiction (see photo below).

This is a much awaited, historic and potentially disruptive breakthrough in the China IP litigation system, that has been a focus of much discussion between US and Chinese experts over 20 or more years, notably between the SPC and former CAFC Chief Judge Rader, former USPTO Director Kappos, and others (including the author/owner of this blog).  The historic 2012 conference between the SPC and the CAFC at Renmin University was one such milestone event in these efforts.   China’s successful experiments in specialized IP courts in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou was another such milestone, as well as the language in the third plenum that facilitated their establishment. However, the engagement preceded this decade.  For example, an important conference on specialized IP courts was held with former Chief Judge Jiang Zhipei, and other Chinese IP judges in Washington, DC on Specialized IP courts in 2002, which involved over 130 judicial experts.   SIPO also exerted an important leadership role as well, through the National IP Strategy and various studies and conferences over the years.

The Provisions came into effect January 1, and the new Court held a kick-off ceremony on that same day.   Almost like clockwork, Judge Wang Chuang, the new deputy chief judge of this new tribunal was at the second US-China IP Summit in Shenzhen on January 3, 2019 (the “Summit”) presenting a bilingual PowerPoint (picture above) explaining the role of the Court, along with several other current and former judges, including Judges Jin Kesheng, former Beijing IP Court President Su Chi, former Guangdong IP Tribunal judge Ou Xiuping, former Beijing High Court Judge Cheng Yongshun, and others.  Considering the high-stakes trade dispute and interaction between China and the US right now, it is fair to say that the setup of the SPC’s IP Court is part of the bona fide effort to enhance IP protection in China which in fact predates the trade dispute.

What will be the impact of this court on foreign-related litigation? We believe that the impact is likely to be positive.  US academics have suggested that the CAFC has had a modest effect of correcting any anti-foreign bias  and the elevation of patent appeals to the SPC level is certain to similarly help direct national attention to important cases and defuse local pressure.  Moreover, the jurisdictional mandate of this court includes appeals from the Beijing IP Court of administrative patent cases, where foreigners constitute a significant cohort, partiuclarly if trademark cases are included (which appears unlikely). The Court also includes at least one judge from the foreign civil (no. 4) division of the SPC.   The recent decision by the SPC to rehear the Huawei v Interdigital case, where Zhu Li was a judge, may also be another signal.  Judge Zhu has since transferred to this new IP Tribunal, and the court has also sent a clear signal that it will be seeking a consistent and fair determinations of cases independent of local influence.   Many of the judges on the roster are well known to the foreign IP and antitrust communities, have met with foreign visitors or traveled overseas, and enjoy the respect of the foreign and Chinese bar.

Here are some of the most significant things that we know about this new Court.

Status of the SPC’s IP Court: It is part of the SPC, which generates some confusion. Given that the judgments, rulings, mediations and decisions made by the SPC’s IP Court are in the name of the Supreme Court, it enjoys a similar status to that of CAFC, whose job is to function as a national appellate court and whose decisions. are typically final.  But there has been and still will be an IP Tribunal (also known as 3rd Civil Tribunal) of the SPC, and a decision made by the SPC’s IP Court, which in normal practice should be final, is capable of been filed for retrial before the said IP Tribunal of the SPC.  In addition, non-technical IP cases will still be appealed according to pre-existing procedures ultimately to the 3d Civil Tribunal.

The head of the new SPC’s IP Court, Mr. Luo Dongchuan, will at the same time continue to serve as Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the SPC, a rank higher than the head of the 3rd Civil Tribunal, which previously heard all IP cases.  Justice Luo effectively oversees IP litigation in China with Justice Tao Kaiyuan, which is a further elevation of the importance of IP to China’s judicial system.

Staffing the Court:  IP tribunal judges are typically amongst the best educated judges in China’s court system.  Many young judges made their name in IP related trials. The judicial personnel list of the court suggests that the court has been viewed as career enhancing for SPC judges, judges from regional courts, and former patent office examiners who have been selected as judges (see the list below).  However, due to the rapid establishment and staffing of this new Court, many of the judges are likely on detail from their prior jobs to the new Court, pending permanent transfer

