Kevin Kozak, US Customs Official Who Supported Engagement With China, Shot By Coworker

I was surprised to read in today’s press that Kevin Kozak, a Deputy Special Agent in Charge of the LA office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, was shot by a co-worker.  Kevin is known to many of us who did training with the Chinese on Customs and criminal IP enforcement from about 2003-2006.  He traveled to China and hosted Chinese delegations in Southern California.  Kevin has unique qualifications as both a law enforcement office and an attorney who has actually prosecuted IP criminal cases.  He was able to contribute a wealth of experience to those discussions.  All of us who worked with Kevin wish him a speedy recovery.

Confronting Chinese Innovation Mercantilism

Interest in and discussion about innovation practices in China continues.  Here’s another upcoming conference, which sounds like it could elicit controversy, from ITIF (the Information Technology and Innovation Forum): “Confronting Chinese Innovation Mercantilism“.  According to the press release “China is unabashedly seeking to favor Chinese-owned firms in order to dominate practically all sectors, especially the higher value-added, innovation-based sectors. Yet, the Washington consensus response can be summed up in one word: patience.”.

A separate stream of discussion in Washington has been on Chinese state-owned enterprises, which ITIF alludes to, including hearings yesterday on Capitol Hill on the role of SOE’s [State Owned Enterprises].  Prof. Curtis Milhaupt from Columbia has also written an excellent paper on this topic describing the organization of SOE’s, but without any strong proscriptive language. Prof. Milhaupt also lectured at Fordham on Feb. 16.

In the long run, there is only way forward on all these issues: informed, principled, and respectful engagement.  It isn’t a simple matter of patience as the ITIF study suggests.  Hopefully serious programs and reports will help us all pursue a reasonable way of engaging China.

OBAMA’S NEW LABORATORIES FOR IP ENFORCEMENT INVOLVING CHINA

The President mentioned China four times in his State of the Union address on January 24, 2012.   Although it’s a bit unclear what his game plan is, it seems that he is looking closely at IP-related claims.  “It’s not right when another country lets our movies, music, and software be pirated,” Obama said:  “Tonight, I’m announcing the creation of a Trade Enforcement Unit that will be charged with investigating unfair trade practices in countries like China. “

What will be the nature of this Trade Enforcement Unit? During the Bush administration, a “top to bottom” review at the U.S. Trade Representative’s office resulted in the creation of a China trade enforcement unit within USTR that took the lead on China trade cases at the WTO.  Claire Reade, the current Assistant USTR for China was the head of that unit.  The Obama administration has also actively supported the work of the newly re-invigorated IPR “Czar”, Victoria Espinel, who has also been looking into a range of IPR-related issues in China.   Perhaps the President is also looking at consolidating government agencies, as USTR Amb. Ron Kirk has recently stated.  Or perhaps it is nothing new at all, as the lack of reaction from the Chinese press seems to suggest.

China may already understand that China-related issues tend to become politicized during any presidential election year, but especially one where the economy remains fragile.  Short term grandstanding by U.S. politicians may be  easily dismissed by China’s leadership, as the Chinese reaction to the recent anti-China campaign commercial of Michigan Senatorial candidate Pete Hoekstra  shows.  It  contains  numerous  linguistic and economic errors. From the long range perspective, however, excessive politicization of complicated IPR issues in China is not likely to be to anybody’s benefit – government or industry.  More importantly, politicization can divert scarce resources.  Rather, when there are facts to support claims, they should be brought forward, without hyperbole and, if necessary, in court or the WTO.

There are lessons that the Administration can learn from several notable experiments in 2011 in dealing with overseas infringement problems. One of them was widely noticed: the extensive report published by the US International Trade Commission China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and Indigenous Innovation Policies on the U.S. Economy (Investigation No. 332-519, USITC Publication 4226, May 2011).   The USITC report was based on surveys sent to over 5,000 US firms in IP –intensive areas.   The report calculated that losses from IPR infringement in China were approximately $48 billion in 2009, which may be an understated figure as losses in less IP-intensive sectors of the economy are not recorded in this report.  According to the USITC, firms in this segment of the U.S. economy also spent approximately $4.8 billion in 2009 to address possible Chinese IPR infringement in 2009.  We need more analytical  data like this – or if the government doesn’t conduct the survey, it should at least rely on surveys and analyses of others in making policies.

