Vringo vs ZTE: What the NDA Dispute in New York Suggests For Licensing Strategies

As many of my readers may know, I was not a fan of the Chinese courts’ decisions in Huawei vs. Interdigital in Shenzhen and Guangdong, which raised a number of process and substantive concerns.  A key question raised in that case was whether “the licensee has been afforded a fair opportunity to take a license.  If the licensee has been afforded an opportunity and declines to take a license, then it is my personal opinion that the licensee should not take the “shield” of a FRAND commitment, and turn it into a sword that weakens the licensors ability to license on fair terms.”    The decisions in those cases plus the Qualcomm investigation has also raised many substantive and procedural concerns, including concerns regarding how to license IP within China in an environment that is increasingly seen as nationalistic, whether foreigners have been singled out, and counter-strategies to deal with Chinese companies inclined to seek protection under China’s antitrust laws.

Prof. Epstein expressed similar concerns in a policy brief  and a Forbes Magazine article earlier this year: “Far from being a device to promote competition, the AML is used to harass foreign firms that provide much needed competition to China’s state-protected agencies….The antitrust laws should not be applied so as to single out patents or any other intellectual property rights for special treatment; all property deployed in the marketplace should be treated equally under the competition laws.”

Two interesting decisions from Judge Kaplan in the Southern District of New York in the matter of Vringo vs ZTE Corp (14-CV-4988) highlight strategic responses to this perception of an aggressive posture of the Chinese courts and administrative enforcement authorities on alleged abusive licensing practices.

By way of background, Vringo has raised money from venture capital firms and is a licensor of telecomm patents, including patents formerly held by Nokia Corporation and Alcatel-Lucent.  From the perspective of a Chinese licensee, of which ZTE may be typical, Vringo is engaged in “abuses of intellectual property” as a “non-practicing entity” that uses “the threat of litigation and injunction to support [its] demands for unfair licensing fees.”  Vringo claims that patents it is asserting are standards essential.  Moreover, it has brought litigation in such places as Australia, Brazil,  France,  Germany,  India,  Malaysia,  the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom against ZTE for their alleged infringement.

In a June 3, 2015 decision by Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York regarding a July 2014 action filed by Vringo for breach of a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) related to possible settlement of these litigations and any other disputes between them, Judge Kaplan issued a preliminary injunction to enjoin ZTE from further disclosing information subject to the NDA in antitrust matters in the EC and China brought by ZTE. The NDA specifically required that confidential information disclosed could not be used in “any existing or future judicial or arbitration proceedings” or “for [their] commercial advantage, dispute advantage, or any other purpose.”

Judge Kaplan’s decisions are suggestive of possible strategies for companies concerned about entering into settlement discussions without increasing Chinese AML litigation risks through well drafted NDA’s. Here is what I derive:

  1. Insist on Appropriate Governing Law, Know Chinese Legal Arguments and Make Sure Your NDA Has A Close Nexus to the Jurisdiction. Judge Kaplan applied New York law, and rejected ZTE’s arguments that Chinese law should govern the NDA and that that ZTE was required to provide the information to Chinese authorities.   Based on an affidavit submitted by my friend Doug Clark, a Hong Kong barrister with considerable Chinese patent experience, Judge Kaplan characterized ZTE’s assertions that it needed to disclose confidential information, as “nothing more than gamesmanship.”  Also of dispositive importance was that Vringo maintains its principal place of business in New York and sought protection under its laws when entering into the NDA.  ZTE voluntarily consented to New York law knowing this background.
  2.  Enter Into Settlement Discussions To Support Resolving Resolve Litigation. Judge Kaplan also rejected ZTE’s argument that the NDA is unenforceable under New York law as “an agreement to suppress evidence.”  The NDA was a permissible agreement between private parties about use of information in private litigation.  New York has a strong public policy encouraging settlement and “[t]here can be no doubt that the NDA was entered into for the explicit purpose of facilitating candid settlement discussions.”  Moreover, “it was entirely lawful for Vringo and ZTE to agree that they would not use information exchanged in settlement discussions in any judicial proceedings.”
  3. Make Out a Case for Irreparable Harm and Appeal to the Courts Sense of Equity. Judge Kaplan found that the irreparable harm requirement was met because “Vringo … probably would suffer injury in the future that could not be undone even if it prevails in this action.”  As with any well-crafted NDA, this NDA also contemplated the availability of equitable remedies for breach including by providing for procedures for the parties to seek a protective order from a court and by reciting, “that money damages may not be a sufficient remedy for any breach of this Agreement and that, in addition to all other remedies to which it may be entitled, the Parties will be entitled to seek equitable relief, including injunction and specific performance, for any actual or threatened breach of the provisions of this Agreement.” Judge Kaplan also noted that Vringo had not been made informed of the initiation of civil litigation or the unauthorized disclosure of its confidential information in an administrative action filed by ZTE in China, which had further compromised its position in those matters. Although he didn’t discuss the fast pace of litigation in China, which I have raised elsewhere in this blog, I am glad to see judges and rightsholders recognize how critical timing is to IP and antitrust matters involving China.