Staffing of the Court

Name Position Former position
Luo Dongchuan 罗东川  Vice-president of SPC, Head of the Intellectual Property Court of SPC Vice-president of SPC, member of the Adjudication Committee of SPC,
Wang Chuang王闯 Deputy Chief Judge Deputy Chief Judge of the Civil Division No.3 (IP Division) of SPC
Zhou Xiang 周翔 Deputy Chief Judge Deputy Director General of the Enforcement Bureau of SPC
Li Jian 李剑 Deputy Chief Judge Presiding Judge of the Civil Division No. 3 (IP Division) of SPC
Zhu Li 朱理 Judge Senior Judge of the Civil Division No.3 (IP Division) of SPC
Shen Hongyu 沈红雨 Judge Judge of the Civil Division No.4 of SPC (for foreign-related cases)
Luo Xia 罗霞 Judge Judge of the Administrative Division of SPC
Fu Lei 傅蕾 Judge Judge of the Civil Division No.3 (IP Division) of SPC
Wei Lei 魏磊 Judge Assistant Judge of the Civil Division No.3 (IP Division) of SPC
He Peng 何鹏 Judge Judge of the Civil Division No.3 (IP Division) of SPC
Jiao Yan 焦彦 Judge Deputy Chief Judge of the Civil Division No.3 (IP Division) of Beijing High People’s Court
Cen Hongyu 岑宏宇 Judge Assistant Judge and the Judge of the Civil Division No. 3 (IP Division) of BHPC
Liu Xiaojun 刘晓军 Judge Judge of the Civil Division No. 3 (IP Division) of Beijing High People’s Court
Cui Ning 崔 宁 Judge Judge of Beijing Intellectual Property Court
Deng Zhuo  邓 卓 Judge Judge of Beijing Intellectual Property Court
Ren Xiaolan 任晓兰 Judge Director of the No.1 Chemical Appeal Division of the Patent Reexamination Board of CNIPA
Gao Xue 高 雪 Judge Deputy Director of the Mobile Communicating Technology Appeal Department of the Patent Reexamination Board of CNIPA
Zhan Jingkang 詹靖康 Judge  Deputy Director of the Examination Guide Department of the Examination Management Division of the CNIPA
Xu Yanru 徐燕如 Judge Deputy Chief Judge of the Civil Division No.3 (IP Division) of ZHPC
Xu Zhuobin 徐卓斌 Judge Judge of the Civil Division No.3 (IP Division) of Shanghai High People’s Court
Ling Zongliang 凌宗亮 Judge Judge of the Intellectual Property Division No. 2 of Shanghai Intellectual Property Court
Zhang Xiaoyang 张晓阳 Judge Judge of the Civil Division No. 3 (IP Division) of Jiangsu High People’s Court
Zhang Hongwei 张宏伟 Judge  Judge of the Civil Division No. 3 (IP Division) of Fujian High People’s court
Liu Xiaomei 刘晓梅 Judge  Judge of the Civil Division No. 3 (IP Division) of Shandong High People’s Court
Tong Haichao 童海超 Judge Deputy Chief Judge of the Civil Division No.3 (IP Division) of Hubei High People’s Court
Tang Xiaomei 唐小妹 Judge Judge of the Civil Division No.3 (IP Division) of HHPC
She Zhaoyang 佘朝阳 Judge Judge of Guangzhou Intellectual Property Court

Internet Courts, Circuit Courts, Specialized IP Courts: The types of courts in China has expanded and is potentially confusing to those unfamiliar with the new experiments.  The SPC had already established Circuit Courts, which are arms of the Supreme Court itself, except that they are in cities other than Beijing.  An example of such a court is the Shenzhen Circuit court which hears retrial cases from Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, and Hainan as well as cases relating to Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.  The Specialized IP Courts, which will remain the same as before, are intermediate courts in Beijing, Shanghai and Jurisdiction, vested with jurisdiction over certain IP lawsuits. They will function all the same as before, but their decision will now be appealable to the SPC’s IP Court, rather than to High Court of the province where the Specialized Courts reside.  These IP Courts are in addition to other local IP tribunals and courts which localities have set up with the support of the SPC and have been experimenting in cross-district jurisdiction, and in combining civil, criminal and administrative adjudication.

The three Internet Courts, located in Beijing, Guangzhou and Hangzhou, will function as before.  Their decisions are not likely to be appealed to the SPC’s IP Court given that the latter only hear patent, mask works, variety of plants, computer software and anti-trust cases.