In another effort, the prestigious U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”), our national appellate patent court, confirmed in TianRui Group Co. Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2010-1395 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 11, 2011) the extension of the USITC’s “Section 337” jurisdiction to trade secret theft occurring in China even if the domestic manufacturer was no longer practicing the trade secret.  Section 337 is a potent tool since the actual manufacturer exporting the infringing product need not be a part of the case for it to proceed and infringing goods to be denied entry into the United States.   By extending the reach of Section 337 cases to trade secret infringements occurring overseas but affecting US markets,  it gave companies  here a remedy to secure the home market against underpriced overseas competition that unfairly benefits from trade secret theft.

The frustration with overseas infringements has also compelled courts to consider creative claims that might be seen as extending their jurisdiction.  Among these, two luxury goods companies brought suits in New York against Bank of China, China Merchants Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China to have the banks freeze assets in accounts owned by the alleged counterfeiters and turn over information about the clients.

States are also working individually and together to see if products that benefit from infringing inputs that may originate from overseas are causing unfair competition in their markets, and to encourage the federal government to take counterpart action.  In another important effort, on November 4, 2011, the National Associations of Attorneys General wrote a letter, signed by 36 state Attorneys General, to the Federal Trade Commission that they were each “seeking ways to use the traditional power of our offices to address the unfair advantage that results when foreign and other manufacturers use stolen information technology, including pirated software, to illegally slash costs.” The letter asked the FTC to  apply Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the counterpart legislation to State unfair competition laws,  to address such acts.  In addition, the letter noted that Washington State and Louisiana have recently enacted laws to precisely address the type of harm caused by overseas competitors that use pirated software to compete with US companies.   Considering the allegedly high incidence of business software piracy in China, these measures could also develop into meaningful tools to address piracy that affects US markets and might otherwise be difficult to reach by US courts or rightsholders.

In many respects,   the current situation involving overseas intellectual property infringements follows the federalist course that Justice Brandeis famously described which creates a “laboratory” for “novel … economic experiments. “  Some of the solutions are to likely found in the States themselves, while others may be found in more aggressive exploitation of existing trade remedies and, as the President has suggested, better coordination of the tools that are available to address them.

Introducing Tom Duke: a brief Q&A

Following our year end review of  individuals’ transitions in China’s growing IP field, here is a Q&A with Tom Duke, a new IP officer at the UK Mission:

Why did the UK decided to send you to Beijing? Is it part of  a broader plan?

My role in Beijing is the first part of a planned international IP attaché network for the UK IPO. As it’s a new post, one of the priorities is to establish the most effective way that I can deliver added value to the networks already on the ground in China (for example in UK Trade & Investment, the FCO and UK/EU projects and industry associations). From reading a couple of your articles about your time in the US embassy, I know you have spoken about providing colleagues with the right tools – based on accurate information of the Chinese IP landscape – and amplifying messages that can benefit all stakeholders.

There is already a small but active IP diplomatic community in Beijing: Japanese, Korean, American, French, and European.  What is your role in that community and in working with rights holders and the government?

I also of course bring some experience, ideas and working practices to the job. I intend to be pro-active in reaching out to Chinese government and non-government partners, as well as work with the international IP community in China. I strongly believe that engagement is most effective if it is coming with a sound understanding of the local context. I thus think it is important to understand the priorities of China, as well as the political realities that influence IP outcomes. I am also ready to communicate our position supported by detailed information on relevant UK expertise and best practice.

What have you done already? 

My first week in the job featured the “UK-China IP Symposium” in London. The event featured a large Chinese government delegation led by SIPO Commissioner Tian Lipu, and with officials from seven Chinese government departments. We had detailed sessions on IP protection and enforcement in both the UK and China, plus a look at models for technology transfer. The event was a great forum to bring me up to speed on industry experience in China, and it was also good to see the appetite for interaction by the Chinese delegation with the speakers from the UK.

