A much awaited, proposed public draft revision to the Antiunfair Competition Law was released by the State Council Legislative Affairs Office on February 25, 2016. Comments are due by March 25, 2016. An open source translation is available here.
This is not an easy law to comment on, as the law combines a range of various issues to varying degrees: competition and fair trade law, trade secrets law, trade dress law, cybersquatting and enterprise name infringements, advertising regulation, bidding law, compliance/anti-bribery, network management and other areas. Strictly speaking it is not an IP law which focuses on giving individuals private rights. Rather, it is geared towards ensuring that there is fair competition in the market, as its title suggests.
A key focus for me has been on the trade secret provisions of the draft. Pertinent provisions are discussed and copied below:
“Article 9: A business operator must not carry out the following acts infringing on trade secrets:
(1) Obtaining rights holders’ trade secrets by theft, enticement, intimidation, fraud, or other improper tactics;
(2) Disclosing, using, or allowing others to use a rights holders’ trade secrets acquired by tactics provided for in the previous item;
(3) Disclosing, using, or allow others to use trade secrets in their possession, in violation of agreements or the rights holders’ demands for preserving trade secrets.
Where a third party clearly knows or should know of unlawful acts listed in the preceding paragraph, but obtains, discloses, uses or allows others to use a rights holders trade secrets, it is viewed as infringements of trade secrets.
(一)以盗窃、利诱、胁迫、欺诈或者其他不正当手段获取权利人的商业秘密;
(二)披露、使用或者允许他人使用以前项手段获取的权利人的商业秘密;
(三)违反约定或者违反权利人有关保守商业秘密的要求,披露、使用或者允许他人使用其所掌握的商业秘密。
“Trade secrets” as used in this Law refers to technological information and business information that are not publicly known, have commercial value, and are subject to corresponding secrecy measures taken by the rights holder.”
Importantly, the draft drops the earlier statutory requirement that trade secrets had to have practical applicability, a “TRIPS-minus” provision which may have had the effect of denying trade secret protection to experimental failures. The distinction between technical information and business information in this draft may also reflect other laws and government agencies some of which, like the Ministry of Science and Technology and SIPO have expressed interest in “technical trade secrets” or “service invention” compensation for trade secrets. Chinas IP courts similarly have jurisdiction over technical trade secrets, but not business confidential information.
The law also expands the scope of a covered business operator, to include natural persons, which is a positive step:
“‘Business operators’ as used in this Law refers to natural persons, legal persons or other organizations engaged in the production or trade of goods, or the provision of services. (“goods” hereinafter includes services). “(Art. 2)
The draft offers very little in the way of improving procedures for trade secret litigation. There are improvements to trade secret administrative enforcement.
“Chapter III: Supervision and Inspection
Article 15: When supervision and inspection departments investigate acts of unfair competition, they have the right to exercise the following powers of office:
(1) Enter business premises or other venues related to the conduct under investigation to conduct inspections;
(2) Question business operators under investigation, interested parties, or other entities or individuals, and request supporting materials, data, technical support or other materials relating to the acts of unfair competition;
(3) Make inquiries about, or reproduce, agreements, account books, invoices, documents, records, business correspondence, audio-visual materials or other materials relating to the acts of unfair competition;
(4) Order business operators under investigation to suspend suspected unlawful acts, to explain the source and quantity of property related to the conduct under investigation, and to not transfer, conceal or destroy that property;
(5) Carry out the sealing or seizing of property suspected to be involved with acts of unfair competition;
(6) Make inquiries into the bank accounts of business operators suspected of acts of unfair competition as well as accounting vouchers, books, statements and so forth relating to deposits;
(7) Where there is evidence of the transfer or concealment of unlawful funds, an application may be made to the judicial organs to have them frozen.
Article 16: When supervision and inspection departments are investigating acts of unfair competition, business operators under inspection, interested parties or other relevant units or individuals shall truthfully provide relevant materials or circumstances, shall cooperate with supervision and inspection departments performing duties according to law, and must not refuse or obstruct supervision and inspection.”
Although I believe most right holders seek improvements in trade secret enforcement, including more deterrent remedies, I am uncertain how much those desires extend to administrative enforcement. Transferring of relevant confidential material to an SAIC official tasked with trade secret enforcement will raise concerns of further trade secret leakage, which are probably not of equal concern in the case of administrative enforcement of, for example, trade dress infringements covered under this draft law. Moreover, the State Council has elsewhere stated that all administrative cases should be conducted ex-officio. To me administrative ex-officio enforcement of trade secrets, with authority to enter business premises to inspect and conduct investigations, is problematic.
The draft law also seeks to increase administrative fines for trade secret theft, and improve burden of proof issues:
“Article 22: Where business operators violate the provisions of Article 9 of this law, the supervision and inspection departments shall order them to cease the unlawful acts, and shall impose a fine between 100,000 and 3,000,000 RMB depending on the circumstances; where the act constitutes a crime, criminal responsibility is pursued in accordance with law.
Where the rights holders of trade secrets can prove that information used by others is substantially the same as their trade secrets and that those others had the capacity to obtain their trade secrets, those others shall bear the burden of proof to show that the information they used came from lawful sources.”
It is unclear to me from Article 22, that this “burden of proof” reversal in the second paragraph above applies to administrative enforcement or civil enforcement, or even criminal process. Moreover, the requirement of substantial similarity of the technology for the shifting to take effect, is probably too high a threshold, having been an impediment for plaintiffs in trade secret litigation in China to date.