Standardization of Trial Rules: A mission of the SPC’s IP Court is to formulate judicial standards and trial rules based on their investigation and research of relevant practices, and such standards and rules shall be followed by the lower courts. This may suggest that the SPC’s IP Court will take over the responsibility of formulating certain judicial interpretations and selecting guiding cases. Wang Chuang noted at the Summit that the Court is considering judicial interpretations on such topics as technology assessors and trade secret protection.  Thus, we could expect a more consistent guidance, both procedural and substantive, from the Supreme Court over IP cases, especially when involving technical matters.  Judge Su Chi (retired) of the Beijing IP Court, also noted at the Summit that he expected that some of his work on development of a case law system would likely be taken over by this Court as well.

Extended Jurisdictional Scope of the Court:  The SPC’s IP Court is empowered to hear major and complicated cases of first instance on a national scale. This implies that some plaintiffs may bring high-profile lawsuits to the Supreme Court directly. This kind of arrangement is very rare in China’s judicial system. The only case we are aware of before this time is the trial of the Gang of Four in 1980. This could be good news for patentees facing difficult issues of local protectionism. It may also have profound impacts on society, and thereby raise the IP awareness of the public.  The Federal Circuit had a similar impact on US society when it decided major cases such as Polaroid v Kodak early in its tenure, which in the US signaled “a new period in which patents regained their importance as intellectual property protection for technology companies.”  The SPC’s IP Court will likely have discretion to determine whether a case belongs to a major and complicated one. There are various factors to be taken into consideration, such as the damages claimed, the nature of the subject matter, the parties concerned, the relevant technicality, the social impacts, and so on.  In addition to this area, the court will also retrial cases arising from application by any party of interest and protest by the Supreme Procuratorate as mentioned (Article 2(5) and Article 11 of the Provisions).

For Chinese IP practitioners and regional IP judges this is also a major game changer.  Chinese patent firms that were once focusing on establishing offices throughout China may now need to think about reinforcing their staff in Beijing.  Chinese judges from various localities may also wonder why certain appellate jurisdiction was removed from their courts.  The answer to that last issue likely lies in the desire of the SPC to establish greater uniformity and predictability throughout China in important technology-related IP cases, as was explained at the Summit.

At the Summit, Judge Wang Chuang noted that four goals of this new court are: boosting technological innovation; testing fields of judicial reform; being a bellwether for patent trials and becoming a preferred court for international patent litigation.  These goals are laudable, not surprising, consistent with the current directions of judicial reform and can help inspire confidence of the foreign business community.  In view of the goal of increasing China’s role as a center for international IP litigation, it is not surprising that so many judges attended the Summit.

In all, the establishment of the SPC’s IP Court is exciting news in Chinese IP community.

Written by Mark Cohen, Harry Fang 方春晖, Steve Song 宋献涛 and Jerry Liu 刘良勇attorneys with the Deheng law firm北京德和衡律师事务所.

Mark Cohen excercised final editorial control and is responsible for any errors. Photograph of Judge Wang Chuang  by Mark Cohen from the Summit.  All rights reserved.

Please write in with your observations on this important development!

flowchartofnewcourt
Updated January 8, 2019 to clarify uncertainty over jurisdiction over trademark administrative appeals, and on January 9 to add a photo of the flow chart for litigation from the Summit which does not include trademarks  (above).

Trade and Peace on Earth: Part 1

O ye who read this truthful rime From Flanders, kneel and say:
God speed the time when every day
Shall be as Christmas Day.

(Frederick Niven, “A Carol from Flanders”, regarding the WW I Xmas truce)

We are in the middle of the 90-day trade war truce, which was announced at the G-20 in Buenos Aires. Is there, however, an opportunity for a lasting trade peace?  Let’s look at developments to date…

Shortly after the Buenos Aires G-20 meeting on December 1, 2018 at which the 90 day truce was agreed to, USTR Robert Lighthizer gave an interview on Face the Nation where he  hinted at the pathway forward, noting: “We have had conversations ongoing.  We have had conversations ongoing for over a year.”  Lighthizer went on to say that we need structural changes and market opening “on this fundamental issue of non-economic technology transfer.”  Lighthizer’s focus was three-fold: forced technology transfer, cyber theft and state capitalism.  Lighthizer noted that tariffs will be raised in March unless a satisfactory solution is found.  In fact, USTR has announced on November 19 a deadline of March 2, at which time tariffs will be raised.  March 2 is 90 days after the December 1 meeting.