The event and other discussions highlighted a number of priority work areas. We’re still in the consulting stage, and I’m actively inviting input from all stakeholders as we build our projects and programmes for the coming year.

We wish Mr. Duke the best in China, and we look forward to learning more about his work.

China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) emphasizes disclosure of IP information

The newly revised “Regulation of Annual Report for the Growth Enterprises Market (GEM) Board” has now reached the committee stage.[1]  Disclosure of IP information will be, for the first time, a point of focus in the Regulation.

Article 22, section 4 of the draft for solicitation of opinions requires companies to disclose if, during the reporting period, there have been significant changes to their intangible property, which includes patents, trademarks or other non-patents. The section also requires the disclosure of the causes for those changes. The new revision would require the listed companies to analyze the risks and consequences of the changes in their core competitiveness, which is also defined as patent, non-patent and franchise rights. The companies are also required to explain the conditions and solutions to those risks and consequences to those who will be seriously affected by the changes.


[1] The revisions are now at the stage of solicitation for opinions; a draft is available for review here.

Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH): experimental zone between State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) and Deutsches Patent-und Markenamt (DPMA)

According to a Joint Statement issued by SIPO and DPMA, the Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) experimental zone was set up on Jan. 23, 2012. This program, unlike the PPH between SIPO and USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office), only includes general PPH, but not the Patent Cooperation Treaty PPH. Under this initiative, applicants can file their PPH applications to either SIPO or DPMA.

Applicants who want to file the PPH application to SIPO can visit here for further information (Chinese).

Applicants who want to file the PPH application to DPMA can find further information here (English).

This program will continue for two years and will be due on Jan.22, 2014.

Additionally, SIPO set up the PPH experimental zone with the USPTO on Dec. 1, 2011, which will only continue for one year.

The Other Chinese Patent Development: China’s Autumnal Patent “Hook”

It is 2012, and China’s State Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”) has once again released its end of the year data on patent filings for the year.  While patent data and scientific citation data suggest that China is on the cusp of becoming an innovative economy, there is another trend that has subsisted for several years:  China’s autumnal upward patent “hook.”

As I have remarked in several conferences during the past two to three years, the data suggests that if patents are a surrogate for innovation activity, one of the most significant factors in China’s innovation efforts are the time of the year:  China innovates in the fall.   February, however, appears to be a slow month for creativity, perhaps due to lack of external pressure (government subsidies, quotas), but also due to the hiatus caused by the lunar new year and the 28 day month.

This past year once again reveals a notable spike for total patent filings at year end.

Compare with 2009 and 2010 data:

This “hook” is especially interesting when we compare the 2009 data with filings at WIPO using the Patent Cooperation Treaty, from the same period:

As China has ramped up its PCT filings, it contrasts dramatically with the total PCT filings as well as the aggregate PCT filings from the rest of the world (less China). See below:

The WIPO data suggests that that the magnitude of this “hook” is largely a Chinese characteristic.   It begins around October and climbs to year end, with a sharper rise than overall PCT filings.

There are other trends suggested by these charts.  In addition to the upward hook, there is also the February downward “spike,” and a mid-year (June/July) “bump”.  The June jump is mild, and looks more like a speed bump than anything else, but its persistence is notable.   Although the new year downward spike is noticeable, patent filings soon resume the year-on-year upward trend shortly thereafter as China continues its efforts to innovate and file more patents.

There are probably externalities that cause these changes.  Patent filings most likely drop significantly when the new calendar year has begun, with new budgets in place and the slowdown in activity with the lunar new year.  Companies that have mid-year fiscal cycles may be inclined to file patents in mid-year, however this mid-year “speed bump” is comparatively small.

The larger autumnal patent hook is probably due to a number of externalities: end of year government subsidies, corporate budgets, quotas for corporate patent filings, and other forms of government and corporate encouragement for enterprises and research institutions to file more patents by the end of the calendar year.