Does this law go far enough in addressing trade secret issues in China?
Although SAIC has historically conducted many administrative trademark cases on behalf of foreigners, historically trade secret administrative enforcement has not significantly benefitted foreign companies or small enterprises. As I previously blogged:
That there were 174 trade secret cases [for 2008-2010] out of 110,896 cases involving the Law to Counter Unfair Competition, or about 0.2% of the total. In addition, the data shows that average fines were 11,624 Yuan, and only 7 cases or about 4 % of the trade secret case were referred to criminal enforcement. Like the civil system, the administrative system also appears to be frequently used to address employee theft of confidential information. Precisely one third, or 58 of these 174 cases involved individual respondents; 24 involved private companies (14%) and 23 cases involved individual businesses (13%). There were no cases where a state owned enterprise or publicly held company was named as a defendant in an administrative action.
One may question, therefore, whether this draft revision of the AUCL addresses the full range of substantive and procedural improvements that need to be made to improve trade secret enforcement in China, much of which may be more uniquely linked to trade secret protection compared to other IP rights. Moreover, many of the problems are amplified by comparison with trade dress or other provisions of this draft law.
Much of the problem with trade secret protection has been in the lack of discovery in the civil system. One significant advantage of improved trade secret administrative enforcement however could be in facilitating the transfer of information obtained in administrative investigations to civil courts or law enforcement authorities, consistent with State Council guidance on facilitating case transfers. Improving civil procedures for trade secret cases could also greatly help in civil prosecution of trade secret cases, including by making necessary changes in evidence collection, burden of proof reversals, and other areas.
The current draft appears unduly oriented to instances where trade secret theft has actually occurred. One critical area concerns the availability of relief for threatened misappropriation of trade secrets including preliminary injunctions, adoption of “inevitable disclosure” type doctrines, and evidence or asset preservation measures. Such measures can be especially important as the harm that may be caused by a misappropriation may be incapable of being compensated for by the misappropriator or beneficiary of the theft. Although revisions to China’s Civil Procedure Law now permit preliminary injunctions for trade secret theft (Eli Lilly vs. Huang Mengwei), China may wish to consider specific provisions in this law to facilitate more liberal dispensation of provisional remedies. China had specifically provided for preliminary injunctive relief in other IP laws, before the most recent Civil Procedure law amendments, and may want to consider appropriate provisions for trade secrets.
Regarding threat of trade secret law, the current law also only addresses “disclosing, using, or allowing others” to use the secret information. This deficiency could easily be remedies by including language on threat or imminent trade secret theft. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act in the United States, by comparison, specifically addresses “actual or threatened misappropriation” which may be enjoined, and also provides a remedy for trade secret inducement. The TRIPS Agreement itself clarifies that a key focus of WTO member trade secret obligations is “preventing information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices.” (emphasis added). The need for preventative measures is also reflected in TRIPS Article 41, which requires WTO members to have “expeditious remedies to prevent infringements.” In addition, inducement liability is being considered in other China IP laws (patent/copyright) and does not appear to be part of this draft. A clear definition of inducement liability may be helpful in limiting losses due to third party misappropriation of trade secrets.
China’s trade secret regime also has several other challenges, including difficult criminal thresholds; unclear relationships with labor law, labor mobility regulations, and employee non-competes; difficulties in gathering evidence; unclear divisions among the appropriate role of civil, criminal and administrative remedies; and even an emphasis on trade secret protection as an aspect of market regulation, rather than as a civil IP right, as is under consideration. Some of these deficiencies may be cured by judicial interpretation and guidance, as was previously addressed by the Supreme Peoples Court in an earlier Judicial Interpretation.
The focus on market regulation denies trade secret holders in China the ability to address infringement based on where a product that benefits from a trade secret misappropriation is sold, but instead may require litigation where the misappropriation occurred. See Siwei v. Avery Dennison (Min San Zhong Zi No. 10/2007) (Sup. People’s Ct. 2009) (China). This may also encourage foreign litigants, concerned about local protectionism or undue influence of local companies on local courts, to seek remedies elsewhere (such as through Section 337 remedies in the United States). In addition, the lack of discovery can also lead to the “exporting” of such litigation. Making these necessary procedural improvements, including improving “success rates” for domestic trade secret cases and improving procedures for gathering evidence, may also enhance China’s position that Chinese judgements in trade secret cases are entitled to res judicata effect in other jurisdictions.
Former SPC Vice President, now Chief Procurator Cao Jianming 曹建明, noted in 2005, trade secret enforcement was the area with the “greatest difficulties” for the courts . Industry has also raised concerns about many of these deficiencies. While many of the changes in the AUCL on trade secret protection are positive, a more comprehensive approach could require reforms in other areas, including the practices of law enforcement and the courts, administrative law reform, civil law reform, and/or a stand-alone trade secret law.
My personal estimation: the AUCL draft is a beginning and not an end in the trade secret reform process.
Categories: Administrative enforcement, AUCL, China IPR, civil code, Civil Enforcement, Criminal enforcement, Discovery, Eli Lilly vs. Huang Mengwei, Legislation, Preliminary Injunction, Preliminary Injunctions, Res Judicata, SAIC, State Council Legislative Affairs Office, trade dress, Trade Secret, Trade Secrets, TRIPS, UTSA, 反不公平竞争法, 曹建明