Notwithstanding LIghthizer’s assertions of on-going discussion, there have been several significant developments which suggest that there may not have been much real communication.  Typically, a new administration needs one to two years before adequately coming to terms with how China negotiates on IP and what may be the “low hanging fruit” in IP improvements that could have a durable impact.  This administration and China have not had anything approaching a “honeymoon” period.  It is not surprising, therefore, that some of the developments during this past year, as well as during the truce period appear, to be missing the mark.

If we dial back to the period when the 301 investigation was on-going, China failed to publicly disclose data on civil trade secret cases for 2018, and actually reduced its criminal trade secret prosecutions by approximately 35% to only 26 cases in that year. China’s revised trade secret law (Anti Unfair Competition Law) (eff. 1/1/18) also weakened trade secret protections by expanding the ambiguity around protections and procedures, where a non “business operator”, such as an employee, misappropriates trade secrets.

The United States also did not always engage comprehensively during this period. Although the United States filed a WTO case against China on March 23, 2018 (the day after the Section 301 Report was released) regarding compulsory licensing terms, the complaint does not specifically call out trade secrets (undisclosed information) as a form of technology licensing.  The European complaint, by contrast, more thoughtfully notes that “China imposes a different set of rules on the import of technology, including industrial property rights, other intellectual property rights and undisclosed information (“intellectual property rights”).”

Other recent efforts undertaken by China suggest that there may also have been some lack of understanding of US interests, including perhaps an undue emphasis on patent licensing.  NDRC, China’s powerful state planning agency,  announced a special Memorandum of Understanding/campaign mechanism involving 38 government agencies to address six types of “dishonest  conduct” by patenting enterprises and individuals.  The “MOU For Cooperation for Joint Disciplinary Actions Against Subjects of Serious Mistrust in the Field of Intellectual Property (patents).” 关于对知识产权(专利)领域严重失信主体开展联合惩戒的合作备忘录  is dated November 21 (before the G-20), but  was published on December 2 (immediately after).

How effective will this MOU be?  For some time, the academic data has suggested that such special campaigns have rarely brought any durable progress.  In fact, China suggested a special campaign for three months at the beginning of the 301 investigation. My response on the record to that suggestion was:

“Many scholars think that these short campaigns have limited duration and effect . . .. So, I’d like to know why is this particular program any different from other ones before it? Why not extend it or make it permanent? Or perhaps should the focus be on judicial reform or other areas?”

The data also shows that foreigners rarely use the administrative patent system and, as I have pointed out, along with former Chief Judge Rader and former PTO Director Kappos, vesting the administrative agency in charge of granting patents with the ability to bring infringement actions and special campaigns may not be conducive to independent adjudication of rights.

Another “truce-responsive” legislative effort appears to be in the works from China’s National People’s Congress, where a first reading of a new “Foreign Investment Law” is reportedly  now under consideration. The law would combine existing laws regarding foreign investment into one statute and is intended to insure that foreigners are accorded national treatment and can participate in government procurement and standards setting, as well as insure that transfer technology is on voluntary terms.  It  hopefully may address some aspects of forced technology transfer that have been identified by USTR in its 301 Report.

There have also been two other significant developments that could affect the landscape for technology transfer and IP protection in China that have a longer history and could be helpful to foreigners facing IP issues in China.  One of these is China’s proposed draft patent law amendments which have also been submitted to the NPC and have gone through its first reading.  The draft offers some improvement on judicial procedures and remedies (including discovery for calculation of damages, and improved damage calculations).  This latest draft also strengthens administrative enforcement, and extends the term for design patents to 15 years (in anticipation of accession to the Hague Agreement on the International Registration of Industrial Designs), provides for enhanced protection of patents in e-commerce, extends patent term for innovative pharmaceutical patents by five years.  However, it may also have weakened protections for pharmaceutical patents, as press reports thus far omit any reference to patent linkage, continuing a trend since this past August.

In my estimation, the most positive development is the establishment of a new specialized appellate circuit IP  tribunal attached to China’s Supreme People’s Court and under the direction of long time IP judge, Luo Dongchuan, now Justice of the SPC.  The new circuit tribunal will have national jurisdiction over technologically complex IP cases and will open for business January 1, 2019.   This court could also have an important impact on technical trade secret cases, patent disputes in key areas, such as semiconductors and pharma cases, appeals from China’s patent office, in insuring consistency of decision making across various intermediate courts, and in other areas.