Note that Judge Kaplan did not enjoin ZTE from filing an AML action in China, but only from using the information obtained in violation of the protective order. Although the facts and circumstances are different, from the perspective of the Huawei vs InterDigital case, Judge Kaplan showed deference to the parties’ choice of law and did not take steps to interfere with decisions to file legal proceedings in other jurisdictions.  Of course, from ZTE’s perspective, it was likely being deprived of  information that it thought would be highly valuable to Chinese authorities.

In a more recent, July 24, 2015 decision, Judge Kaplan threatened sanctions against ZTE’s counsel for interposing objections that appear to be intended to delay or harass the deposition of ZTE’s counsel in what appears to have been subsequent discovery related to the above mentioned brief of the ZTE/Vringo NDA. This order appears to have been issued to support Vringo’s allegations that ZTE’s counsel “had an active role in coordinating pressure tactics by Chinese authorities in response to Vringo’s licensing demands.”   ZTE’s counsel have been ordered by Judge Kaplan to show cause why they should not be sanctioned under F.R.C.P, Rule 11.

The spate of IP-related Chinese licensing and antitrust decisions has also come at a time when the US and Chinese judicial and administrative systems are increasingly interacting, sometimes with a deepening sense of each other’s legal system or the comity that may be afforded to another court, or the different time frames that US and Chinese courts operate under.

The opinions expressed here are the author’s own academic perspectives and should not be taken as a reflection of any opinion of any client or employer, past or present, or a reflection on any market valuation of any stock or equity of any kind. Please email me with any corrections to this or any other posting, or feel free to post your own commentary on this blog.

SAIC Releases IP Abuse Rule

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The State Administration of Industry and Commerce has issued final Rules on Stopping the Abuse of Intellectual Property to Eliminate or Restrict Competitive Conduct on April 7 (Order No. 74)  (关于禁止滥用知识产权排除、限制竞争行为的规)with an effective date of August 1, 2015.

Above is a wordcloud drawn from a machine translating (Bing) of the new SAIC IP abuse rules.

WIPO, SIPO and USPTO: US-China Patent Filing Trends

Chinese Activity at WIPO

A WIPO report released on March 19 noted that Huawei, with 3,442 published PCT applications, overtook Panasonic as the largest applicant in 2014. Qualcomm was the second largest applicant in 2014, with 2,409 published applications. ZTE Corp. took third place with 2,179 PCT applications.

These top three applicants have similar patent filing profiles, with digital communication accounting for the bulk of their total filings.

The report highlights some weakness amongst Chinese academic institutions: among the top 25 educational institution filers, there were only two Chinese academic institutions – Peking University (no. 19) and Tsinghua (no. 23).

United States Activity at SIPO

SIPO’s 2014 Statistical Report (no. 164), analyzes filing trends from foreign countries, including the United States that further underscores the competition amongst Qualcomm, Huawei and ZTE and in the ICT sectors.

United States China invention patent applications with SIPO amounted to 135,138 pieces over the previous five year period analyzed.   The annual growth rate during this period was 8.3%. In 2013 United States patent applications were 29,992, about 1.4 times 2009.