Your thoughts on the causes of this “hook”?  How might it compare to Western companies that are under pressure by their management to file more patents?  Do you think it has any correlation with patent quality? Are there comparisons to be made with other countries?

Written by Mark Cohen with the assistance of Jae Zhou, 2L at Fordham Law.

 

China’s First Overseas Patent Filer?

Dr. Jin Fuey Moy (梅振魁; Mei Zhenkui, 1862-1924) was not principally an inventor, and his 1908 patent on an enhanced nutcracker for chestnuts  (“Attachment for Nutcrackers”, USPN 883,538) is in fact, the only thing he is known to have patented. He filed for patent protection for the same invention in Canada. Like many men from Taishan County (Toisan) in Guangdong Province, he came to the United States to seek his fortune and never returned to China. Following his elder brothers, he emigrated in 1875, making his way to New York, where he became a domestic servant and was baptized a Christian. Through the beneficence of some well-to-do Methodists who foresaw a missionary career for him, he was sent to New Jersey’s Pennington Seminary and then to Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia. He earned his M.D. degree in 1890, the first Chinese to graduate from the school, and one of the first to become a physician in the United States.

In addition to working as a doctor, Moy made his living as an interpreter. He worked for the U.S. Immigration Bureau until he was discharged for allegedly smuggling Chinese immigrants into the United States. But he is most famous as the subject of two Supreme Court cases in which he was charged with misusing the mails to promote the illegal sale of drugs and for writing prescriptions that put heroin and morphine into the hands of drug addicts: United States v. Jin Fuey Moy,  241 U.S. 394 (1916), and Jin Fuey Moy v. United States,  254 U.S. 189 (1920).   The cases helped shape early federal efforts to regulate narcotics and, unlike his patent, are cited frequently to this day.  The Court reversed his conviction in the first case but affirmed in the second; he paid for his crimes with a two-year term in the Atlanta Penitentiary.

It is rare to see a patent, such as this (see also drawing here), which was filed in a foreign country and begins “I…. a subject of the Emperor of China.”   However, the first efforts at a patent law in China were during the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), and later at the end of the Qing Dynasty (1889).  Is it possible that there were other patents, filed within China, by “subjects of the Emperor of China.”

The total pendency on this patent appears to have been less than two years from date of application in the United States (applied July 18, 1906 and granted March 31, 1908).  We hope that the USPTO and SIPO can once again achieve this admirable record of keeping patent pendency to below two years.  The patent itself could probably be filed today in China as a utility model patent, as it consists simply of a new apparatus.  We could find no further citation to it in the USPTO database.

Dr. Moy’s biography, together with those of two of his brothers, is the subject of Three Tough Chinamen by Scott D. Seligman, which will be published in Fall, 2012 by Earnshaw Books.

This blog was prepared primarily by Scott Seligman, with some assist on patent law by Mark Cohen.

Thank you, Scott!

 

Related News:

Must Read of the Month: Subject of the Emperor Filed Enhanced Nutcracker Patent in U.S. and Canada 

Brief recap of “Patents, Trade, and Innovation in China”

Attached is the speech by USPTO Director David Kappos from the joint Fordham/George Washington University conference on IP, innovation and trade issues in China on December 13.   USPTO Director Kappos was introduced by CAFC Chief Judge Rader, himself a veteran of Chinese-IP engagement.  The speech gives a good summary of hte current state of US IP engagement with China from the perspctive of USPTO including the important work of patent cooperation with SIPO which is handled by USPTO directly.
Approximately 125 people attended the program, to discuss the full range of issues, including rule of law and IP protection, patent protection and patent prosecution, IP enforcement, trade related aspects of IP, and constructive proposals for next steps forward.   Attendees included practicing lawyers, government officials, academics, and business people.  The program was intended as a “public discussion” on IP-related issues, in order to enhance substantive engagement on IP issues iwth China.  When asked at the end whether the conference should be held again, there was a unanimous show of hands.  In order to enhance the dialogue the conference was intended as an “off the record” discussion.