Interestingly, none of these changes address Lighthizer’s other goals of addressing cyber theft and state capitalism.

There have been other changes in how the US engages with China that suggest some modifications in the bilateral relationship are permanent.  US companies have now begun wondering how they can take advantage of US Customs rules regarding determinations of country of origin of products with Chinese content, to minimize the potential application of 25% punitive tariffs.   They are busy revisiting Customs doctrines regarding “substantial transformation, including the progeny of cases and rulings since the landmark decision in Anheuser Busch v. United States 207 U.S. 556 (1907), in order to see how they might restructure manufacturing in China through conducting more assembly or finishing outside of China.  For Customs lawyers this must be a boon period.  At the same time, the US Department of Commerce has published new, potentially restrictive rules on “foundational” and “emerging” technologies, which may be targeted towards China, and the Treasury Department/Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States is conducting a pilot program that could restrict “passive, non-controlling” foreign investments in technology.  Meanwhile, Huawei’s CFO was arrested pending extradition to the United States, and Fujian Jinhua is banned from acquiring US technology, as it has been determined to be a threat to US national security.  It is clear to me that even if this stage of the trade war were to end, a new normal in trade relations with China has emerged and significant steps will need to be taken to reestablish trust.

My next blog will offer some ideas for reducing the bilateral temperature.

Christmas Day, 2018 (rev. 5:00 PM).

A Data Download on Semiconductor Patent Litigation in China

Because of its strategic importance to both the United States and China, the IC sector is a useful example of how Chinese policies and plans may – or may not – be influencing the Chinese government in the protection of foreign-owned IP.

A useful starting point for evaluating the challenges in IC IP protection in China is the data collected from China’s court cases.  IP House has conducted a heretofore unpublished and useful study of all semiconductor-related patent disputes in its database, attached here (in Chinese).  The data shows that there have been 166 first instance civil patent infringements IP judgments with the word “chip” (芯片), and 86 second instance cases.    There have also been 142 first instance administrative decisions, typically involving validity matters, and ninety second instance decisions. 52.91% of the first instance cases involved invention patents, 10.31% involved utility model patents and 36.77% involved design patents.

Regarding civil cases, 39 were heard in Zhejiang, 35 in Guangdong, 27 in Beijing, 21 in Jiangsu and 11 in Shanghai.  Every other jurisdiction had fewer than five cases, and no cases were reported for Fujian Province.

The data suggest a comparatively low “success” rate for plaintiffs in semiconductor patent disputes.   Amongst the 183 reported judgments, only 51 cases were fully or partially successful — a 38.34% success rate.  This compared to an overall success rate of about 80% for litigants in patent cases in 2014 in China, as reported by Bian Renjun at Berkeley. Cases were not reversed to a significant degree on appeal; 60 out of 70 cases supported the original decision of the first instance court.  Amongst the “top 10 “ courts in terms of litigation volume, the success rate for semiconductor patent plaintiffs varied dramatically.   Guangdong had the highest success rate (60%), followed by Beijing (43.75%), Zhejiang (23.08%) and Jiangsu (19.05%).  76 of 77 successful litigants obtained an injunction to stop infringement; one litigant did not request an injunction.

Regarding administrative reviews, 117 out of 140 cases involved affirming the original administrative decision, an “affirmance rate” of 83.57 percent.  Eighty one out of ninety cases were affirmed on appeal.

The United States was the principal foreign civil litigant, with seven cases, followed by the British Virgin Islands and the Netherlands, each with two cases.  The United States was the principal first instance administrative plaintiff challenging SIPO’s decisions, with 30 cases, followed by Japan (5), Netherlands (3) and several countries with only one civil case (France, Germany, Cayman Islands, Korea,   Singapore and Israel).