According to SIPO, the following companies from the United States filed more than 3,000 patents from 2009-2013: Qualcomm (6,029); GE (5,875); General Motors (5,697); Microsoft (3,957) and IBM (3,293). Also of note during this period, Apple’s patent filings have increased rapidly, while Microsoft’s decreased after 2011 to 327 in 2013, falling to 11th place among US applicants.

SIPO’s description of Qualcomm’s role in communication technologies underscores highly competitive relationships in China:

Over the five year period of this survey, Qualcomm’s 5-year filings have ranked amongst the top three United States applicants. Chinese enterprises have also substantially increased their communication invention patents, and this substantial growth has a number of advantages. However, in key areas such as mobile phone chips, Qualcomm still owns core IP. It provides licenses to patented technology to Chinese communications equipment and consumer electronics equipment enterprises, and uses this technology to charge exorbitant license fees.

What about Chinese activity in the US?

USPTO’S Fiscal Year Report (ending September 30, 2014), provides partial data on Chinese filing trends in the United States. In 2013, there were 15,496 patent applications from China, having nearly doubled from 8,358 in 2010. Patent grants to Chinese residents more than doubled from 2010-2014 from 3,059 to 7,717.

Additional data is necessary to compare Huawei and ZTE’s filing trends in the United States and whether they reflect similar competitive trends in PCT filings and in China.

NDRC and Qualcomm Reach Resolution of Antimonopoly Law Complaint

Qualcomm announced yesterday, February 9, that it has reached a resolution with China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) regarding the NDRC’s investigation of Qualcomm under China’s Antimonopoly Law (AML). The NDRC has issued an Administrative Sanction Decision finding that Qualcomm has violated the AML. Qualcomm has stated that it will not pursue further legal proceedings contesting the NDRC’s findings and that it will implement a “rectification plan” that modifies certain of its business practices in China.  Qualcomm has also noted that while it is “pleased” with NDRC’s review and approval of this rectification plan, it is “disappointed” with the results of the investigation.  Key aspects of the rectification plan are:

Qualcomm will offer licenses to its current 3G and 4G essential Chinese patents separately from licenses to its other patents and it will provide patent lists during the negotiation process. If Qualcomm seeks a cross license from a Chinese licensee as part of such offer, it will provide fair consideration for such rights.

For licenses of Qualcomm’s 3G and 4G essential Chinese patents for branded devices sold for use in China, Qualcomm will charge royalties of 5% for 3G devices (including multimode 3G/4G devices) and 3.5% for 4G devices (including 3-mode LTE-TDD devices) that do not implement CDMA or WCDMA, in each case using a royalty base of 65% of the net selling price of the device.

• Qualcomm will give its existing licensees an opportunity to elect to take the new terms for sales of branded devices for use in China as of January 1, 2015.

Qualcomm will not condition the sale of baseband chips on the chip customer signing a license agreement with terms that the NDRC found to be unreasonable or on the chip customer not challenging unreasonable terms in its license agreement. However, this does not require Qualcomm to sell chips to any entity that is not a Qualcomm licensee, and does not apply to a chip customer that refuses to report its sales of licensed devices as required by its patent license agreement.

The NDRC imposed a fine on the Company of 6.088 billion RMB (approximately USD 975 million), which Qualcomm will not contest. Qualcomm will pay the fine on a timely basis as required by the NDRC.

The settlement appears to identify certain issues which likely were actively negotiated, including, the smallest “unit” based upon which royalties may be collected, compensation and negotiation for cross-licenses from Chinese licensees, dates of  application of newly imposed licensing terms, royalties and licensing practices for  essential and non-essential 3G and 4G patents, calculation of any different Chinese domestic market royalties,  sales of chips in conjunction with royalties and calculation of a fine.   It is unclear from this announcement how significant a difference the prospective licensing terms are from Qualcomm’s current licensing regime, and the impact, if any, on this new licensing scheme on Qualcomm’s global licensing practices.  It is also unclear  at this time how proportional this penalty and rectification program is compared to other NDRC investigations.