I draw the following tentative conclusions from this data:

  1. Success rates for semiconductor cases vary dramatically by jurisdiction in China. My guess is that the Guangdong courts, which have the highest success rates, have greater expertise in both semiconductor patent litigation and patent litigation overall, which may make them more “expert” on these matters. Due to variations in success rates amongst jurisdictions, the semiconductor sector is a useful example of why China needs a national appellate IP court.
  2. No matter what major court one looks to, success rates for these cases are lower than the average for other types of patent litigation. This may suggest either a lack of familiarity with the technology or an unduly skeptical view of the courts regarding semiconductor patent assertions at this time. Considering that the vast majority of the cases do not involve foreigners, the low success rate primarily affects Chinese litigants.
  3. Foreigners, and especially Americans, use the courts primarily to litigate patent validity matters. There were 4.5 times more administrative semiconductor patent cases brought by Americans compared to infringement cases. Overall foreigners brought four times more validity cases compared to infringement cases in this area.  This means that the Beijing IP Court, which hears all validity disputes, plays a key role for foreigners on semiconductor patent matters.  Semiconductor patent cases also follow the general pattern where foreigners are disproportionately willing to challenge SIPO in court, but are less willing to bring infringement cases to final adjudication.
  4. Utility model and design patents are frequently asserted in patent disputes in China and may have value to foreign companies needing to protect their IP in this important market.
  5. The Fujian courts do not appear in this IP House report. However, Fujian has already heard one high profile case (AMEC v Veeco), which was settled and does not appear to be publicly available at this time. The second high profile case, involves Micron Technologies, and is currently on-going.

I hope to blog further about the AMEC cases in the United States and China in a subsequent posting.

 

December 2017 Update

 

Here are some updates on IP developments in China from this past December 2017:

1.  Xi Jinping: China must accelerate implementation of big data strategy (English) 习近平:实施国家大数据战略加快建设数字中国 (Chinese).  Xi Jinping, during a collective study session of the Politburo on December 8th, has urged the country to accelerate implementation of its big data strategy to better serve social and economic development and improve people’s lives. Xi said efforts should be made to advance national big data strategy, improve digital infrastructure, promote integration and sharing of digital resources, and safeguard data security.

2.  Legal Daily on December 5, 2017 notes that leakage of private data from government  websites is getting attention, all local governments start rectification and protection mechanism  政府网站泄露隐私问题受关注,各地整改升级保护机制 (Chinese)

3.  Ministry of Education, Department of Human Resources and Social Security, and Ministry of Finance regulated information disclosure of private information 教育部人社部财政部三部委规范信息公开 保隐私信息安全自查工作要不留死角(Chinese).  This appears to be related to the developments described in the Legal Daily article described above.  Note that unauthorized disclosure of confidential information of foreigners had been a concern during prior meetings of the bilateral Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade.   Compare 2014 and 2016 U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT).   From 2014 JCTT: The United States and China confirm that trade secrets submitted to the government in administrative or regulatory proceedings are to be protected from improper disclosure to the public and only disclosed to government officials in connection with their official duties in accordance with law.  Each side will further study how to optimize its respective relevant administrative and regulatory procedures within its legal system, where appropriate, including by strengthening confidentiality protection measures, limiting the scope of government personnel having access to trade secrets, limiting the information required from companies to include only information reasonably necessary for satisfying regulatory purposes, and stipulating that any requirements on government agencies to publicly disclose information appropriately allow for the withholding of trade secrets.  Government officials who illegally disclose companies’ trade secrets are to be subject to administrative or legal liability according to law.  The United States and China agree to exchange information on the scope of protection of trade secrets and confidential business information under their respective legal systems.  China acknowledges that it is to conduct a legislative study of a revised law on trade secrets.  The United States acknowledges that draft legislation proposing a Federal civil cause of action for trade secrets misappropriation has been introduced in the U.S. Congress.  From 2016 JCCT: Both sides confirm that, in those cases in which a judicial or administrative enforcement authority requests the submission of confidential information in conjunction with a trade secret enforcement matter, such requests will be narrowly tailored to avoid putting at risk sensitive business information and will be subject to appropriate protective orders to control additional disclosure and ensure that information is not further misappropriated and that any decision that is made publicly available in conjunction with a trade secret enforcement matter will have all confidential information appropriately redacted. The United States and China confirm that trade secret investigations are conducted in a prudent and cautious manner.

4.  Overview of China’s intellectual property protection: 32000 suspected criminal cases have been transferred since 2011.  中国知识产权保护状况全景式展示  2011年以来移送涉嫌犯罪案件3.2万起(Chinese).  Note: This is data on referrals from administrative to criminal enforcement. The transfer from admin to criminal seems like part of overall efforts that China took to improve IP protection. The article mentioned that three agencies: National Copyright Administration, SAIC and SIPO, all enhanced IP protection enforcement. For instance, National Copyright Administration, through “Jian Wang” (Swordnet) project, investigated 5560 infringement cases over the past 13 years; SAIC investigated 19,400 trademark infringement cases from Jan to Oct 2017; and SIPO and other IP protection agencies investigated 189,000 all kinds of infringement and counterfeiting cases in 2016.Related background information: State Council Opinion on Improving Administrative/Criminal IPR Enforcement Coordination.

5.  China Intellectual Property Development Alliance was established  中国知识产权发展联盟成立 (Chinese).   The focus of this alliance is to create a good environment for IP application and protection and to build an ecosystem for IP operation.

6.  Notice on establishing national intellectual property pilot parks.  关于确定国家知识产权试点园区的通知 (Chinese).  2017 new list of national intellectual property pilot parks 2017年新一批国家知识产权试点园区名单 (Chinese).  These pilot parks are established by local governments.  They will provide IP services, information sharing services, help incubate IP intensive industries, and provide supporting infrastructure. SIPO approves them, and will monitor pilot parks’ work progress and review document for renewal.

7.  The story behind of independent development of C919 (English); C919背后的自主研制之路 (Chinese).  The Chinese article describes the patents involved in the C919 aircraft project.

8.  China implemented the first national military standards of intellectual property management in the field of equipment construction 我国首部装备建设领域知识产权管理国家军用标准实施 (Chinese).

9.  China’s R&D investment hits a new high.  我国研发投入再创新高 (Chinese).   China’s total GDP in 2016 was $11 trillion and R&D investment is around $230 billion, which is about 2.15% of GDP. For US, R&D investment is estimated to be around 2.8% of GDP in 2016.

10. China’s invention patent applications exceed one million from Jan. to Oct. (English); 前10个月发明专利申请量超百万件 (Chinese).

11.WIPO Stats on Patent Application Filings Shows China Continuing to Lead the World (English);  China Tops Patent, Trademark, Design Filings in 2016 (English).

12,  “China Big Data Rule of Law Development Report 2017” released.   《中国大数据法治发展报告(2017)》发布 (Chinese).  Related:  Presentation on 2017 China Big Data Rule of Law Development Report 2017中国大数据法治发展报告(实录与PPT)(Chinese)

13.  China to boost competitiveness in AI (English) 产业三年行动计划提出在八大领域率先取得突破——人工智能服务渐入千家万户(Chinese).  The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) recently released an action plan to substantially improve the development of the AI industry. This plan set to make breakthroughs in eight areas, including smart cars, service robot, drone, AI medical diagnosis, facial recognition, voice recognition, smart translation and smart home product. The MIIT promised more policy support, including special funds, talent cultivation and a better business environment. Measures will also be rolled out to build industry clusters, set up key laboratories and encourage data sharing.

14.  Encourage indigenous innovation and build strong brands.  鼓励自主创新 聚力品牌经济 (Chinese).  The China Council for Brand Development is working with the National Development and Reform Commission to formulate “China’s Brand Development Strategy.” This program aims to cultivate 1000 well-known international brands in five years.

15.  More than 2000 clues have been received for the “Suyuan” campaign against trademark infringement.  打击商标侵权“溯源”行动已收到2000余条案件线索 (Chinese)  SAIC started a campaign called “Suyuan” against trademark infringement in September 2017. Until the end of November, more than 2000 clues on cases have been reported.

16.  Shenzhen IP court and Shenzhen Finance court were established 深圳知识产权法庭和深圳金融法庭同时揭牌办公 (Chinese).   A new Shenzhen IP court was opened on December 26, 2017. This court will handle intellectual property cases which were under the jurisdiction of the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court.

17,. Wang Jinshan was appointed as the Chief Judge of Beijing IP Court.  王金山被任命为为北京知识产权法院院长 (Chinese).  Wang replaces Chief Judge Su Chi, who has guided the court since it was first launched and implemented numerous reform projects. We wish him well. Judge Wang graduated from Peking University with a major in Law. He was the party secretary of Beijing IP Court since May 2017. Judge Wang also previously worked at Beijing Intermediate People’s Court.

18.  China’s software copyright registration exceeds 700,000 in 2017.  2017年我国软件著作权登记量突破70万件  http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=39313 (Chinese).

We hope to be providing more updates in the year ahead from the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology.

As usual the information contained herein does not necessarily represent the opinion of any government agency, company, individual or the University of California.

By Berkeley staff.